THE NEW A^IERICAN NAVY 




Drawn by Henry Kfiitinlalil 

ADMIRAL DEWEY ON THE FOREBRIDCiE OF THE OLYMPIA 
DURING THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 



THE NEW 
AMERICAN NAVY 



BY 



JOHN D. LONG 

SECRKTARY OF THE NAVY 

1897-1902 



ILLUSTRATED WITH DRAWINGS RY HENRY 
REUTERDAHL AND WITH PHOTOGRAPHS 



Volume I 




NEW YORK 

THE OUTLOOK COMPANY 

1903 



V.^"T 



THt- 







V 



COPYRIGHT, 1903, BY THE OUTLOOK COMPANY 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



Published November, IQ03 



PREFACE 

Since the war with Spain our navy has stead- 
ily strengthened the hold which it already had on 
popular sentiment. Its brilhant record at that 
time, its substantial consummation of the war by 
the unprecedented thorougliness of its victories 
at Manila and Santiago, the clean and creditable 
conduct of its commissioned and civilian officials 
in charge of its business affairs, and the neces- 
sity of its expanded equipment and service by 
reason of om* added insular possessions, have 
stimulated the feelmg of national mterest m it 
and dependence on it. These have also led to 
most generous appropriations by successive con- 
gresses for its continued increase in officers and 
men, m ships, and in all the facilities of naval 
construction. The object of this volume is to 
give mformation as to the start and progress of 
this increase, the development into what is now 
called the New IS^avy, as well as to tell of its 
recent exploits. 

With this purpose there has been an attempt 
not so much to make a picturesque story as to 



vi PREFACE 

give an idea of the work done in the last half- 
dozen presidential terms by earnest members of 
Congress, by successive secretaries of the navy, 
by naval oflScers and seamen ; also of the many 
arts that enter into the construction, armament, 
and equipment of our men-of-war; of the organ- 
ization and administration of the various bureaus 
of the Navy Department, the great busy navy- 
yards, and the steadily bettering Hfe of all on 
shipboard; and of the achievements by which 
officers and enhsted men have added so much 
luster to the already shining record of the Amer- 
ican navy. My regret is that in referring to 
some of these achievements in connection with 
recent naval operations, I have omitted so many. 
But where merit has been the rule, it is impossible 
to mention every desert unless almost every name 
on the roll and action on the record be specified. 
Yery likely a sailorman would better treat all 
these topics than a civilian. The latter, however, 
is so far disinterested that his praise cannot be 
charged to bias in favor of his own caUing. 
As Secretary of the Navy from the fifth of 
March, 1897, to the first of May, 1902, I had an 
opportunity to be impressed by the fine spirit, the 
loyal, patriotic impulse, the scientific and mechan- 
ical attainments, the courage, devotion, and ser- 
vice of the men of the navy. These qualities, 



PREFACE vii 

and not the frictions, foibles, and faults which 
are a part of all human nature, have given them 
their notably high character. Associated with 
them I felt their tremendous power as a mighty 
arm upholding the honor of the country; retired 
from that association I regard them with midi- 
mmished admiration and confidence. 

JOHN D. LONG. 
HiNGHAM, Mass., July 15th, 1903. 



CONTENTS 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 

Nucleus of the New American Navy — Inefficiency of 
Spain's navy in the war with the United States — 
Lesson of the need of preparedness taught by our 
naval history — The navy at the beginning of the 
Civil "War — Damage to our merchant marine in- 
flicted during the Civil AVar — Reduction of naval 
force at the end of the Rebellion — Virginius affair 
exhibits our naval weakness — Geographical situa- 
tion of the United States as affecting our naval policy 
— Value of steam for war purposes first recognized 
by the United States — Ericsson — Iron ships — Ar- 
mored ships — Contest between guns and armor — 
Merrimac and Monitor — Their combat an epoch- 
making one — Steel ships — Rapid changes in naval 
construction an excuse for Congressional inaction in 
providing for new men-of-war — Secretary Robeson's 
policy — The navy in 1879 — Law of 1883 limiting 
repairs — Birth of the New Navy — Secretary Hunt's 
recommendations — Naval Advisory Board and its 
recommendations — Effect of naval construction on 
steel industry — Naval Committee's report, and Con- 
gressional action thereon resulting in building of 
first ships of the New Navy ■ 1-25 

II 

BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 

Uncertainty in the early 80's as to motive power and mar 
terial to be used in the new ships — Navy-yards ill 



CONTENTS 

equipped for shipbuilding — Europe then in advance 
of the United States in naval science — Comparative 
expenditures by Europe and the United States — Con- 
tempt of foreign nations for our navy — Second Naval 
Advisory Board and its work — Twin screws opposed 
and then adopted — Sail vejsus steam power — Lack of 
cooperation between bui'eaus and board — Secretary 
Chandler's report — Contract awarded to John Roach 
— Criticisms on the new vessels — The White Squad- 
ron — Additional ships — Career of the Charleston — 
New types of men-of-war — Modern ordnance and 
torpedoes — Our pioneer torpedo-boat, the Cushing — 
The Vesuvius — Armored ships necessary — Armor 
and its manufacture in the United States — Congress 
endeavors to secure lower prices — Guns and armor — 
Battle-ships authorized — Vessels comprised in the 
New Navy — Their cost — Navy-yards — Private ship- 
yards — Improved standards of manufacture a result 
of the construction of the New Navy 26-59 



m 

THE ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION OF THE NAVY 

Importance of personnel to an efficient navy — The les- 
son of the SjDanish Armada — Examjiles from our 
own naval history — The old-time man-of-war's man 

— The new mechanic-sailor — A modern naval officer's 
duties — Personnel of the New Navy — Of the old — 
The midshipman's trials — Early schools for naval 
training — Professor Chauvenet and Secretary Ban- 
croft — The Naval Academy — Its reconstruction — 
The naval war college — The engineer service — The 
line and staff controversy — The reorganization law 

— Foreigners in the sei'vice — Apprentices and the 
Americanization of the navy — Training-schools for 

new duties — The marine corps 60-95 



CONTENTS xi 

IV 

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVT 

The man at the desk — The forgotten men who make 
our victories sure — Early officials and their faithful 
siibordinates — Our debt to bureau chiefs in the 
Civil and Spanish wars — Functions of the Navy De- 
partment — Its early history — Xaval commissioners 

— Maury's criticisms — Reorganization — The bu- 
reau system — Scandals and abuses in the old navy 

— Secretary Whitney's reforms — Continued by Sec- 
retary Tracy and his successors — Navy-yard reor- 
ganization — Lack of docking facilities — New docks 

— The bureau system's disadvantages — Recommen- 
dations for its improvement — The Naval Obser- 
vatory — The Board of Construction — A general 

staff 96-124 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

Cuba's struggle for freedom — Our sympathy — Presi- 
dent Cleveland's action — President McKinley's policy 
toward Spain — Action by the Senate — Spain's re- 
concentration policy causes protest by the President — 
American help for starving Cubans — General Wood- 
ford's offer to Spain and its result — The Maine sent 
to Havana — The De Lome incident — The destruc- 
tion of the Maine — The Court of Inquiry and its 
verdict — The crisis precipitated — Preparations for 
war — The squadrons mobilized — Congress appro- 
priates fifty millions " For the National Defense " — 
Purchase of foreign men-of-war — Improvised war- 
ships — Their equipment — The enlistment of crews 



xii CONTENTS 

— The naval militia — The Naval War Board — The 

New Navy ready for war 125-164 

VI 

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAT 

Spain's colonies a source of weakness — The Navy De- 
partment plans to strike the vulnerable point — The 
Philippine Islands and the attack by the New Navy — 
Preparations in advance of the war — The Spanish 
defenses — Our Asiatic Squadron — Dewey and his 
captains — Dewey's instructions and preparations — 
He is told to strike — The Philippine captain- 
general's proclamation — Dewey's problem — Mon- 
tojo's fleet — Dewey sails for Manila — Forcing the 
channel — The first shot — " You may fire when 
you 're ready, Gridley ! " — The destruction of the 
Spanish squadron — Attack on the shore defenses — 
• The good news comes to Washington — Results of 

the battle 165-200 

vn 

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA AND ITS EFFECT 

Cuba's independence recognized — Diplomatic relations 
severed — The plan of campaign — Admiral Cervera 
on Spain's most effective defense — Cuba the first 
scene of naval endeavor — Plans for American de- 
fense against possible attack by the Spanish fleet — 
Our squadrons — Sampson and Schley in command — 
The captains of the fleet — List of vessels that 
served during the war — Spain's fleet — The Presi- 
dent's proclamation of blockade — Objects of the 
blockade — Havana not to be attacked — The block- 
ade from a foreign point of view — Captain Jacob- 
sen's description of Havana in war time — Portugal's 
attitude in the conflict 201-238 



CONTENTS 



VIII 

THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET AND SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT 
TO SANTIAGO 

Cervera arrives at Martinique — Confidence of the navy 
as to the final result — Sampson bombards San Juan, 
Porto Rico — Speculation as to Cervera's destination 
— Views of Cervera's chief of staff — Movements of 
our naval scouts — Position of the fighting ships — 
The Flying Squadron sent to Cienfuegos — Samp- 
son's plans of battle — Schley's lack of dispatch — 
The Spanish squadron enters Santiago Harbor — 
Schley ordered to Santiago — His delay — The de- 
partment's anxiety — An urgent dispatch — Cervera's 
plan to leave Santiago — Schley sails for Santiago, 
but tui'DS back — His infelicitous message to the de- 
partment — The coal situation — Schley's excuses — 
He finally arrives at Santiago — His attack at long 
range — Sampson's blockade of the Spanish fleet — 
The Schley Court of Inquii-y and its verdict . . . 239-287 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
VOLUME I 

PAGE 

Admiral Dewey on the Forebridge of the Olympia 
DURING THE Battle OF MANILA Bay .... Frontispiece 

Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl 

Hon. W. H. Hunt 15 

Secretary of the Navy under President Garfield 
Photograph by Clinedinst 

Hon. William E. Chandler 21 

Secretary of the Navy under President Arthur 
Photograph by Clinedinst 

The White Squadron at Sea 24 

Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl 

The Late Rear-Admiral Robert AV. Shufeldt .... 29 
President of the Second Naval Advisory Board in 1882 
Photograph by C. M. Bells 

Rear- Admiral Francis Tiffany Bowles 31 

Secretary of the Second Naval Advisory Board, recently Chief Con- 
structor of the Navy 
Photograph by Prince 

Hon. William C. Whitney 38 

Secretary of the Navy 1885-1889 
Photograph by C. M. Bell 

Coast-defense Monitor Amphitrite 45 

Photograph copyright 1900 by E. Muller 

Casting Armor-plate : Tapping the Furnace ... .47 

Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl 

Hon. H. a. Herbert 49 

Secretary of the Navy, 189^-1897 



XVI 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



Hon. Benjamin F. Tracy S3 

Secretary of the Navy, 1889-1893 
Battle-ship Oregon in Dry Dock 57 

Photograph by E. MiUler 

The Training-ship Hartford weathering a Gale in the 
North Sea 61 

Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl 

Rear-Admiral Arent Schuyler Crowninshield .... 65 

Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and a Member of the Naval 

War Board during the war 
Photograph by Gessford 

Rear-Admiral Charles O'Neil 68 

Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance during the war 

Photograph by O. Johnson 

Paymaster General Edwin Stewart 72 

Photograph by Stalee 

Rear-Admiral Philip Hichborn 76 

Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repairs during the war 
Photograph copyright 1902 by J. E. Purdy & Co. 

Captain Willard Herbert Brownson 79 

Present Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy 
Photograph by E. Muller 

Rear-Admiral George Wallace Melville 83 

Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering during the war 
Photograph by Henry Hoyt Moore 

Rear-Admiral William Knickerbocker Van Reypen . . 87 
Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery during the war 

Photograph by Clinedinst 

Training-ship Hartford 90 

Photograph by E. Muller 

Officers and Crew of the Training-ship Hartford . . 94 

Photograph copyright 1902 by E. Muller 

Rear-Admiral Mordecai P. Endicott 101 

Now Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks 
Captain Samuel Conrad Lemly, Judge Advocate Gen- 
eral IOj 

Rear-Admiral Royal Bird Bradford 109 

Chief of the Bureau of Equipment during the war 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xvii 

Major-General Charles Heywood, U. S. M. C 112 

Photograph by Rice 

Docking a War-ship 115 

The cruiser Brooklyn entering the dry-dock at the Brooklyn Navy- 
Yard 
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl 

Hon. John D. Long 117 

Secretary of the Navy 1897-1902 
Photograph copyright by J. E. Purdy & Co. 

Navy Department Building, Washington 120 

Photograph by Henry Hoyt Moore 

Hon. William H. Moody 123 

Secretary of the Navy since May 1, 1902 

Photograph by Henry Hoyt Moore 

Wig-wag Drill by the Signal Corps 126 

Photograph by E. Muller 

Rear-Admiral Frederick Rodgers 130 

President of the board for inspecting newly acquired war-ships 

during the war 
Photograph by J. E. Purdy & Co. 

The Old Battle-ship Maine 135 

Copyright 1807 by A. Loeffler 

Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee 140 

In command of the battle-ship Maine when she was blown up in 
Havana Harbor, and of the cruiser St. Paul during the war 

Photograpli by HoUiuger 

Battle-ship Texas 148 

Photograph by E. Muller 

Hospital-ship Solace 157 

Photograph copyright by E. Muller 

Admiral George Dewey 167 

Photograph copyright 1809 by F. B. Johnston 

Cruiser Olympia 174 

Photograph copyright 1901 by E. Muller 

The Late Captain Charles V. Gridley 180 

In command of the cruiser Olympia at the battle of Manila Bay 
Cruiser Raleigh 185 

Photograph copjTight 1903 by E. Muller 



xviii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

The Battle of Manila Bay 192 

The crew of the Reina Christina escaping from the burning ship 
Drawn by Henry Reuterdahl 

Early Morning on the Blockade 205 

Drawn by Henry Reuterdalil 

Battle-ship Massachusetts 210 

Photograph copyright 1900 by E. Muller 

Rear-Admiral John Adams Howell 213 

Commander of the Northern Patrol Squadron during the war with 

Spain 
Photograph by C. M. Gilbert 

Rear-Admiral George Collier Remey 218 

Commandant of the naval base at Key West during the war 
Photograph by Rice 

Admiral Cervera 225 

Rear-Admiral John Crittenden Watson 233 

Photograph copyright 1898 by F. Gutekimst 

The Late Rear-Admiral William Thomas Sampson . . 240 
In command of the North Atlantic Squadron during the war 
Photograph by HolUnger 

Rear-Admiral Robley Dunglison Evans 250 

In command of the battle-ship Iowa during the war 
Photograph by Gessford 

Rear-Admiral Winfield Scott Schley 255 

In command of the Flying Squadron during the war 
Photograph by Bachrach & Bro. 

Cruiser Brooklyn 263 

Passing under the Brooklyn Bridge 

Photograph copyright 1901 by E. Muller 

Cruiser New York 275 

Photograph copyright by E. Muller 

MAPS 

Chart showing the course of the United States fleet under Com- 
modore Dewey and the position of the Spanish fleet under 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xix 

Admiral Montojo during the battle of Manila Bay, May 3, 
1898. With a chart showing the course of Commodore 
Dewey's Heet from Hongkong to Manila Bay 193 

Daily positions of the Spanish S(inaclr()n under Admiral Cervera 
from April 9, 1898, to July 3, 1898 242 

Chart showing daily positions of fleet in campaign against Span- 
ish Squadron under Admiral Cervera from May 15, 1898, to 
July 3, 1898 262 



THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 

The Forty-seventh Congress, diuing its ses- 
sions of 1881-82 and 1882-83, authorized the con- 
struction of three steel cruisers and one steel 
dispatch boat. These ships were the nucleus of 
the ^ew American Navy, the development of 
wliich in peace has potently aided the upbuild- 
ing of numerous industries of the nation, and the 
achievements of which in war rival in glory and 
results those for wliich the Old ^N'avy is justly 
famous. 

Spain suffered crushing defeat in 1898 because 
she was not ready and because the United States 
— comparatively only — was ready for the com- 
bat. Before the shock of conflict, the former's 
fleets appeared formidable in comparison with 
our own. The battles of Manila and Santiago, 
and the futile efforts of Spain to form a squadi'on 



2 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

strong enough to effect the relief of her ultrama- 
rine dependencies, showed that her sea force was 
practically in a state of weakness and inefficiency. 
Fortunately for us, the pitiable decrepitude exist- 
ing sixteen years prior to the recent test of the 
naval arm of our government had aroused the 
country, and regeneration had followed the awak- 
ening. Yictory over the foe of 1898 must be 
attributed, therefore, in some measure to the 
patriots who foresaw their comitry's need and 
with characteristic energy and push took mea- 
sures which enabled her to meet it. 

The lesson of the need of preparedness is 
taught by our whole naval history. No war has 
found the American navy fully prepared to un- 
dergo its test; but that with Spam clearly de- 
monstrated that never before in our history was 
the service on the whole in so efficient a condi- 
tion. The Declaration of Independence brought 
troops and men-of-war into bemg, but when the 
object of the Revolution had been achieved they 
disappeared, and a peace-loving people resumed 
the ways of peace. Depredations committed by 
Algerian corsairs and burdens imposed upon 
^ American commerce and other disputes which 
imperiled our relations with Great Britain and 
France in the closing years of the eighteenth 
century forced the creation of a navy. The Con- 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 3 

stitntion, — clear Old Ironsides, — the Constella- 
tion, the Essex, the Enterprise, and other frigates 
and sloops of war, which were the first impos- 
ing naval guardians of American honor, taught 
wholesome respect for the flag in the West In- 
dies and the piratical Mediterranean ; and in the 
second war with Great Britain, due among other 
causes to British impressment of American sea- 
men, they saved the nation by victories afloat 
which offset defeats ashore. Both in the war 
of the Eevolution and of 1812, however, our pri- 
vateers, the scourge of British commerce, were 
not the least factors in oui' success. The war 
with Mexico, caused by lust of territory, and yet, 
as so often happens, resulting in the development 
of beneficent territorial enlargement, involved 
no struggle for sea supremacy ; but had the 
United States become simultaneously involved 
in hostilities with either Great Britain or France, 
as was apprehended, the navy would have expe- 
rienced grave difficulty in protecting the Atlantic 
and Gulf coasts, and lending assistance to the 
army operating in Mexico. Later, the rumbhngs 
of the Civil "War preceded the lightning flashes 
of that titanic struggle, and though Mr. Toucey, 
Secretary of the ^avy in Buchanan's administra- 
tion, urgently advised the addition of improved 
ships, Congress failed to act. Had the Federal 



4 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Government been possessed of a fleet equipped 
with the latest appliances even in that day avail- 
able for service, the firing on the flag at Sumter 
would have been the signal for the institution of 
an effective patrol of the coasts of the seceding 
States; shipments of cotton abroad and the im- 
portation in return of munitions of war would 
have been minimized, and the Rebellion would 
have been suppressed in a shorter time than the 
unprepared condition of the Korth necessitated. 
Maintenance of the Union and prevention of for- 
eign complications required the construction of 
a TlIRyj capable of blockading the numerous ports 
of the Confederacy. War-ships were impro- 
vised, but at a terrible cost to the merchant ma- 
rine. Prior to the Civil War, two thirds of the 
foreign trade of the United States was carried 
in ships flying the Stars and Stripes. Our ship- 
ping represented 5,350,000 tons, which was val- 
ued at $275,000,000. The extraordinary charac- 
ter of the emergency demanded that much of 
this tonnage should be impressed into the naval 
and military services. One million eight him- 
dred thousand tons were taken, and one hundred 
million dollars withdrawn from the capital em- 
barked in the shipping industry. The Alabama, 
the Confederate tiger of the sea, destroyed one 
hundred thousand tons of shipping, and caused 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 5 

the o^\nicrs of vessels to seek foreigii registries 
or tie tlieir craft to the dock rather than send 
them improtected on voyages which were likely 
to end in the prize court or destruction by fire 
at sea. Foreign shij^s and foreign capital eagerly 
entered the mdustry which the United States 
was comi^elled to abandon. From the damage 
inflicted upon our merchant marine during the 
Ci\nl War there has been, as yet, no full recov- 
ery ; and the stupendous increase in our foreign 
trade is the more remarkable in view of the fact 
that it has been effected in spite of the disad- 
vantage of its conveyance in ships flying the 
flags of other nations than our own. 

In the hght of the teacliings of almost a hmi- 
dred years it seems strange that the country 
should not have realized, when the RebeUion 
ended, the necessity of a permanent navy of suf- 
ficient strengih adequately to protect American 
interests. American men-of-war had aided in 
the impetus to the European movements for 
more liberal government. They had served as 
the agent of civilization in aiding in the suppres- 
sion of piracy and the slave trade. They had 
protected commerce by the display of the flag in 
distant lands. The institution of hydrographic 
research and the surveys of the highways of 
the oceans and coasts of our own and friendly 



6 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

countries had facilitated trade expansion. The 
inadequacy of their number at the outbreak of 
the RebelHon was responsible for the practical 
annihilation of the merchant marine ; but when 
a large fl-eet was gathered they nobly did their 
share of the exhaustmg work which the preser- 
vation of the Union imposed. 

A reduction of the naval force when the Re- 
belhon terminated was then inevitable, for an 
unmihtary people hke the United States was 
conscious of no desire or need for immense fleets. 
To cope with the tremendous task which the 
Rebellion set the IS[oi"th, Secretary of the I^avy 
Welles constructed or began the construction of 
208 war-vessels and purchased 418 shij^s of the 
merchant marine. An inventory of the navy 
when hostilities ceased showed that most of these 
ships were imfit for war purposes, because of 
the use of miseasoned timber, of structural de- 
fects, or of hasty construction, and they were 
sold. Some of the best ships were, however, 
wisely retained. But the nation was eager to 
lay aside its arms and tm^n to the solution of the 
problem of reconstruction and the development 
of its internal resources. It was enough that 
when ships were needed they had been acquired. 
Appropriations were voted to some extent for 
maintenance, but not for increase. ISlov, at a 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 7 

time when a nn\j could be rendered obsolete by 
the invention of an improvement in an instrument 
of war, was the policy without some justification 
from an economical point of view, though involv- 
ing a good deal of risk to a country the foreign 
trade of which had begmi to recover from the 
injuries war had dealt it, and the contact of which 
with foreign nations fiu-nished many points of 
friction. The Alabama claims were a fruitful 
source of contention with Great Britain. The 
Virguiius affair ahnost precipitated war wdth 
Spain and caused the mobilization in southern 
waters of a fleet which consisted in great part of 
antiquated and rotting ships and gave no promise 
of the splendid possibilities of the magnificent 
squadi'on assembled at Key West a quarter of a 
century later for its now historic dash on Cuba. 
The revolution in Cuba known as the Ten Years' 
War caused great injury to American Uf e, Amer- 
ican property, and American trade, and there 
prevailed in this coimtry, to Spain's intense in- 
dignation, that keen sympathy for the rebels 
which om* people are always inclined to extend 
to a people stri\nng to be free. The lack of an 
efficient na^^ also caused some embarrassment 
in dealing with French pretensions m connection 
with the Panama Canal. 

Geographical situation has been and is a 



8 THE NEW AIVIERICAN NAVY 

strategic advantage of the greatest importance 
to the United States. Our compact coast Kne and 
absence of interest in foreign waters caused the 
early naval builders of our comitry to decide not 
to imitate Great Britain and France in the con- 
struction of large and costly fleets, but to assem- 
ble a force which should comprise ships of the 
very best types in their respective classes. This 
pohcy produced results dear to every patriotic 
heart. By their \dctories, American frigates 
proved their superiority in saihng quaUties and 
armament. To the United States belongs the 
credit of first recognizing the value of steam for 
war purj)oses, and, in spite of strenuous opposi- 
tion, war-ships proi3elled by this new motive 
power were added to the navy. 

A voluntary exile from his native comitry, and 
finding England inhospitable to his inventions, 
Ericsson came to the United States and produced 
the first effective screw-propeller man-of-war — 
the Princeton. "With her machinery below the 
water line, and consequently safe from an ene- 
my's fire, the Princeton marked a long step in 
advance in naval construction. The nations of 
Europe, as they had done before, followed Amer- 
ica's lead. Great Britain discarded her wooden 
sailing ships and constructed a fleet of wooden 
steamers. The heat of the boilers and engines 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 9 

caused dry rot, and many of the ships were worn 
out after three years' service. The "wooden 
walls of England " were tottering. Then came 
the iron ship, with its power of resistance to the 
gun in use, and Great Britain hastened to pro- 
vide herself Avith this latest type of naval devel- 
opment. But the machinery required for the 
propulsion of these awkward craft occupied so 
much space that the amount of coal which their 
bunkers accommodated was sufficient for only 
six days' steaming. The restless spirit of inven- 
tion produced the compomid engme, which was 
compact, consumed comparatively little coal, and 
was capable of driving a ship at the same speed 
with greater economy. The armored ship, a 
slightly earlier advance in naval construction, 
was a device of the American genius of war, but ^t 
the French were the first to show its practical 
value. The need of this type of craft was de- 
monstrated by the Ericsson wrought-iron gun 
and by the battle of Sinope, in which Kussian 
ships, using explosive shells, set on fire and de- 
stroyed a Turkish squadi'on which fu-ed only 
sohd shot. In the Crimean War France sent 
floating batteries, protected by four and one half 
inches of iron, against the Russian forts at Kin- 
burn. Though hulled repeatedly, the vessels 
sustained no damage except shght dents in their 



10 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

stout metal plates. Having developed armor 
which could resist the gun, attention was in turn 
given to the construction of a gun which could 
perforate the armor. The thickness of the plates 
was increased. The caliber of the gun kept pace 
with it. Soon the weight of the armor was so 
great that the ships became unwieldy. The gun 
was transformed from a smooth-bore into a rifled 
weapon, by this means giving higher velocity, a 
flatter trajectory, and greater accuracy to the 
heavier projectile — essential requisites of pene- 
tration. Rapidity of fire Avas obtained by the 
introduction of the breech-loading system. The 
gun retained the advantage, but its superiority 
only emphasized the necessity of protection. 

The gun was still in the muzzle-loading stage 
in the United States navy when the first battle 
of iron ship against iron ship occurred. The 
Merrimac and the Monitor were the contestants 
in this historic struggle. It was a duel of prime 
national importance. From an international 
point of view, however, it possessed far greater 
significance. Before the appearance of the Mon- 
itor, the Merrimac had destroyed the Congress 
and the Cumberland, and had by her victory de- 
monstrated that the era of the wooden sailing 
ship had closed and the era of ironclad steamers 
had begun. The action with the Monitor showed 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 11 

that ironclad must fight ironclad in order to retain 
physical equality. These astounding conclusions 
forced the immediate construction by Europe of 
new and more powerful navies. Commenting 
editorially ujion the effect of the battle, the Lon- 
don '' Times" said: — 

"Whereas we [Great Britain] had available for immedi- 
ate service 149 first-class war-ships, we now have two, 
these two being the Warrior and her sister the Ironsides. 
There is now not a ship in the Enghsh Navy apart from 
these two that it would not be madness to trust to an 
engagement with that little Monitor. 

Iron is the Unk between wood and steel in 
naval construction; its quick passage from use 
as the material for the construction of hulls and 
the protection of ships Avas due to the develop- 
ment of the gun and the demonstrated superior- 
ity of steel. The latter metal possesses greater 
tensile strength and ductility, and furnishes in- 
creased immunity from damage by gromiding or 
colhsion. A competitive test of iron and steel 
plates at Spezzia, Italy, proved that steel was 
the future metal of ship protection. 

Improvement had succeeded improvement with 
such bewildering rapidity as to provoke grave 
doubts and the widest difference of opinion 
among American naval experts. This was one 
of the important reasons for the failure of Con- 



12 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

gress to appropriate money for new men-of-war 
even when the country was confronted with the 
danger of stramed relations with Great Britain, 
Spain, and France. The diverse views which 
were expressed formed the basis for humorous 
criticism in the House of Eepresentatives when 
the question of authorizmg the first ships of the 
New IS'avy was mider discussion. Eepresentative 
Belford, of Colorado, remarked that the debate 
reminded him of a sermon he once heard dehv- 
ered by a distinguished African preacher. 

"'Brethren,' began the minister, 'we have 
assembled here on the sacred Sabbath Day to 
discuss great and sacred questions. In the first 
place, I will proceed to discuss some matters 
about which I know a Httle and you know no- 
tliing. In the second place, I will proceed to 
discuss matters concerning which you know a 
httle and I know nothing. We will then con- 
clude with elaborate dissertations on questions 
about which none of us know anything.' " 

Mr. Belford's ridicule was not entirely de- 
served, for there were members of the House and 
many citizens who fully appreciated the utterly 
mefficient condition of the navy and who sought 
to have the remedy promptly administered. They 
had observed with grave disapproval the parsi- 
monious policy of Congress which had forced 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 13 

the Navy Dej)artment, in order to maintain its 
service, to resort to the subterfuge of rebuilding- 
men-of-war under their old names and paying 
for their construction out of the appropriation 
for " repairs " and with moneys oljtained from 
the sale of condemned ships. This action on 
the part of Mr. Robeson, Secretary of the N^avy 
in President Grant's administration, was not 
altogether without the patriotic motive of pre- 
paring for possible foreign war, but it subjected 
him to severe attack by the opposition majority 
in the House of Representatives. During the 
Hayes administration the country learned with 
dismay that our navy was inferior to that of any 
European and at least one South American 
power, and that little Chili, triumphant over 
Peru, could send her Almirante Cochrane and 
captured Huascar against San Francisco, and 
the United States would be imable to repel them. 
An examination of our navy list of 1879 shows 
that there were five steam vessels classed as first- 
rates, which had been built twenty-five years 
before and which were then obsolete and practi- 
cally useless as men-of-war; twenty-seven sec- 
ond-rates, of which three lay on the stocks, rotten 
and worthless, seven were in ordinary unfit for 
repair, and only nme were actually in condition 
for sea duty; twenty-nine third-rate steam ves- 



/ 



14 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

sels, of which fifteen only were valuable for naval 
purposes; six fourth-rate steam vessels, none of 
which was of account as a war-ship ; twenty-two 
saihng vessels, but five of which could even 
navigate the sea; twenty-four ironclads, fourteen 
of which were ready for effective service; and 
two torpedo-vessels, one of which was described 
as " rather heavy for a torpedo- vessel, not work- 
ing so handily as is desirable for that purpose," 
and the other, known as the Alarm, was in the 
experimental stage. During my administration 
the Alarm was sold as old iron. Of the one hun- 
dred and forty-two vessels which comprised the 
navy when Mr. Hayes was President, but forty- 
eight were available for immediate service and 
sixty-nine capable of carrying guns and fighting 
in defense of the country. In the entire navy 
there was not a single high-power, long-range, 
rifled gun ! Congress passed a law in 1888 pro- 
hibitmg the repairing of any wooden man-of-war 
the expense of which should be more than twenty 
per cent, of the cost of the construction of a new 
ship of the same type and displacement. The 
operation of this law caused forty-six vessels to 
be immediately dropped from the service. Con- 
gi'ess subsequently directed that no wooden ves- 
sel should be repaired when the cost of repairs 
was in excess of ten per cent. The observance 




I'liotnsxraph by Clineclinst 

II()\. W. H. HINT 

Secretary of the Navy under President Garfield 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 15 

of this policy has removed from the na'S'y list 
many of the old ships of memorable achieve- 
ments, and an examination of the register to-day 
shows the names of but a few of the mighty 
fighters of the past. Those still carried on the 
register are used as training or receiving ships. 
The double-turreted monitors Puritan, Mianto- 
nomoh. Terror, Ampliitrite, and Monadnock, re- 
constructed as a part of the New Na^y, are the 
only vessels laid down in the period of iron and 
wood which are capable of rendering effective 
service. 

The birth of the New Navy occurred in the 
administration of President Arthur. " I cannot 
too strongly m^ge upon you my conviction," he 
said m his first annual message, "that every con- 
sideration of national safety, economy, and honor 
imperatively demands a thorough rehabihtation 
of the navy." Secretary of the Navy Hunt rein- y 
forced tliis utterance by stating in his annual 
report that it was a " source of mortification to 
our officers and fellow comitrymen generally 
that our vessels of war should stand in such mean 
contrast alongside of those of other and inferior 
powers," and he asserted that the matter required 
the " prompt and earnest attention of Congress." 
Tw^o months later Secretary Hunt made a still 
stronger appeal to the House Naval Committee. 



16 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

" The creation of a navy," he said, " is a subject 
which naturally attracts present attention, from 
the fact that our relations on the Isthmus and 
om- mterests may be said to have reached a criti- 
cal point. It seems to be the pretty well settled 
opinion of our people that we camiot afford to 
give up the right of free way across the Isthmus 
to any foreign power. It seems to be well set- 
tled that with our vast possessions on the Pa- 
cific, increasing rapidly in population as they are, 
in population and development, we should have 
some sure mode of communication across that 
Isthmus which we may call our own, and which 
we must, at least for a time, manifest the ability 
to protect. In order to afford such protection, 
the construction of the nucleus of a New IS^avy 
obviously becomes an imperative necessity." 

The comitry was ripe for the recommendations 
of the President and the Secretary of the ISTavy. 
"With a imanimity both surprising and gratifying 
to the administration, the press supported the 
recommendations, and in so doing it reflected 
the real sentiment of the people. Before mak- 
ing any suggestions for the reconstruction of the 
navy. Secretary Hunt had previously, with the 
approval of President Garfield, appointed the 
Naval Advisory Board, which was directed to 
prepare a " practical and plain statement of the 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 17 

pressing need of appropriate vessels in the ser- 
vice at the present time." This hoard comprised 
some of the ablest officers of the navy. They 
were: Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, President; 
Commodore William G. Temple, Captain P. C. 
Johnson, Captain K. R. Breeze, Commander 
H. L. Howison, Commander R. D. Evans, Com- 
mander A. S. Crowninshield, Lieutenant M. R. 
S. Mackenzie, Lieutenant Edward "W. Yery, 
Chief Engineer B. F. Isherwood, Chief Engineer 
C. A. Loring, Passed iVssistant Engineer C. H. 
Manning, Kaval Constructor John Lenthall, Na- 
val Constructor Theodore D. Wilson, and Naval 
Constructor Philip Hichborn. Credit belongs to 
this board, not only for the part it played in the 
regeneration of the navy, but for its recommen- 
dation that steel be used as the material for the 
hulls of men-of-war — a recommendation that 
facilitated the development of one of the greatest 
of American industries. 

The TinYj list of 1881 was scanned by the 
Advisory Board, and it reported that of the sixty- 
one imarmored cruising vessels composing the 
apparent effective force of the service, but thirty- 
two were available or could be made so at a cost 
low enough to warrant the expenditure. The ne- 
cessities of the country required, in the opinion of 
the board, the watchful care of seventy cruising 



V 



18 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

vessels, and it recommended that thirty-eight 
imarmored cruisers should be built. It also advo- 
cated the construction of five steel rams, five 
torpedo-gunboats, ten cruising torpedo-boats, 
and ten harbor torpedo-boats. Of the vessels of 
the cruiser type, it proposed that eighteen should 
be of steel and twenty of wood. The recom- 
mendation that steel be used for some of the pro- 
jected ships was strenuously opposed — strangely 
enough — by Naval Constructors Lenthall, Wil- 
son, and Hichborn, and Chief Engineer Isher- 
wood. The majority advocated it because of 
" the impetus that such a step would give to the 
general development of steel manufacture in this 
comitry," and " for the reputation and material 
advantage of the United States it is of prime 
necessity that in this comitry, where every other 
industry is developing with gigantic strides, a 
bold and decided step should be taken to win 
back our former prestige as the best shipbuilders 
of the world." The minority were not so opti- 
mistic as their brother officers. They m-ged that 
iron be used instead of steel because the material 
sold for steel was simply a high quality of iron 
made at greatly increased cost from cast mgots. 
The report of the minority is interesting as show- 
ing the view taken by many people of the Amer- 
ican steel industry. 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 19 

" We assume," it stated, " that the great na- 
tional vessels proj^osed are to be construeted of 
materials mannfactiired in the United States, and 
not imported from Great Britain. Before this 
material eonld l)e constructed of tliis mild steel, 
the manufacture of that material would have to 
be created in this comitry; enormous plants, at 
correspondingly great cost, would have to be ob- 
tained, and workmen would have to be educated 
to their use ; also, as there is now no demand for 
this kind of steel for shipbuilding in the United 
States, the cost of educatmg the workmen and 
creating the plant to produce it w^ould have to 
be entirely borne by the few naval vessels that 
might be constructed of it. Should mild steel 
be insisted on for the hulls of these vessels, the 
contracts for it would probably fall into the 
hands of a few middlemen or speculators, who, 
instead of ha^nng it manufactiu'ed here, would 
import it, while recei■^^ng for it an excessive 
price, based on what would be the reasonable 
cost of its manufacture here. Under these cir- 
cumstances no reasonable approximation can be 
made of the increased cost of our vessels if built 
of mild steel instead of iron, but evidently the 
increase would be very gi'eat." 

How different is the result from that antici- 
pated by the gentlemen who signed the above 



20 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

statement! At the time the report was made 
the United States ranked as the second country, 
and, it was claimed, the first, in the extent of its 
steel manufactures. Certauily to-day no nation 
in the world can compete with it in tliis industry. 
American rails may be said to gird the earth; 
American steel bridges span the rivers of Eu- 
rope, of Asia, and of South America; American 
machinery is used m every country. Li 1880 
there were 140,798 persons employed in the iron 
and steel industry of the United States. Twenty 
years later this nmnber had increased to 226,161. 
The value of the iron and steel products in 1880 
was 1296,557,685; m 1900 it was $835,759,034. 
The naA'y has played no inconsiderable part in 
the development of this gigantic industrial move- 
ment, which is another evidence of its close rela- 
tion to the development of the industrial hues of 
peace. 

The recommendation of the majority of the 
Naval Advisory Board limited the use of steel to 
eighteen vessels. The House Committee on 
N^aval Affairs went even further. Congress had 
received with every evidence of gratification the 
recommendations of the President and Secretary 
Hunt. Li the elections of 1880 the Repubhcan 
party had succeeded in wresting from the Demo- 
crats the control of the House, which the latter 




Photograph by Climdiii-t 

HON. WILLIAM E. CHANDLER 

SetTi'tiuv of tlie Niivv uinii-r I'lcsiileiit Arlliur 



h 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 21 

had held smce 1875. It is a tribute to the wis- 
dom of the party that its representatives placed 
behind them all memory of the policy of fault- 
finding with the navy, which their political 
opponents had observed, and addressed them- 
selves to the work which the coimtry considered 
so essential and to which the President had in- 
vited particular attention. One of the important 
results of the change of complexion of the House, 
so far as the navy was concerned, was the assign- 
ment of Benjamin W. Harris, of Massachusetts, 
to the chairmanship of the I^^aval Committee. 
Mr. Harris was a close student of naval affairs 
and an untiring w^orker. He had entered the 
Forty-third Congi^ess, and in the Forty-fourth, 
Forty-fifth, and Forty-sixth congresses had 
served as a member of the minority of the IS'aval 
Committee. His thorough knowledge of matters 
before it and his consequent equipment for de- 
bate caused him to become the leader of his party 
in replying to attacks upon the Eepublican 
administration of the navy. Indeed, his Demo- 
cratic colleagues on the committee worked with 
him, wiicn the control of the House passed to 
the Kepublicans, to achieve the rehabilitation of 
the service. As chairman of the committee, Mr. 
Harris labored zealously. He and other mem- 
bers of the committee made a careful investi- 



22 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

gation of the condition and needs of the navy, 
and, after the receipt of the report of the Advis- 
ory Board, conducted a special inquiry into the 
iron and steel manufacturing industry, the com- 
mercial exiDansion of the United States, and the 
shipbuilding industry. Prepared by the facts 
thus collected, the committee, in a report which 
its chairman submitted to the House in March, 
1882, announced that no maritime nation was 
less able to wage war than the United States. 
Steel was recommended " without hesitation or 
doubt " as the " only proper material for the con- 
struction of vessels of war." The committee 
was not willing to advocate the adoption of the 
entire shipbuilding programme of the Advisory 
Board, — probably on the ground that it was not 
exj^edient as a matter of parliamentary success 
to ask so much, — but urged Congress to apjDro- 
priate money for the construction of two cruisers 
capable of an average speed of fifteen knots, four 
cruisers capable of an average speed of fourteen 
knots, and one steel ram. The Advisory Board 
had recommended that five rams be authorized, but 
the committee was not disposed to advocate the 
building of more than one, because it considered 
the type experimental. The failure of the Ka- 
tahdin, the name given to the ram built, furnishes 
evidence of the excellent judgment of the com- 
mittee. 



TIIE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 23 

Congress was not even prepared to go to the 
extent in increase advocated by the committee. 
The Act of August 5, 1882 (the Hon. WilHam 
E. Chandler having then become Secretary of 
the Kavy), which act may be said to be the mea- 
sure which brought the 'Ne^y Na\y into exist- 
ence, provided for only " two steam cruising 
vessels of war ... to be constructed of steel of 
domestic manufacture . . . said vessels to be 
provided with full sail power and full steam 
power. One of said vessels shall be of not less 
than five thousand nor more than six thousand 
tons displacement, and shall have the highest at- 
tainable sj^eed ; . . . one of said vessels shall be 
of not less than four thousand three hmidred 
nor more than fom* thousand tons disjilacement." 
No appropriation was made for carryuig this act 
into effect, and, besides, what is known as the 
Second Naval Advisory Board, organized in ac- 
cordance with another provision of the same law, 
recommended that the larger ship be not built, 
on the ground that such a vessel was not then 
necessary, and that it would be advisable to 
begin the New Na^^ with shijis of moderate 
tonnage. The board suggested that Congress 
authorize the construction of five vessels — one 
of about 4000 tons, and three of about 2500 
tons, to be built of steel, and one iron dispatch- 



24 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

boat of about 1500 tons. At the second ses- 
sion of the Forty-seventh Congress an act was 
passed, approved March 8, 1883, which ^Drovided 
for the construction of the several vessels recom- 
mended by the board, with the exception of one 
of the medium-sized steel cruisers. That Con- 
gress fully intended that the private enterprises 
of the comitry interested in ship construction 
should participate in the industrial advantages 
connected with the building of the l!^ew Navy is 
shown by the provision in the act of authoriza- 
tion that the Secretary of the Navy " shall mvite 
proposals from all American shipbuilders whose 
shipyards are fully equipped for building or 
repairing iron or steel steamships, and construct- 
ors of marine engines, machinery, and boilers." 
The ships constructed mider this act were 
the Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and Dolphin. In 
the war with Spain the Chicago and Atlanta 
were undergoing repairs; the Boston partici- 
pated with other ships of Dewey's command in 
effecting the destruction of Spanish power in the 
Far East ; and the Dolphin performed blockade 
service in Cuban waters. These vessels exer- 
cised, however, a far more important mfluence 
than that growing out of participation in war. 
Their construction entirely of American mate- 
rial furnished employment for hundreds of men 



THE BIRTH OF THE NEW NAVY 25 

and distributed several millions of dollars among 
the people. Furthermore, they marked the re- 
sumption of the old policy of the United States 
of providing itself with the best weapons of 
defense, and gave commerce practical assurance 
of protection in its future operations and ex- 
ploitation, and American citizens promise of 
defense of their lives and interests in foreign 
lands. At the time of their completion there 
had been a change in the political administration, 
and one of the least creditable acts of the first 
Cleveland administration was its mijust dej^recia- 
tion of some of them — a depreciation which, by 
their splendid record of long and efficient ser- 
vice, has been shown to be utterly unfomided or 
founded only on mistaken partisanship. 

The New American Navy — a lusty yomig- 
ster — was born. 



n 

BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 

The 'New Navy of the United States was 
launched in the waters of uncertainty. The 
training of centuries had bred a reliance on wind 
as the motive power for ships which forty years 
of experience with steam had not dispelled. 
Though steel had been adopted for the hulls of 
merchant steamers and parts of war-ships con- 
structed abroad, there was apprehension whether 
plates of sufficient tensile strength and ductility 
could be manufactured in the United States. 
Besides, the cost of steel and its propensity to 
corrode and foul in salt water were objections 
urged against its use for men-of-war. The 
country was pitifully lacking in large private 
shij)yards, and it was asserted that there would 
be no real competition between shipbuilders. 

Under the practice of a century, navy-yards 
were regarded as the proper places to construct 
vessels, though it was recognized that those 
existing were ill equipped with tools for working 
in steel, and that political corruption and favor- 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 27 

itism lloiirislied vigorously within their Hiuits. 
So deplorable was their condition in this respect 
that it was charged, with some show of truth, 
that, instead of being maintained for the sake 
of the ships, the ships dragged out a protracted 
existence for the sake of the yards. 

When the United States laid the keels of the 
first ships of the New Navy, it was in this, as in 
ether departments of naval science, far behind 
foreign maritime nations. Europe had discov- 
ered the superior combustibility of bituminous 
coal and was equipping war-ships with furnaces 
for its use. The United States was content to 
burn anthracite, notwithstanding the inferiority 
of this variety and the known existence of bitu- 
minous coal within its borders. Attention had 
been especially given abroad to water-tight sub- 
division, drainage, ventilation, forced air drafts, 
etc. At home, beyond shght improvements in 
ventilation, no progress had been made in these 
important branches of ship construction. Our 
machinery was lamentably inferior to that in the 
navies of foreign nations. "We had not begun 
the regular use of compound engines, and were 
still building and installing old-fashioned boilers. 
Experiment and war had supplied Europe with 
rifled guns of high power. Our country had 
only reached the point of inserting rifled tubes 



28 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

in its antiquated smooth-bores. Rapid-fire guns, 
capable of penetrating the sides of any of our 
ships from a distance of two thousand yards, 
looked threateningly through the ports of Eu- 
ropean men-of-war. There were not a dozen 
of these weapons in the American navy. The 
HotchMss rapid-fire gun, which was introduced 
into foreign services, was the invention of an 
American, who, unable to induce his own gov- 
ernment to adopt it, had been compelled to ex- 
ploit it abroad. Even the renowned Ericsson, to 
whom the country was so deeply indebted, failed 
of recognition from the Navy Department, and 
at the age of eighty-three years was forced to 
turn to other governments for encouragement. 
Inventors and manufacturers were spurred to the 
achievement of greater triumphs for the benefit 
of Europe. There was no incentive in this 
country to naval development. In the seventeen 
years following the close of the Civil War, Eu- 
rope spent more than two billion dollars for the 
maintenance of her navies, and almost four hun- 
dred million dollars in their development. In 
the same period the United States expended 
three hundred million dollars, most of which was 
disbursed for maintenance, while a good share of 
the rest was wasted. Admiral David D. Porter 
expressed the European view of the United 




Photojraph by C. M. li^ 



THE LATE REAR-ADMIKAL ROBERT W. SHUFELDT 

President of the Secoiiil Naval Advisory Board in IsSi' 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 29 

States when he said that " foreign nations laugh 
at ns, and say we can neither go to war nor 
defend ourselves from attack, because we cannot 
build sliips nor make guns." This contemptuous 
attitude was due to our feeble naval condition, 
and also to our dependence upon Europe for ship 
material, — a condition that no longer exists and 
is not likely to exist again in this generation. 

Thus, while the United States was known to 
possess boundless resources, the energy and 
abihty to develop them had not yet fully mani- 
fested themselves. The country was midoubtedly 
anxious for a navy — not a large one, but an 
estabhshment built up along the lines of the old 
policy of creating the most effective ships of 
their respective classes and in sufficient numbers 
to protect expanding American interests. 

The Act of 1882, which authorized steel ships 
that were never built, provided for the organiza- 
tion of the Second Xaval Advisory Board, two 
of the members of which it specified should be 
civilian experts. The naval officers appointed on 
the board were Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, 
designated as president; Chief Engineer Alex- 
ander Henderson, Commander J. A. Howell, 
Lieutenant Edward Yery, and Naval Constructor 
F. L. Fernald. The two civilians appointed 
were Mr. Henry Steers, ship architect, and Mr. 



30 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Miers Coryell, marine engineer. Assistant Naval 
Constructor Francis T. Bowles was appointed 
secretary of the board. Commodore Shufeldt 
was an officer of wide experience not only in 
the regular naval establishment, but in the mer- 
chant marine and consular service. He had 
served on the European station, and while abroad 
had studied naval development. Upon his return 
to the United States he had been appointed 
chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruit- 
ing in the Navy Department, in which position 
he had acquired valuable information as to the 
needs of the naval service. Chief Engineer 
Henderson had had thirty years' experience with 
the machinery of the wooden and iron men-of- 
war of the navy. Commander Howell w^as a 
recognized torpedo expert. Lieutenant Yery, 
an ordnance officer of known ability, was the only 
member of the First Naval Advisory Board se- 
lected for service on the Second Naval Advisory 
Board. Naval Constructor Fernald was one of 
the leading officers of his corps. Mr. Steers 
and Mr. Coryell had both achieved high repu- 
tation in their respective professions. Mr. 
Bowles, whom I was to have the pleasure of 
recommending for appointment in 1901 as Chief 
Constructor, which position he now holds, had 
recently returned from Europe, where he had 




rhc.tu-rnpli ii.v I'ln..-.- 

REAK-ADMIKAL FKANCIS riFFAXY i;()\Vl>h> 
Secretary of the Secomi Naval Advisory BoarJ. recently Chief Constructor of the Navy 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 31 

undergone a course of instruction at the Royal 
Naval College. His modern education and the 
information he had obtained were of great service 
to the board during its preparation of the plans 
and specifications of the new ships. 

The Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, and Dolphin 
were the first ships of the New Navy. That they 
might embody the latest inventions. Congress 
directed that before contracts were placed for 
their construction " the Secretary of the Navy 
shall, by proper public advertisement and notice, 
invite all engineers and mechanics of established 
reputation and all reputable manufactm-ers of 
vessels, steam-engines, boilers, and ordnance 
having or controlling regular establishments and 
beino- enofaofed in the business, all officers of the 
ivdvj, and especially all naval constructors, steam 
engineers, and ordnance officers of the navy 
having plans, models, or designs of any vessels 
of the classes hereby authorized or of any part 
thereof, within any given period, not less than 
sixty days, to submit the same to said board." 
There was decided public interest in the compe- 
tition, but, either because the time was too 
limited or because no compensation accompanied 
success, not a complete set of designs was sub- 
mitted. Many plans of sections of a war-ship 
and of guns with which to arm the vessels were 



32 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

received, and a number of models were brought 
to the notice of the board. Examination of the 
responses made failed to show any designs of a 
novel character worthy of adoption. The de- 
partment then turned to the shipbuilders of the 
country for suggestions. 

In the mean time, the l^aval Advisory Board 
had been at work upon the important problems 
given it to solve. The question arose as to 
whether single or twin screws should be adopted 
for the ships. The fii'st vote showed the board 
unanimously in favor of the single screw. Before 
announcing the result. Commodore Shufeldt in- 
vited the youthful secretary, who had no vote, 
to state his views. 

" I am sorry I cannot agree with the judgment 
of the board," Mr. Bowles responded. "I be- 
lieve twin screws are better, and if I am given 
the time I think I can demonstrate it." 

"Without consulting his colleagues, Commodore 
Shufeldt adjourned the board, and young Bowles 
set to work to gather information and prepare as 
strong an argument for twin screws as he could 
frame. That argument carried conviction with 
it, for the board decided to provide the largest 
vessel — the Chicago — with twin screws. Sin- 
gle screws were retained for the other ships. 
The machinery of the Chicago also differed 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 33 

from the recognized naval practice, and seemed 
to be a reversion to the style used in the cele- 
brated Stevens battery of thirty years earlier 
date. The plan was prepared by Mr. Coryell, 
and it was said by a member of the board that 
it was adopted because of the unwillingness of 
the naval members to become involved in a dis- 
pute with the civilian experts, and in the belief 
that development in machinery before the au- 
thorization of additional ships would convince 
the country of the inadvisability of repeating the 
Chicago experiment. The machinery of the 
Boston, Atlanta, and Dolphin was merely a 
duplication of that which had been installed 
in wooden vessels of latest construction. 

Discussion of the method of propulsion of the 
ships involved consideration of the question of 
the sail area that should be supplied to them. 
Great difference of opinion existed on this point. 
The act of 1882 required that the vessels author- 
ized thereby should have "full sail power and 
full steam power." The act of 1883 provided 
that the ships should be constructed " as recom- 
mended by the Advisory Board." The board re- 
commended that they be equipped with only two 
thirds sail poAver. This recommendation provoked 
a storm of criticism. Mr. Steers thus described 
the conflicting views entertained in the service : — 



34 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

" A number of naval officers asked me, ' Why 
do you not give the ships more sail power? ' Said 
I, ' Yery well; we will give it. But what do you 
give up for it? Sixty tons! You get rid of sixty 
tons of coal and you take that sixty tons weight 
and put it on the spars.' A naval officer said to 
me, ' Steers, why do you not put on more sail ? 
Why do you not have a larger sail power ? ' I 
told him why. I left him, and another naval offi- 
cer of equal standing the very next moment said 
to me, * Steers, why do you put so much sail on 
these boats ; why do you not cut it down ? ' " 

The reconstruction of the na\'y demanded the 
harmonious cooperation of all the officers of the 
service. Instead, a disposition was manifested to 
place obstacles in the way. The constructing 
bureaus of the department adopted an attitude 
of antagonism toward the Advisory Board, and 
this antagonism went to the extent of open con- 
demnation of the designs after their adoption and 
work on the ships had begun. Chief Constructor 
Theodore "Wilson said the Chicago could, under 
favorable conditions, make the sea speed of four- 
teen knots required by her contract, " if her en- 
gines develop 5000 horse-power and her screws 
are properly designed. There is a very grave 
question how long she will keep it up, from 
the fact that, not being sheathed with wood and 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 35 

copper, she -will foul very quickly and her speed 
will be reduced." Mr. Wilson predicted that as 
sea-going vessels the Atlanta and Boston " will 
practically be failures." 

In spite of doubt and disagreement and the 
virulent criticism made of the plans prepared 
under the supervision of the board, William 
E. Chandler, the then Secretary of the Navy, 
adopted the recommendations of Commodore 
Shufeldt and his associates, and called for bids 
for the construction of the projected ships. The 
Chicago was designed to have a displacement of 
4500 tons, a sea speed of 14 knots, and an arma- 
ment of four 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and two 5-inch 
breech-loading rifles. The Atlanta and Boston 
were each to displace 3000 tons, to have an aver- 
age sea speed of 13 knots, and be armed with two 
8-inch and six 6-inch guns. The Dolphin was to 
be of 1500 tons, 15 knots speed, and to carry one 
6-inch gun. Secondary batteries of small guns 
were to be supplied to all the vessels. That Sec- 
retary Chandler was firmly of the belief that the 
designs would produce splendid ships is shown 
by the following extract taken from his annual 
report for 1884 : — 

They represent three main types of unarmored war- 
ships now universally considered as indispensable compo- 
nents of any fleet suitable for general national service 



36 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

upon the high seas. The Chicago is an example of the 
largest and best unarmored cruising and fighting vessel 
now built, and will have no superior in the world in the 
combination of speed, endurance, and armament. In the 
Boston and Atlanta speed and endurance have been given 
full development, while their fighting power has been not- 
ably increased by placing the battery in a central super- 
structure on the spar deck and adopting a brig rig, thereby 
leaving the extremities clear and unobstructed for fore 
and aft fire. In the Dolphin an important auxiliary in 
naval operations will be obtained, and she is expected to 
furnish an excellent model from which may be expanded 
a high-speed commerce-destroyer, instead of taking as a 
standard either the overgrown merchant-hne steamers or 
the large and expensive dispatch-vessels which have been 
built abroad, of questionable utility in time of peace. 

The bids for the new vessels were opened on 
July 2, 1883. Eight firms participated in the 
competition. The proposal of John Roach, whose 
shipyard was at Chester, Penn., was the lowest, 
and it was accepted. To the gratification of the 
department, the contract cost of the four vessels, 
excluding masts, spars, rigging, and boats, was 
only 12,440,000. This was |774,100 less than 
the estimates of the Advisory Board. ^^Tow that 
the contracts had been awarded, the pessimists 
reiterated the statement that it would be impos- 
sible to carry out the provision of the law requir- | 
ing that the vessels should be built of " steel of 
domestic manufacture, having as near as may be 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 37 

a tensile strength of not less than 60,000 pounds 
to the square inch and a ductility in 8 inches of 
not less than 25 per centum." To insure com- 
pliance with this law the Advisory Board pre- 
pared a set of strict regulations governing the 
acceptance tests of steel supplied to the navy. 
The high standard then fixed is largely respon- 
sible for the excellent reputation early gained by 
this product of American resources and skill and 
for the phenomenal growth which the industry 
has attained, so that again the naYj is to be cred- 
ited Avith one of the greatest industrial advances 
of our time. Before the construction of the 
Chicago and other vessels of her day began, steel 
was held at 81 cents per pound; it immediately 
dropped to 4^ cents ; and this reduction, as well 
as its speedily recognized merits, brought about 
its use for the many pm-poses for which it is now 
employed. 

The criticism which had torn the rotting hulls 
from the live-oak frames of the old navy, and had 
discovered flaws in the designs of the new ves- 
sels, suggested grave defects in the new ships as 
their construction progressed. Inadequate sail 
power, slow speed, the doubtful value of the ma- 
chinery of the Chicago, the absence of sheathing, 
and the peculiar shape of the Atlanta and Bos- 
ton, were the subjects of never-ending comments 



38 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

by critics of the navy. The Dolphin was de- 
nominated merely a pleasure boat without offen- 
sive or defensive power. Criticism waxed louder 
when the Dolphin, on her official trial, failed to 
attain the horse-power required by her contract, 
and structural defects were asserted by the trial 
board. "William C. Whitney, Secretary of the 
'Navy in Cleveland's administration, 1885-89, 
declined at first to accept the Dolphin, but ulti- 
mately did so. The little vessel was subjected 
to a series of severe trials ; but, in the course of 
a cruise she was directed to make, she made 
58,000 miles, and was under steam 9000 hours. 
In that entire period she was compelled to stop 
but once for repairs, which were completed in 
two hours. The unfortunate financial failure of 
John Roach in 1885 forced the government to 
take over and complete the Atlanta, Boston, and 
Chicago, and it was not until 1886 that the At- 
lanta was commissioned, and 1887 that the Bos- 
ton and Chicago entered active service. When 
the designs for these vessels were in course of 
preparation, there were but eight 16-knot vessels 
in existence. The highest speed for one hour 
attained by the Chicago was 16.35 knots; the 
Boston, 16,33 knots; and the Atlanta, 16 knots. 
For ships of their date and class they are to-day 
efficient vessels. These three shij^s, with the 




IMiotograph by C. M. B.ll 

HON. WILLIAM C. WHITNEY 

Secretary of tlie Navy 1885-188'J 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 39 

Yorktown of later date, formed the famous 
White Squadron, which twelve years ago vis- 
ited Europe and gave the maritime nations of 
that continent visual knowledge of the posses- 
sion by the United States of modern men-of- 
war. The war with Spain taught Europe that 
the navy those ships represented was able to 
destroy the war-vessels which her own yards 
had built. 

AVhile criticism raged Congress halted in the 
reconstruction of the new navy. Additional ships 
were not authorized until the session of 1884-85, 
which authorized the building of two cruisers, 
subsequently christened the Kewark and Charles- 
ton, and two gunboats named the Yorlvtown and 
Petrel. The Charleston was built upon designs 
purchased in England. The drawings for her 
enofine and boilers were a combination of features 
of the machinery of several foreign cruisers. 
Their lack of proportion and agreement necessi- 
tated many expensive changes. The Charleston 
was further criticised because she was provided 
with compound engines, when the naval practice, 
at the date of her construction, had changed to 
triple expansion, an advantage which will be ap- 
preciated when it is understood that the new type 
made possible a considerable increase in speed. 
Like her predecessors, however, the Charleston 



40 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

performed efficient service during her short life. 
Her first notable achievement was the capture of 
the steamer Itata. The Itata, which had been 
seized by the United States Marshal at San 
Diego, Cal., on suspicion of filibustering in con- 
nection with the Chilian revolution of 1891, 
escaped from his custody. Yindication of the 
majesty of American neutrality required her re- 
capture. President Harrison directed that the 
Charleston be sent to overhaul her. Under war 
conditions the cruiser speeded after the chase. 
Before the object of the voyage was accom- 
plished, she had steamed to Iquique, Chili, a dis- 
tance of more than six thousand miles. On her 
way to Manila, during the war with Sj)ain, the 
Charleston entered the harbor of Agaiia, Guam, 
and demanded the surrender of the island. The 
Spanish governor and the inhabitants were un- 
aware that the mother country was at war with 
the United States, but the frowning guns of the 
man-of-war convinced them of the fact, and sur- 
render followed. The Charleston's career was 
brought to a tragic close. While cruising off the 
north coast of Luzon in 1900, she ran on an 
uncharted reef and sank. Her officers and men, 
fortunately, succeeded in leaving the ship before 
she disappeared. A new Charleston, practically 
an armored cruiser and embodying the latest 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 41 

developments in naval science, was contracted for 
in 1901, and her characteristics give promise of 
a vessel which will make a formidable enemy in 
time of war, and an effective guardian of Ameri- 
can interests in time of peace. 

Almost two years elapsed before the actual 
construction of the Charleston, Newark, York- 
town, and Petrel began. On August 3, 1886, 
President Cleveland approved a Naval Appro- 
priation Act which must be regarded as historic, 
not only on accomit of the additional strength it 
gave to the naval arm of the government, but 
because among the number authorized was the 
ship the destruction of which was the culminating 
incident in the chain of events which led to the 
war with Spain. The act directed the building 
of the Texas, a second-class battle-ship, the 
Maine, an armored cruiser, the Baltimore, a pro- 
tected cruiser, the Vesuvius, a dynamite cruiser, 
and the Cushing, a torpedo-boat. 

Thus, new types of men-of-war were intro- 
duced mto the navy. The Texas and Maine 
were the first modem armored cruising ships 
constructed by the United States. The necessity 
for their addition to the na\^ had been demon- 
strated by the battle between the French and 
Chinese fleets in August, 1884, at the Pagoda 
Anchorage, Min Kiver, when the sliips flying 



42 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

the dragon flag were sunk in half an hour. This 
disaster opened the eyes of the world to the 
terribly destructive effect of modern ordnance. 
Prior to the reconstruction of the I^ew IS^avy the 
torpedo had been regarded as an important means 
of defense, and the reliance placed upon it was 
a potent cause for the delay in building mod- 
ern ships. A great ironclad fleet organized by 
France during her war with Prussia was ordered 
to annihilate the Prussian navy, and, if neces- 
sary to bring on an engagement, to force the 
harbor in which the enemy might have sought 
refuge. In attempting to enter a port the lead- 
ing French ship was injm*ed by a torpedo, and 
the fleet returned to its native land and took no 
further part in the struggle. During her war 
with Turkey, Russia planted torpedoes in the 
Danube, and, though provided with a formidable 
fleet of ironclads, Hobart Pasha, the gallant 
Turkish commander, was unable to force the 
river. 

These incidents, as well as our oivn experience 
in the Civil War, gave a value to the torpedo as 
an implement of war which greatly impressed 
the maritime nations. Europe rapidly supphed 
herself with large flotillas of torpedo-craft having 
high speed and armed with torpedoes of the 
latest ty|3e. The first fast torpedo-boat ever built 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 43 

was constructed by Thorneycroft, of England, 
for the Norwegian government, and by the time 
our Dolphin was completed, European navies 
were vying with each other to obtain the largest 
and most efficient number of these craft. The 
Gushing was the pioneer of the American steel 
torpedo-boat flotilla. She also enjoys the dis- 
tinction of having been the fii-st vessel of the 
United States na^^ to be provided with quad- 
ruple expansion engines. Impetus was given to 
the construction of torpedo-craft by the sinking 
of the Chihan ironclad Blanco Encalada by the 
torpedo-gunboats Almirante Condell and Aliui- 
rante Lynch during the Chilian Kevolution of 
1891. Impressed by this achievement, Congress 
immediately authorized a torpedo cruiser of seven 
himdred and fifty tons, but it was never built. 
Since the Gushing was laid down, the United 
States has constructed or is building sixteen tor- 
pedo-boat destroyers, thirty-five torpedo-boats, 
and eight submarine boats. The value of the 
submarine boat has yet to be showai. While still 
in the experimental stage, boats of this type have 
been built in the United States and Europe which 
indicate the possession of possibilities which pro- 
gressive naval powers cannot afford to overlook. 
The Vesuvius was one of the experimental ves- 
sels built for the United States navy. The act 



44 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

authorizing her construction details her charac- 
teristics: "Said cruiser to be not less than two 
hundred and thirty feet long, twenty-six feet 
beam, seven and one half feet draught, three 
thousand two hiuidi-ed horse-power, and guaran- 
teed to attain a speed of twenty knots an hour, 
and to be equipped with three pneumatic dyna- 
mite guns of ten and one half inch caliber, and 
guaranteed to throw shells contaming two him- 
dred pomids of dynamite or other high explosives 
at least one mile, each gmi to be capable of being 
discharged once in two minutes, at a price not 
exceeding three hundi-ed and fifty thousand dol- 
lars." 

The Vesuvius* exceeded the horse-power and 
speed required by the law, but the superior range 
of high-powder guns and her vulnerability im- 
paired her value for offensive purposes. During 
the war with Spain, she was ordered to Santiago 
de Cuba, where, under the protection of the guns 
of the ^N'orth Atlantic fleet, she threw dynamite 
shells mto the harbor. The effect produced was 
materially luiimportant though morally great. 
Tliis exi^erience confii-med the view that the ship 
was of limited usefuhiess, and she is now in or- 
dmary, awaiting transformation mto a torpedo- 
boat or other disposition. 

Like the Charleston, the Texas and Baltimore 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 46 

were built in accordance with designs purchased 
abroad. These three ships are the only vessels 
of the na\y of any accoimt, with the exception 
of the Albany, N^ew Orleans, and Topeka, pur- 
chased during the war with Spain, which are the 
product of foreign thought. The cruisers Phil- 
adelphia and San Francisco, authorized in 1887, 
the Olyinpia, Cincumati, Raleigh, Detroit, Mar- 
blehead, and Montgomery, provided for in the 
act of 1888, and the triple-screw Columbia, pop- 
ularly named the " Gem of the Ocean," and her 
sister ship, the Minneapolis, as well as the gun- 
boats authorized by the same acts, were all 
designed by Americans and built of American 
material — characteristics of every vessel author- 
ized simultaneously with or after them. 

The necessity of armored ships was appre- 
ciated by the fii'st N^aval Advisory Board, which, 
though failmg to recommend the authorization 
of any ironclads, specifically reported that " such 
vessels are absolutely needed for the defense of 
the comitry in time of war." By express direc- 
tion of Congress, the second IN^aval Advisory 
Board investigated the question of completing 
the monitors Pui'itan, Amphitrite, Monachiock, 
Miantonomoh, and Terror, laid down in the clos- 
ing years of President Grant's administration. 
The board reported that when completed the 



46 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

vessels would be efficient. Congress appropri- 
ated f 1,000,000 for their engines and machinery, 
but subsequently directed that work cease on 
these vessels, and it was not until ten years had 
passed that the last of them was ready for ser- 
vice. Five additional monitors have been au- 
thorized — the Monterey, which was built at San 
Francisco and . commissioned in 1893, and the 
Arkansas, Comiecticut, Florida, and Wyoming, 
which were ordered in the first days of the strug- 
gle with Spain and before experience m war had 
thoroughly demonstrated the unsuitability of this 
type of ships for offensive work, l^aval oj^inion 
to-day is decidedly opposed to the construction 
of additional monitors. The monitor was the 
product of pecuUar conditions, and its day is 
past, just as the frigate was made obsolete by 
the development of the steam engine and the 
gun. 

The question of armor has been one of the 
most troublesome with which the navy has had 
to deal, and it was with a feeling of sincere grati- 
fication that the department was able to effect 
its settlement in 1901. There was, of course, no 
steel armor plant in the United States when the 
construction of the IS^ew ISTavy was begun. Sec- 
retary Chandler was compelled to place contracts 
in England for compound armor for the turrets 




<, w 
5 ^ 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 47 

of the Miantonomoh, and in his annual report for 
1883 he suggested that, in view of the large 
amount of this material which the monitors would 
need, it was desirable that Congress should take 
action which would encourage American manu- 
facturers to embark in the industry. When he 
assumed office. Secretary Whitney decided not 
to award contracts to foreign firms, but to bring 
about the creation of armor and gun steel plants 
in the United States. By permitting the wants 
of the na^-y in armor and steel to accumulate, 
Mr. Whitney was able to negotiate for the manu- 
facture of a quantity large enough to induce the 
Bethlehem Iron Company to establish a plant for 
the manufacture of this material. Congress cor- 
dially seconded Mr. Whitney's efforts, and ap- 
propriated $4,000,000 to facilitate success. Mr. 
Whitney declared that the estabhshment of this 
plant "must be deemed to have been the first 
important step towards the creation of a navy 
modern m character." Mr. Whitney deserves 
high praise for the policy he adopted, but he 
acknowledges that the credit for the achievement 
belongs in part to the Gim Fomidry Board, 
organized by Secretary Chandler, to the Board 
of Ordnance and Fortifications, the president of 
which was Secretai-y of War Endicott, and to 
special committees of the Senate and House of 



48 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Representatives, which had conducted exhaustive 
investigations into the subject of gun and armor 
manufacture. The Bethlehem Iron Company 
agreed to begin the dehveries of armor in 1889, 
but its faiku^e to do so, added to the j)rospect of 
indefinite delay in the completion of sliips under 
construction, caused Benjamui F. Tracy, Secre- 
tary of the ^N^avy in Harrison's admmistration, to 
award a contract for six thousand tons of armor 
to Messrs. Carnegie, Phipps & Company, the 
largest steel manufacturers in the United States, 
with the miderstanding that they should imme- 
diately establish a plant. Secretary AVliitney was 
also responsible for the establishment in this 
comitry of the fii'st plant for the manufacture of 
small guns. As a condition of a contract for 
guns for the secondary batteries of war-ships, he 
required the Hotchkiss Company to set up a fac- 
tory in this country. The same comj^any also 
acquired the right to manufacture a torpedo, the 
invention of Captain J. A. Howell of the navy, 
which was used to some extent by the service. 

The development of armor within the last 
twenty years is one of the marvels of naval sci- 
ence. Compound armor, composed of a wrought- 
iron plate with a hard-steel face one third as thick 
welded to it, was succeeded by sohd steel. Sohd 
steel was displaced by nickel steel, nickel steel by 









^ 


ia^H 








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W 




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K^ 


J. 




"K: , 




\ L^-^l 


^^^^ 


%■ . 






X ^^^^H 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 


^N^ 






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'^H J^^^l 


^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 






1 


H 


^M 



HON. H. A. HERBERT 

Secrelarv of the Xaw 1.S03-IS97 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 49 

Ilarveyizcd armor, and recently the last named, 
partially, by Krnpp armor, the highest develop- 
ment yet reached. Very high prices demanded 
by the armor manufacturers led Congress, during 
the administration of Secretary Ilerbeil;, to make 
an exhaustive inquiry. Mr. Herbert conducted an 
independent and very thorough investigation. 
When as his successor I entered the Navy De- 
partment in 1897, Congress had limited the price 
of armor to an average of $300 per ton. Three 
battle-ships then building had reached a stage of 
construction where armor was needed if the work 
were to continue. The Carnegie and Bethlehem 
companies, the only two firms in the coimtry 
provided with the requisite plants, were invited 
to submit bids, but they declined to do so on the 
gi^ound that they were unable to manufacture 
armor at the price fixed by Congress. The act 
limiting the price required the Secretary to ap- 
point a board to prepare plans and estimates for 
an araior plant. This direction was obeyed, and 
at the next session of Congress a report was 
submitted which fixed the cost of a factory at 
$4,000,000. Wliile the government could, of 
course, manufacture armor, it seemed to me 
imwise for the United States to embark in an 
industry which was properly the field of individ- 
ual o23eration, and, furthermore, the cost of the 



50 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

material turned out under governmental condi- 
tions was certain to be higher than that turned 
out by private manufacturers. Congress was 
induced to increase the limit of cost to $400, and 
then contracts for Harveyized armor were placed 
with the Carnegie and Bethlehem companies. By 
the act of March 3, 1899, the limit of cost was 
again fixed at |300. Believing that a large 
quantity might attract bidders, the armor for 
thirteen vessels, amomiting to 24,950 tons, was 
grouped and proposals were advertised for. Be- 
lieving, too, that none but the best materials 
should be used for American ships, I aj^proved 
specifications which called for armor of a quality 
equal to that manufactured by the Krupp pro- 
cess. IS^otwithstanding the value of the contract 
and the fact that the time for deliveries imder it 
had been extended over a considerable period of 
time, the lowest bid received fixed the price per 
ton at a sum largely in excess of that named by 
Congress. A further objection to the accept- 
ance of this bid was the fact that the company 
submitting it had no plant and could not be- 
gin deliveries before January, 1904. Congress 
finally determined to intrust the Secretary of the 
Navy with the matter of arranging for the pur- 
chase on fair terms, and, notwithstanding the 
apprehension of some members, inserted this 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 51 

provision in the Kaval Approiiriation Act, ap- 
proved Jnne 7, 1900 : — 

Provided, that the Secretary of the Navy is hereby au- 
thorized to procure by contract armor of the best quality 
for any or all vessels above referred to, provided such 
contracts can be made at a price which in his judgment 
is reasonable and equitable ; but in case he is unable to 
make contracts for armor under the above conditions, he 
is hereby authorized and directed to procure a site for and 
to erect thereon a factory for the manufacture of armor, 
and the sum of four million dollars is hereby appropriated 
toward the erection of said factory. 

This was a generous confidence in me, and the 
work of reaching an equitable agreement with the 
armor manufacturers began at once, f aihng which 
the intention was to carry out the instruction of 
Congress with resj^ect to the estabUshment of an 
armor plant. Though it had been intimated that 
the armor makers would demand $54:5 for every 
ton of Ki'upp armor furnished, the negotiations, 
which were conducted through Rear-Admiral 
Charles O'Xeil, the accomplished Chief of Ord- 
nance, to whom great credit is due, led to a wil- 
lingness on their part to meet the government 
more than halfway. The new construction 
since the declaration of war against Sjiain in- 
cluded, besides the monitors and smaller craft, 
eight battle-ships, six armored cruisers, and nine 
protected cruisers. These ships required a total 



52 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

of 37,000 tons of armor. Such a large quantity 
enabled the department to make highly advan- 
tageous terms both in respect of quaUty and 
price. The highest price ever paid for armor 
by the United States was $725 per ton for the 
sponsons of the Iowa and Brooklyn. Including 
royalty, the United States agreed to pay |456 
for Krupp armor, and |411.20 for Harveyized 
armor. A few months ago the armor manufac- 
turers advised the Navy Department that the 
royalty paid by them upon the Krupp process 
had been reduced ten shiUings per ton, and that 
the price of armor will be less by that amoimt to 
the United States. It is safe to say that never 
have we obtained such excellent protection for 
our ships at so small a cost. 

While armor was attaining wonderfully resist- 
ive quality combined with comparatively little 
weight, which is the important characteristic of 
the Krupp process, the power of the gmi was 
steadily increasing and the projectile and pow- 
der were keeping pace. With the same pres- 
sures, the gmis of to-day produce almost twice 
the velocities of those of 1882, fire with much 
greater rapidity, and have penetration and range 
which would not be possible with weapons of 
the old type. In 1882 experiments were con- 
ducted with steel projectiles. To-day steel pro- 




HON. BENJAMIN F. TKACY 

Secretary of tlie Navy lS><'.t=l,S;i;? 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 53 

jectilcs, fitted with soft steel caps and given 
sufficient velocity, can without difficulty per- 
forate Krupp armor of a thiclvuess much greater 
than their own caHber. Smokeless powder was 
introduced into the navy during the war with 
Spain. 

The history of the armor fleet of the United 
States furnishes one of the most interesting 
chapters of the New Navy. Following the 
authorization of the Texas and Maine, Congress 
directed, in 1888, the construction of the ar- 
mored cruiser New York. Foiu- years later, 
the armored cruiser Brooklyn was authorized. 
In his first annual report, dated November 30, 
1889, Secretary Tracy stated that the " necessi- 
ties of our vuhierable position demand the ira- \. 
mediate creation of two fleets of battle-ships, of 
w^hich eight should be assigned to the Pacific 
and twelve to the Atlantic and Gulf coasts." 
Mr. Tracy was far in advance of the country. 
Congress did, however, agree to the construc- 
tion of first-class battle-ships, and by the act of 
June 30, 1890, authorized the construction of 
" three seagoing coast-line battle-ships," w^hich 
were christened the Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon. Two years later the Iowa w^as author- 
ized. These four vessels and the Texas consti- 
tuted our battle-ship force during the war with 



54 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Spain. The Kearsarge and Kentucky, equipped 
with superposed turrets, were constructed in 
accordance with the provisions of the ^aval 
Appropriation Act approved in 1895. The 
authorization of the Ilhnois, Alabama, and Wis- 
consin followed in 1896; that of the Ohio, Mis- 
souri, and second Maine, in 1898; afterwards 
that of the Georgia, Nebraska, ]^ew Jersey, 
Yirginia, and Rhode Island, and then that of 
the Connecticut and Louisiana. The Avar with 
Spain taught afresh the value of sea power, and, 
besides battle-sliips. Congress has since then 
authorized the construction of eight armored 
cruisers — the California, Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, Maryland, Colorado, South Dakota, 
Washington, and Tennessee — and three pro- 
tected cruisers, which are practically armored 
cruisers — the St. Louis, Milwaukee, and second 
Charleston. There are sixty-five war-ships un- 
der construction. 

The ]N^ew IS^a^^ comprises to-day one hundred 
and seventy-two steel ships, nineteen of which 
are battle-ships of the first and one a battle-ship 
of the second class ; ten armored cruisers ; one ar- 
mored ram ; ten monitors (iron and steel) ; twenty- 
six protected and miprotected cruisers ; forty-six 
gunboats, and fifty-nme torpedo-craft. The cost 
of these ships approximates |275,000,000 — a 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 55 

small part of the wealth of our coimtry. With 
the exception of a few million dollars, all this 
money has been expended in the United States. 
The money disbursed for the creation of the 
New Navy has thus been distributed among our 
own citizens. 

The navy-yards, which in 1833 were, to say 
the least, in a highly inefficient condition, are 
to-day well equipped with modern tools and 
appliances, and capable of making any repairs 
that a modern ship may require. The New 
York yard is imdergoing equipment for building 
a battle-ship, but there is much yet to be done 
before it and other yards will be up to the stand- 
ard of excellence which the country demands 
of its implements. The navy-yards twenty 
years ago employed less than five thousand 
men, nearly every one of whom had gained 
place by means of political influence, and was 
dependent upon political influence for contin- 
uance on the government pay-rolls. The spoils 
system was checked by Secretary Tracy, who 
courageously initiated reforms, and Secretary 
Herbert firmly continued this policy. There are 
to-day more than fifteen thousand navy-yard 
employees, all imder ci^s-il service rules with 
respect to appointment and promotion, not one 
of whom is removable except in consequence of 



56 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

his own fault. During the five years of my 
naval administration there was no violation of 
the rules governing the emj^loyment of labor at 
the yards. This covers not only appointments 
but promotions, which, under regulations then 
placed in force, were made in accordance with 
the efficiency records. Just before the expira- 
tion of my term even the shipkeepers were put 
under the labor rules, and with this act the last 
relic of the spoils system came to an end. It 
was almost a pity to part with it as a reminder 
and " terrible example " of the old spectacle of 
the carcass and the vulture. 

The fear which existed before contracts were 
awarded for the Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and 
Dolphin, that only a few firms would enjoy 
the benefit of war-ship construction, has disap- 
peared. Thirteen shipbuilding firms are to-day 
constructing men-of-war. There is not an in- 
dustry in the land which fails to receive direct 
or indirect profit from the enlargement of the 
navy. Even the cornstalks which the farmer 
supplies to the manufacturer are used in the 
making of the backing of the armor of war- 
ships. More than a hmidred trades assist in the 
building of a man-of-war. Among them are 
the iron and steel industry, the coal industry, 
the oil industry, the brass industry, the copper 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 57 

industry, the aluminum industry, the electrical 
industry — indeed, I might continue through the 
list of industries of the United States and find 
few that fail to contribute in some way to the 
construction or operation of the ships of our 
New Navy. 

There is another feature in connection with 
the development of our navy which should not 
be lost sight of, and which has a material and 
educational side. The increase in the construc- 
tion of naval ships has led directly to an increase 
in the construction of ships in the merchant 
marine. The gi*eat shipyards at San Fran- 
cisco, Ne"vvport News, Cramps', Bath, Maine; 
and more recently at Quincy, Mass., owe their 
creation to getting naval work to do, and thereby 
have been put in position now to do even larger 
amoimts of merchant marine work. Indeed, 
one of the complaints now made against ship- 
builders for delay in completmg naval vessels 
is of inclining to neglect these for non-govern- 
mental work. 

Educationally, too, few people have any idea 
what a stimulus the increase in our navy has 
been in all that line of technical, designing, 
engineering, and mechanical training wliich is 
one of the many features of our technical 
schools, now so rapidly increasing all over the 



58 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

country both in number and scope. The collat- 
eral influence upon industrial arts of the creation 
of the navy, apart from its direct influence 
upon shipbuilding facihties themselves in the 
United States, is much greater than is generally 
known. The necessity for building naval ves- 
sels of great strength, combined with the least 
possible weight, has made it essential to produce 
the very best quahty of structural steel. The 
high standard set by the ISayj Department in 
the very beginning of the ISew ISTavy forced 
upon our steel manufacturers the early develop- 
ment of an art which has since become one of 
the controlling factors in the industry of the 
country. This was publicly recognized by the 
president of the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion when he recently said that the standard set 
by navy officers for structural steel had practi- 
cally jiroduced and made necessary this impor- 
tant art in the United States. The construction 
of vessels, with the machining of ship plates, 
armor plates, heavy shafting, etc., has made it 
necessary to produce in this country machines 
for dealing with these classes of work. The 
genius of the American people devoted to these 
subjects has produced machines surpassing those 
in use abroad for similar purposes. The minor 
developments in this hue are multitudinous, and 



BUILDING THE NEW NAVY 59 

have led to a very considerable export of similar 
classes of machinery to foreign countries. 

The rivalry among the designers of naval 
vessels, the production of the most efficient 
armor plate, the most powerful ordnance, the 
most efficient powder, the fact that a naval ves- 
sel is not only a vast engine of great complica- 
tion, involving all the building arts, but that it 
is a home for very large crews, also develops 
and sets a standard for all domestic articles 
required for use in the navy — clothing, food, 
supplies, and furnishings of all kinds. The 
standard set for all these tends to the promotion 
and improvement of our national products at 
large. 

These are some of the lines along which the 
development of our navy tends toward the 
educational and industrial advance of the whole 
country. They all necessitate and encourage 
the industrial training of our people, and are in 
line with that education which is now recog- 
nized as the most important education — the 
education of the hand and the brain in the use- 
ful arts of life. 



Ill 

THE ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION OF 
THE NAVY 

The effectiveness of a navj depends vitally 
upon the efficiency of its personnel. Provided 
with war-ships of latest construction, a service 
made up of officers and men inadequately trained 
and lacking spirit is halfway toward defeat. 
Composed of inferior vessels, manned by experi- 
enced and resourceful officers and men, a fleet 
may wrest victory from a physically stronger 
enemy. 

The history of the United States and that of 
Spain, foes in 1898, furnish many instances of 
valor and intelligence overcoming numerical and 
material superiority. Philip of Spain saw his 
Invincible Armada harried and finally scattered 
by the smaller command of Howard and Drake. 
Three hmidred and ten years later, a queen hold- 
ing in trust the scepter Philip once wielded, 
sent to annihilation a squadron of war-ships as 
modern in construction and armament as were 
in their day the wooden vessels dispatched by the 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 61 

earlier monarch to subjugate England. The 
force of 1588 sustained reverse because it was 
deficient in sailors; that of 1898 suffered total 
destruction because it lacked engineers. 

No such disasters as befell the navy of Spain 
have yet clouded the navy of the United States. 
The cycle from our Revolution to the Spanish- 
American war is bright with shining deeds, the r 
fruit of the gallantry and skill of the men who did 
them. Wliat can be more inspiring than the in- 
trepidity of John Paul Jones as he stands on the 
deck of the shot-torn and sinking Bon Homme 
Richard, shouting orders to his men, who are 
working like demons at such guns as are yet 
unmomited by the enemy's fire ? Above the 
noise of booming camion and the sharp rattle of 
musketry and the hoarse cries of infuriated crews 
he hears the hail from the smoke-hidden Serapis : 

" Has your ship struck ? " 

And then the laconic reply : — 

" I have not yet begmi to fight ! " 

It w^as not a question of that courage which is 
so common, but of that nerve which endures to 
the end and without which the ordinarily brave 
man flinches from the ultimate test and respon- 
sibility. 

Outside of Boston Harbor the unlucky Chesa- 
peake, mamied by a green and heterogeneous 



62 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

crew, is wildly firing at the well-disciplined 
British frigate Shainion. Lawrence is struck 
and is borne below. 

" Don't give up the ship ! " he cries. " Tell 
the officers to fight to the last. !N^ever strike 
the colors. They shall wave while I live." 

The nation is rent by civil war. Under a rain 
of shot and shell, a Union fleet steams mto 
Mobile Bay. The first ship, the Brooklyn, fal- 
ters. 

" What 's the trouble ? " is shouted from the 
flagship, the Hartford. 

" TorjDedoes ! " is the explanation, trumpeted in 
reply. 

" Damn the torpedoes ! " exclaims Farragut. 
" Four bells. Captain Drayton, go ahead. Jouett, 
full speed." 

The dawn glows on the Bay of Manila on the 
first of May, 1898. An American squadron, 
wliich it reveals, steams straight for a Spanish 
force lying mider the batteries of Cavite. Soon 
shell are hurtling toward it, but, falling short, 
expend their energy in the water. When the 
proper range is reached, Dewey turns and quietly 
remarks : — 

" You may fire when you 're ready, Gridley." 

Courage has been always a characteristic of 
the American sailor, but it alone was not respon- 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 63 

sible for victories achieved by our men-of-war 
over those of enemies no less brave. In the days 
of the saihng ship the sui)eriority was due, in an 
important degree, to the greater skill w ith which 
the ship was handled by experienced officers and 
its crew of hardy longshoremen. Hull won as 
much distinction in sailing the Constitution as in 
fighting her. The native intelligence, the quick 
eye, and the supple limbs of the men, bom and 
bred in the salt air of the Atlantic coast, eas- 
ily worked the simple guns of that day. Raw 
material is not so easily convertible into the 
experienced man-o'-war's-man of the twentieth 
century. The abandonment of sails and the sub- 
stitution of steam and electricity, with the count- 
less improvements accompanying the change, 
have created in the war-ship of the ISTew^avy a 
demand for a mechanic-sailor — that is, a man 
trained in the operation and repair of fightmg 
machinery, yet impregnated wdth the salt of the 
sea. Ability to navigate and sail a ship was 
the first requisite of an officer and a seaman of 
the Old IS^avy; to-day they are engineers and 
mechanics first, and sailors afterwards. A mod- 
ern battle-ship from stem to stem is simply a 
huge fighting machine. It is propelled by ma- 
chinery; its turrets, themselves machines, are 
operated by machinery ; the gmis are loaded and 



64 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

fired by machinery; the torpedoes, comphcated 
engines, are sent on their careers of destruc- 
tion by machinery; small boats and anchors are 
lowered and hoisted by machinery, and water- 
tight compartments are opened and closed by 
machinery. 

Steam and electricity are the powers which 
move this terrible creature of man's destructive 
genius; and steam and electrical engineers are 
required to guide and super\dse its operation. 
An officer's duties are not, however, limited to 
the practical application of these sciences. He 
must also know how to navigate his ship and be 
able to care for the health and general well-being 
of the men under his command. Occasions 
arise when he must conduct negotiations for the 
settlement of important diplomatic questions, 
and he frequently represents the government at 
fmictions of international consequence. He res- 
cues the shipwrecked, gives assistance to the 
national merchant marine, and, if called on, quells 
its mutinies. He surveys dangerous coasts, 
makes deep-sea somidings for the triple purpose 
of finding a suitable bed for a projected cable, 
charting the bottom of the ocean, and promoting 
ichthyology. He determines for navigators the 
longitude and latitude of doubtful points. He 
should have at least a rudimentary acquaintance 




reak-ai).mii;al AHEXT SCIirYLEi; ckowxix.shield 

Chief of thy Uiiieau of Navigation and a Member of tlie Naval War Board diiriiig tlie war 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 65 

with astronomy, and imderstand something of 
chemistry and metalhirgy. Becanse legal ques- 
tions are sometimes raised by or referred to him, 
and becanse he serves on courts-martial and 
administers pimishments, he ought to be familiar 
^vith the principles of common law. Above all, 
he must be a man of quick decision, of nerve, 
and of somid judgment, for, as commanding 
officer of a battle-ship or even a vessel of inferior 
class, he should know in battle when to strike 
and strike sure; in peace, how to determine an 
important question affecting the honor of the 
nation which is brought to him for immediate 
settlement. 

I have described the attainments of the ideal 
officer, but it does not follow that every member 
of the commissioned force of the navy possesses 
them. At the same time, the preliminary educa- 
tion given at the naval academy and the subse- 
quent trainmg in active professional life insure 
the development of an officer, provided he can 
and will improve his opportunities there. It is 
the proud boast of the American navy that in 
its existence of more than a century in but few 
instances has the man been wanting when the 
occasion for him came. 

The personnel of the na^-y of the United 
States was created simultaneously with the an- 



66 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

thorization of the first war-ships of the Old Navy. 
The act of Congress of March 27, 1794, directed 
that " there shall be employed on board each of 
the ships of forty-four guns, one captain, four 
heutenants, one Ueutenant of marines, one chap- 
lain, one surgeon, and two surgeon's mates ; and 
in each of the ships of thirty-six guns, one cap- 
tain, three lieutenants, one heutenant of marines, 
one surgeon, and one surgeon's mate, who shall 
be appointed and commissioned in Hke manner 
as other ofl&cers of the United States." Thus 
was formed the hue, and the marine, medical, 
and chaplains' corps. The " purser," an enhsted 
man, was to develop into the paymaster. An 
experienced shipbuilder was needed to design 
and construct the first ships, and Joshua Hum- 
phreys was appomted a naval constructor and 
assigned to duty. As the navy grew, additional 
constructors were required, and the men em- 
ployed for construction work were eventually 
given commissions. TaMng advantage of a law 
authorizing the appointment as assistant naval 
constructors of any cadets who had graduated 
with distinction in the mechanical department 
of the naval academy, Cadet Engineer F. T. 
Bowles, in 1879, applied for an appoinment, and 
also requested permission to attend the Royal 
Naval College at Greenwich, England, which 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 67 

had ail advanced course in shipbuilding. The 
older constructors opposed Mr. Bowles's ambi- 
tion, but grit and persistency gained for the 
yoimg cadet a victory of the greatest importance 
to his corps. Only leading graduates of the 
academy have since been assigned to the con- 
struction corps — none from ci\al life. The pro- 
fessors of mathematics — now an anachronism in 
the military organization of the na\'y — were 
originally teachers on board ship of midshipmen 
of the Old Navy. They no longer follow the 
sea, and their duties are civilian. Of the fifteen 
officers of this corps in ]S"ovember, 1902, eight 
are on duty as teachers at the naval academy, 
one is director of the nautical ahnanac, and the 
remainder are coimected with scientific work of 
the naval observatory. Congress should pro- 
vide that no further appointments be made to 
this corps, as all its work can be procured from 
civil life, and the anomaly of a pension or retire- 
ment for non-military service should be done 
away with. 

Like naval constructors, civil engineers fii'st 
received appointments from the Secretary of 
the jN^avy, and were liable to dismissal or removal 
at his pleasure. They, too, were at last made 
a part of the commissioned force. Ci-sdl engin- 
eers have many and important duties, relating 



68 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

principally to the planning and construction of 
naval stations. With the exception of the line 
and construction corps, appointments in the com- 
missioned branch of the navy are made from civil 
life. Medical officers are selected at large, after 
a thorough examination. President McKinley 
approved my recommendation that appointments 
of civil engineers, assistant paymasters, and pro- 
fessors of mathematics should be made after 
com23etitive examination. Li this comiection it 
may be said that it is difficult to see why any of 
the various staff officers, who as a corps never 
go to sea and have no military command, should 
have military rank or title. 

The commissioned personnel of the first ships 
of the Old 'Nayj was formed during the adminis- 
trations of Presidents Washington and Adams. 
The midshij^men, who were designed to be the 
futm'e commodores and captains, were all of ten- 
der years when appointed, and, without prepara- 
tion, were sent on board ships either fitting out 
or about to sail in search of the enemy. Yet the 
need of mental education for the youngsters was 
great, and fitful attempts were made to j^rovide 
it. Congress having refused to establish a naval 
school, the N^avy Department in 1802 prescribed 
in regulations the duties of schoolmasters; but 
schoolmasters were not appointed. When, in 




Photograpli l«v o. .Iohll^..ll 

ki:ai;-ai).mii;al ( iiaulp:s oneil 

Chief of the Bureau ul Ordiiaiue during tlie war 



I 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION G9 

1819, the Kavy Department decreed that midship- 
men must pass a professional examination in order 
to receive promotion to the grade of heutenant, 
the country greeted the reform with gratification ; 
the youths were affected with consternation. It 
was the thing for a " middy " during the greater 
period of his apprenticeship to apply himself to 

" doing what he was told, and doing it quick " 

— a process which was frequently accelerated by 
a rope's-end — and to devote as much time as he 
could spare in the six months prior to examina- 
tion to the study of the theoiy of seamanship. 
This theoretical education was obtained from a 
few books on mathematics and navigation, and 
sometimes from the kindly help of a superior. 
In " The United States Naval Academy," written 
by Mr. Park Benjamin, whose fidl and excellent 
history of the naval academy I have followed, 
the author thus describes the examination of 
Midshipman Joseph Tatnall : — 

Commodore : " Mr. Tatnall, what would be your course, 
supposing you were off a lee shore, the wind blowing a 
gale, both anchors and your rudder gone, all your canvas 
carried away, and your ship scuddmg rapidly toward the 
breakers ? " 

Tatnall: "I cannot conceive, sir, that such a combi- 
nation of disasters could possibly befall a ship in one 
voyage." 

Commodore: "Tut, tut, young gentleman, we must 



70 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

have your opinion supposing such a case to have actually 
occurred." 

Tatnall: "Well, sir — sails all carried away, do you 
say, sir ? " 

Commodore : " Aye, all — every rag." 

Tatnall : " Anchor gone, too, sir ? " 

Commodore : " Aye, not an uncommon case." 

Tatnall: "No rudder, either?" 

Commodore : "Aye, rudder unshipped." (Tatnall drops 
his head despondingly in deep thought.) " Come, sir, come 
— bear a hand about it. "What would you do ? " 

Tatnall (at last and desperate) : " Well, I 'd let the in- 
fernal tub go to the devil, where she ought to go." 

Commodore (joyously): "Right, sir, perfectly right! 
That will do, sir. The clerk will note that Mr. Tatnall 
has passed." 

A temporary government school for educat- 
ing midshipmen was organized in 1821. Seven- 
teen years later Secretary Paulding established a 
preparatory school in the naval asylum, a home 
for aged seamen, at Philadelphia. To this school 
boys were sent for instruction for a period of 
eight months, after which they were ordered to 
sea. Aside from the fact that it marked an 
advance in naval traiiung, this school is remem- 
bered to-day because it caused the connection 
with the navy of "WilUam Chauvenet, who was ap- 
pointed professor of mathematics and navigation. 
When first employed. Professor Chauvenet was 
only twenty years of age; but he mstituted re- 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 71 

forms, introducecl order and system, and extended 
the scojoe of studies. Despite the failure of 
efforts which had been made since the navy was 
created to obtain authority of law for the estab- 
lishment of a school for the education of mid- 
shipmen. Professor Chauvenet threw himself into 
the project with all the enthusiasm of youth, and 
drew UY> i^ plan, requiring no legislation and no 
additional cost, for an mstitution the curriculum 
of wliich included every subject a naval officer 
of the day required to fit him for his duties. Mr. 
David Ilenshaw, Secretary of the IS'avy in 1844, 
adopted the scheme, which contemplated a two 
years' course of instruction, but it did not go into 
operation because Secretary Mason, Mr. Hen- 
shaw's successor, revoked the order. This action 
was taken upon advice given by older officers of 
the service, who insisted that the midshipmen 
were needed on board ships, and that as their 
futui-e duties were connected with the sea, the 
sea was the only school in which they should be 
taught. 

Many causes were operating to bring into Ufe 
the seed which Professor Chauvenet had sown. 
The introduction of steam, the scandalous con- 
duct of many officers, the lax discipline, brutality, 
and oppression which existed afloat, and finally 
the tragedy of the brig Somers, when Midship- 



72 THE NEW AIVIERICAN NAVY 

man Spencer, son of the Secretary of "War, and 
two enlisted men were hanged on the charge 
of plottmg mntmy, estabhshed the necessity of 
a method by which reputable boys could be 
appointed, and receive a moral and mental edu- 
cation which would enable them to conduct them- 
selves with honor and dignity, and reflect credit 
upon their country and service. Loudly as the 
press and citizens called for action, Congress did 
not respond, and it was left to the patriotic and 
far-seeing George Bancroft, of Massachusetts, 
the distinguished historian of the United States, 
to estabhsh the Kaval Academy. 

Shortly after Mr. Bancroft entered the ^avy 
Department, Professor Chauvenet brought to his 
attention the need of systematic education for 
midshipmen. The Secretary saw that to effect 
the adoption of the plan he must fii'st conciliate 
the older officers of the navy. The service was 
induced to give its assent through a board of 
officers, to which Mr. Bancroft diplomatically 
referred the subject, and after the school was 
estabhshed and in operation on the military reser- 
vation of Fort Severn at Amiapolis, jurisdiction 
over which had been ceded to the na\^', the 
Secretary asked Congress for an appropriation 
"for repairs, improvements, and instruction." 
The appropriation was promptly made by the 




riintci^niph liy 



PAVMASIEK-GENEKAL EDWIN STEWAKT 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 73 

House, but rumors were current that the Senate 
would declme to concur. Having great personal 
influence, Mr. Bancroft exercised it, with the 
result that the appropriation was granted and 
the naval academy legally estabhshed. From 
that day until the present there has been gradual 
improvement in the curriculum of the institution. 
It was one of the most important acts of my time 
when Congress, in compliance with urgent recom- 
mendations, authorized in 1898 the reconstruction 
of the academy buildings, at a cost not to exceed 
eight million dollars — since raised to ten. The 
reconstruction is now in progress, in accordance 
with a plan prepared by a board of officers ap- 
pointed by Secretary Herbert, although that offi- 
cial, on account of the condition of the national 
finances, considered it too comprehensive for 
immediate adoption. When the academy is 
rebuilt, it will be an institution superior to any- 
thmg of the kind in the world, and will meet 
every requirement of instruction and conven- 
ience. Prince Henry of Prussia, on the occa- 
sion of liis visit to the United States in 1902, 
mspected the naval academy, and expressed to 
me sm'prise that we should be spending such a 
large sum of money on an educational institu- 
tion rather than for men-of-war. It was with a 
feeling of patriotic pride that the response could 



74 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

be made that the resources of our country are so 
great that it can undertake, without anticipating 
embarrassment, the construction of an academy 
worthy of the personnel of which it is the source 
of supply, and yet have ample funds with which 
to continue the building of ships. 

Since the establishment of the naval academy, 
more than twenty-five hmidred midshipmen and 
cadets have been graduated, and the cost to 
the country has been about eight million dollars 
— a sum equal to that which will be paid for 
its reconstruction. That the organization of the 
school has amply repaid the country is shown, 
first, by victories gained by our navy in the Civil 
and Spanish wars, and their far-reaching results, 
and, second, by the progress made in naval sci- 
ence, with its tremendous effect upon industrial 
development, for which many officers are to be 
credited. 

The very nature of an officer's duties necessi- 
tates constant study of the subjects which they 
embrace. The course at the naval academy cov- 
ers four years, and the cadets are then sent to 
sea for a two years' cruise, upon the expiration 
of which they return to undergo final examina- 
tion. There is no good reason for more than one i 
year's cruise at sea. At the end of that time, | 
even if not at once upon graduation, the cadets 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 75 

eliould receive commissions as ensigns if foimd 
qualified upon examination. During his career 
at the academy the cadet pcrfonns the duties of 
seamen and officers of every grade. lie is care- 
fully instructed in gmmery, navigation, and sea- 
manship. He learns English and French, and 
now Spanish, as well as something about inter- 
national law and history, becomes a proficient 
mathematician, and acquires a Imowledge of 
physics, chemistry, and hygiene. Because the 
naval officer of to-day must be an engineer, he is 
thoroughly groimded in marine engineering, both 
electrical and steam, and naval construction. 
Wlien commissioned, he is on occasions given 
tours of duty at the torpedo-station at Newq^ort, 
where he receives instruction in the construction 
and operation of the torpedo, and at the Washing- 
ton Gun Fomidry, where he takes part in assem- 
bling forgings into great gims. He midergoes 
a post-gi-aduate course at the naval war college 
— an institution established at Kew London, 
Conn., almost simultaneously with the reconstruc- 
tion of the navy. The naval war college, like 
the naval academy, was not brought into exist- 
ence by authority of Congress. Secretary William 
E. Chandler, under date of May 3, 1884, organized 
a board of naval officers, consisting of Commo- 
dore S. B. Luce, Commander W. T. Sampson, 



76 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

and Lieutenant-Commander C. E. Goodrich, to 
report upon the subject of a ]30st-graduate course 
for officers of the navy. Exj^laining to the 
Senate the reason for the estabhshment of the 
institution, Mr. Chandler stated that " the con- 
stant changes in the methods of conducting naval 
warfare imposed by the introduction of armored 
shi23s, swift cruisers, rams, sea-going torpedo- 
boats, and high-power guns, together with the 
more rigid methods of treating the various sub- 
jects relating to naval science, render imperative 
the establishment of a school where our officers 
may be enabled to keep abreast of the improve- 
ments going on in every navy in the world." In 
its report recommending the organization of the 
institution the board expressed the opinion that 
" a cogent reason for such a school is that there 
may be a place where our officers will not only 
be encouraged but required to study their pro- 
fession proper — war — m a far more thorough 
manner than has ever heretofore been attempted, 
and to bring to the investigation of the various 
problems of modern naval warfare the scientific 
methods adopted in other professions." The 
course at the college is divided under two heads 
— the science and art of war, and law and his- 
tory. The college has been in successful opera- 
tion for fifteen years, and has been of much 




I'liuto-raph copyriglit 1fl(i-.> by J. E. Tiirclv .<■ Co. 

i;eai;-ai).mikal I'liii.ii' hk iiiioux 

Chief of tlie Bureau uf Construction and Kepuirs during the war 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 77 

benefit ill fitting officers not only to command 
single ships and squadrons, but to perfonn pro- 
perly numerous other important duties with 
which they are charged. I am confident that 
the training many officers received at the col- 
lege has been of great service to them in times 
of peace and war. Toward the close of my 
administration instructions were given for the 
estabhshmcnt of a post-graduate com-se in steam 
engmeering at the naval academy. This was 
done upon the recommendation of Rear- Admiral 
G. W. Melville, the veteran engineer-m-chief of 
the nnYj, and the course will enable officers of 
the new line to perfect themselves in the science 
of their profession. The medical officer was not 
overlooked, and a medical school was established 
in Washing-ton. Arrangements were made vrith 
the War Department for harmonious cooperation 
with the medical school of the army. Medical 
officers of the na^^ have had no sufficient oppor- 
tmiity to study their profession, and cooperation 
with the army will not only fill this want but cre- 
ate a healthy mutuality Avhich will stimulate both 
services. The war college is now at Newport, K. I. 
In the na\^ to-day there is missing from the 
list of titles of officers one which for half a cen- 
tury occupied an honorable and increasingly im- 
portant position upon it — that of engineer. The 



H 



78 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

introduction of steam into the navy caused the 
appointment in 1836 of Mr. Charles H. Haswell, 
of New York. He was the first engineer of the 
service. In spite of the element in the navy 
and the comitry which clung to sails, it speedily 
became apparent that steam propulsion must be 
adopted for men-of-war, and about 1842 Con- 
gress had authorized the construction of four 
steam vessels — the Fulton, Mississij^pi, Missom^i, 
and Michigan — and one steamship, known as the 
Engmeer, had been purchased. For the design 
of the machinery of the vessels the construction 
of which was authorized, and for its care and 
operation after mstallation, twenty engineers 
were appointed. The engineers were dissatisfied 
with their status and pay and with the appoint- ■ 
ment of a man who was not familiar with the 
principles of their profession ; and an appeal was 
made to Congress for adequate recognition. 
Agitation was effective. Congress, by the act 
approved August 31, 1842, created the staff 
engineer corps of the navy. This act provided 
for the appointment by the Secretary of the 
N^avy of one chief engineer, two first assistant, 
two second assistant, and three third assistant 
engineers for each steam ship-of-war, to be paid 
salaries ranging from $500 to $1500 per annum. 
Three years later a law was enacted authorizing 




Photoirraph by E. Miillrr 

CAPTAIN Wll.LAKl) HKKliKH 1" BliOWNSON 
Present Superiiiteuilent of the U. S. Naval Ac-adeiiiy 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 79 

the President to appoint engineer officers, and 
in 1860 Congress granted substantial increases 
in pay to officers of this corps. In the mean time 
the question of the relation of the staff to the 
hue had become a subject of controversy, and 
Secretary Toucey, in January, 1859, issued an 
order annomicing the relative rank of officers of 
the staff C0113S. This order explicitly stated that 
it conferred no authority to exercise mihtary 
command " except in the discharge of their [offi- 
cers of the staff corps] duties, and no addi- 
tional right to quarters." Congi^ess enacted Mr. 
Toucey's order into law, strikuig out the words 
" except in the discharge of their duties," and 
thus, the engineers claimed, iacreased their em- 
barrassment and difficulty in controlling and dis- 
ciplining the men of their divisions. The value 
of steam propulsion had been demonstrated be- 
fore the Civil War, but the events of that strug- 
gle emphasized its superiority over sails, and 
established the fact that men especially trained 
in the manipulation of engines must be employed. 
Wlien the naval academy was fomided, Lieu- 
tenant James H. Ward, a member of the faculty, 
foresaw the important part steam would play in 
the futiu-e service, and arranged that it should 
be one of the principal subjects of the com*se. 
With his detachment from the academy less at- 



80 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

tention was paid to steam, and it was soon made 
a subordinate branch of the department of natu- 
ral philosophy. During the Civil War Secretary 
Welles called the attention of Congress to the 
desirability of educating steam engineers, and a 
law Avas enacted in 1864 authorizing the instruc- 
tion at the academy '' as naval constructors or 
steam engineers of such midshipmen and others 
as may show a peculiar aptitude therefor." Sec- 
retary Welles was not satisfied with the law, and 
he asked, before the plan was put into operation, 
whether steam engineering should not be made 
to constitute a necessary part of the education of 
all midshij)men, " so that in our future navy every 
line officer will be a steam engineer, and qualified 
to have complete command and direction of the 
ship." Here was the fu-st official suggestion for 
the present consolidated line of the navy. The 
young men appointed imder the act of 1864 and 
enactments in the years immediately following 
were styled cadet engineers, and in 1882 they 
were transformed into naval cadets of the Ime. 

This last law was intended to settle the line 
and staff controversy, which had been raging on 
board every war-vessel of the navy, and which 
had already attracted the attention of thinking 
men of the country. So long as the engineers 
of the navy were appointed from civil life, it was 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 81 

plain that there could be no agreement between 
them and officers of the line bred in all the tra- 
ditions of the service. The antagonism extended 
to the students at the naval academy, the cadet 
engineers among whom had been by law organ- 
ized into a separate class, and the amalgamation 
of the cadet engineers and the midshipmen failed 
to produce the desired effect. Those graduates 
assigned to the engineer corps speedily became 
out of harmony with the luie, and there was little 
disposition on the part of the line to promote har- 
mony by cooperation with the engineer corps. 
The difference in views between the two branches 
of the service appears very clearly in the testi- 
mony given before the House IS'aval Committee 
when it was investigating the question of reor- 
ganization of the personnel. 

At the begimiing of my term in the depart- 
ment the discussion between the Ime and the staff 
was a matter of immediate importance. IN'aval 
officers natiu-ally felt keen interest each in his 
own corps. The engineering profession through- 
out the comitry had become a party to the issue, 
and was demanding that its representatives in 
the navy should receive that measure of official 
recognition which the high character of the call- 
ing requires. Secretary Herbert had prepared 
a bill for the reorganization of the line, which 



82 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

contemplated the removal of a large number of 
officers by transfer either to a reserve or to 
the retu-ed Hst, and by increase of officers, prm- 
cipally in the higher grades. A bill was also 
introduced grantmg actual rank, military title, 
and adequate numbers to the engineer corps. 
N^either the Herbert bill nor the engineer bill 
had been adopted, and the condition I fomid was 
that of stagnation in promotion, with its train of 
evils, and of the existence of friction between the 
line and the staff, which not only produced in- 
efficiency, but which, through its effect upon 
Congress, almost endangered the upbuilding of 
the navy. 

Representative Francis H. Wilson, of New 
York, the recognized champion of the engineers 
in the House, had frequent conferences with the 
department in regard to the action which should 
be taken for the restoration of harmony in the 
service. Mr. Theodore Roosevelt — now Presi- 
dent — was then assistant secretary, and was 
esj^ecially active in this direction, obtaining the 
views of rival factions. As a result of full con- 
sideration of this matter, I appomted a board to 
which was confided the preparation of a plan for 
the reorganization of the personnel. Mr. Roose- 
velt was made president of this board. Had a 
line or an engineer officer been named, the board 




Plioti.-i^iph hy Hciuy llnvt M..,.rr 

REAR-ADMIKAL GEORGE WALLACE MELVILLE 

Cliief of tlie Bureau of Steam Eiigineerins; duviiii; tlie war 



ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION 83 

at the outset would have been embarrassed. By 
designating the assistant secretary, who was 
recognized as an earnest friend of the service at 
large, the line and the staff were certain of fair 
rulings upon questions which might arise be- 
tween them. Mr. Roosevelt was intended to 
serve, and did serve, as moderator. The line 
was represented by two chiefs of bureaus, Com- 
modore Crowninshield and Commodore W. T. 
Sampson, and four other officers of standing and 
influence in the service — Captam A. H. Mc- 
Cormick, Captain Robley D. Evans, Commander 
J. ]Sr. Hem23hill, and Lieutenant-Commander 
Richard Wainwright. The engineer corps, 
which comprised fewer officers than the line, 
was represented by four officers — Commodore 
George W. Melville, engineer-in-chief and chief 
of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, a man of 
common sense, judgment, and possessmg the 
implicit confidence of his subordmates; Chief 
Engineer Charles W. Rae, Chief Engineer 
George H. Kearny, and Passed Assistant Engi- 
neer Walter M. MacFarland. The recorder of 
the board Avas a line officer — Lieutenant Albert 
L. Key. No other corps were given rej^resenta- 
tion on the board, because the mam question was 
between the line and the engineer corps. 

The board was m session for about a month. 



84 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

The representatives of both the line and engi- 
neers manifested an earnest desire to come to an 
miderstanding. Commodore Melville submitted 
a projjosition for an independent engineer corps, 
which should comprise 303 oiiicers, who should 
have positive rank and military titles and the 
same right of absolute command over their own 
divisions which watch and division officers of the 
line have, the chief of the Bureau of Steam Engi- 
neeruig to have the rank and pay of a commo- 
dore. This proposal was rejected, and then 
Captain Evans submitted a plan, which had all 
along been in the mind of the dej^artment and of 
the board, for the amalgamation of the line and 
the engineers. This solution, though at first 
sight revolutionary, was really the final step in 
the process of evolution through which the navy 
was passing. The fmidamental studies of offi- 
cers of the deck and engine-room at the naval 
academy were identical; the younger line offi- 
cers served in engine-rooms on torpedo-boats, 
and line as well as staff officers miderwent train- 
ing in machine work, if not in the engine-room, 
in departments devoted to electrical and ordnance 
equipment. In the old days of sail, the naval 
officer was first of all master of the motive jDOwer ; 
why not in the days of steam? The acceptance 
of the proposal by the engineers was followed by 



ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY 85 

the drafting of the provisions of a bill to be laid 
before the Secretary for transmission to Congi'ess. 
Examination of this showed that, besides provid- 
ing for the coml)ination of the line and engineer 
corjis, it enabled the voluntary retirement of offi- 
cers in the grades of captain, commander, and 
lieutenant-commander, should natural causes fail 
to produce a certain number of casualties in 
those grades and in that of lieutenant; and that 
should the casualties and vohmtary retirements 
be not sufficient to cause the average vacancies 
fixed, then a board of rear-admirals should se- 
lect a limited number of officers for retirement. 
Wliether vohuitarily or compulsorily retired, the 
officers affected were to receive the rank and 
three fourths of the sea-pay of the grade next 
higher to that which they had attained at the 
time of retirement. Here were then j^rovisions 
that the board contemplated enacting into law, 
which permitted valuable officers to go on the 
retired list, though it was plain that ships imder 
construction would require when commissioned 
the services of all that could be gathered, and 
which also gave the benefits of retirement with 
increased rank and pay to officers who w^ere 
unfitted for duty, and less desening of such 
consideration than others retired w^ithout any 
premium because of disability incurred m the line 



86 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

of duty. I transmitted the bill to Congress with 
a recommendation for the enactment of its pro- 
visions, with the exception of those specified. It 
was believed that such a law would bring har- 
mony into the service, and the results of its opera- 
tion since enactment in 1899 have justified this 
belief. It still seems advisable that the voluntary 
and compulsory retirement provisions should be 
modified so that oflScers affected by them shall 
retire with the rank and three fourths of the sea- 
pay of the grade held at the time of retirement, 
and not be given a premium for getting out of 
the service. The bill further provided that the 
navy should receive army pay, that the title " mid- 
shij^man " should replace that of " cadet " for 
students at the naval academy, that the course at 
the academy should be reduced from six to four 
years, and that the good old title of " commo- 
dore " should be dropped — very likely a proper, 
but certainly, from the standpoint of sentiment 
and historical association, a regrettable provision. 
It created a corps of warrant machinists, and im- 
proved the condition of the enlisted force by con- 
ferring upon its members the same privileges and 
rights respecting retirement and pension that 
obtam in the army and marine corjDS. The 
enthusiasm aroused by sea victories during the 
war with Spain caused the enactment of the bill 




Phi.toL'raiih by Clin.diii-t 

reak-ai).mii;al wii.liam knk kehbockkk van keypen 

Cliicf of the Bureau of Mediiiiie and Surgery during tlie war 



ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY 87 

with some amendments and additions, the latter 
relatin«: mainly to the marine corps. 

It was loudly urged against this reorganization 
bill that it would operate to the disadvantage of 
the service; that the age was one of specializa- 
tion, and that it was impossible to make a fight- 
ing man a " jack-of-all-trades." Those who 
made these statements forgot that in amalgamat- 
ing the fine and engineer corps we were simply 
repeating history ; that England's ships were 
once sailed by men especially employed for that 
duty and fought by soldiers who had nothing to 
do with the operation of the vessels ; but the 
combination of these two types produced the 
sailor who could not only sail his ship but who 
could fight it as well. When steamships entered 
our navy, the sailor, clinging to the traditions of 
his calling, jealously refused to surrender his 
privileges and prerogatives to the engineer. As 
the work of the soldier and the sailor gradually 
approached each other and finally intermingled, 
so has that of the navigator and the engineer. 
The persomiel law was framed to meet special 
conditions, and so long as those conditions exist 
it will produce the results intended; but when 
they change, it will require revision. It would 
not be sm-prising should the machinists war- 
ranted under the personnel law become a future 



88 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

engineer corps, just as the late engineer corps 
developed from civilians appointed into the navy 
during the early years of steam. 

The officers command a ship, but the brawn 
and its intelligent application are supplied by the 
enhsted men. In the old navy the ships were 
manned by sailors who could patch a sail, knot a 
parted shroud, repair a boat, sponge, load, and 
fire a gun, — in fact, do any work appertaining 
to their rating. Boys were enlisted as powder- 
monkeys and for other light work. That they 
were distinguished by the same ardor as pos- 
sessed their older comrades is shown by Captain 
Hull's report on the battle of the Constitution 
and the Guerriere, in which he said that " from 
the smallest boy in the ship to the oldest seaman, 
not a look of fear was seen. They all went into 
action giving three cheers and requesting to be 
laid alongside of the enemy." Enough American 
citizens not engaging in the national and mer- 
chant marines, causing the employment of many 
foreigners in this branch of the governmental 
and industrial services, the suggestion was made 
in 1835 that boys be enlisted and trained in the 
ways of the sea. Congress incorporated the 
suggestion into law in 1837, and under the au- 
thority granted him Secretary Paulding enlisted 
several hmidred youngsters and distributed them 



ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY 89 

among the linc-of-l)attle ships Columbus and 
North Carolina and the frigates Java and Hud- 
son. The plan was inaugurated under ausjiicious 
circumstances, but, the department announcing 
that the apprentices would not receive commis- 
sions, interest disappeared and failure followed. 
A second effort to establish the apprentice sys- 
tem was made by Secretary Welles. The ex- 
periment at first produced gratifying results, 
justifying a behef in important future benefit to 
the service. Thinking an opportmiity to attain 
commissions would encourage the boys. Secre- 
tary Welles, in his annual rej^ort for 1864, sug- 
gested that " from among the apprentices on the 
schoolship, a selection of one half of the midship- 
men appointed might be made with great advan- 
tage to the service and to the countiy. ... It 
would popularize the service and open to those 
who may have enhsted the highest positions and 
honors in the service." Mr. Welles succeeded 
in having a number of apprentices sent to the 
academy, where they were examined for admis- 
sion; and some of the able officers to-day are 
those who miderwent their first naval experience 
as enhsted boys. 

Discoiu-aging though the attempts of his pre- 
decessors were. Secretary Robeson, in 1875, 
issued a circular authorizing the enhstment of a 



90 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

certain number of apprentices. There was im- 
perative need of such action. The percentage 
of foreigners in the navy at this time had reached 
such a high figure that confusion and inefficiency 
prevailed. Admiral David D. Porter thus de- 
scribed the humihating condition of our enhsted 
force when the reconstruction of the navy be- 
gan : "A few years ago one of our ships with a 
cosmopohtan crew was anchored in the harbor 
of Yillefranche. The crew represented nineteen 
different nationalities, and so inefficient was the 
organization that some wag painted on a board 
and himg in the gangway, ' Ici on parle Anglais,' 
Uke the signs in Paris shops. "Wlien the Tren- 
ton went into commission, as fine a body of Ger- 
mans, Huns, I^orsemen, Gauls, Chinese, and 
other outside barbarians as one could wish to 
see were on board. Of the whole number not 
more than eighty could speak English. These 
men shipped for money. They had no sentiment 
for our flag or nationality, and possibly if it came 
to an action with a ship of their own or neigh- 
boring nation they would haul down the Ameri- 
can colors and hoist their own." 

]N^ational pride demanded an American navy. 
So the ajDprentice was encouraged. In 1881 the 
city of Newport ceded Coaster's Harbor Island 
m IS'arragansett Bay to the government as a site 



I 





■-« 



m: 



I'linto-raiih liy 1-.. Ml 



THAIXI.\(}-SHIP HAKTFORD 



ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY 91 

for a naval apprentice station. During my ad- 
ministration the island of Yerba Buena, in San 
Francisco Baj^, was acquired, and upon it a mod- 
ern training-station for a^iprentices was built. 
When Secretary Robeson made the third attempt 
to organize an apprentice training-system, it was 
predicted that it would fail. To-day it is one of 
the important branches of supply for our enlisted 
force. It seemed a violation of the jDrinciples 
of the Kepublic to maintain a service which 
limited the achievements of an employee; and 
regarding Secretary Welles's plan as eminently 
just and proper, I recommended that Congress 
enact a bill permitting the commissioning of 
enlisted men promoted from apprentices, after 
examination of their mental, moral, and physical 
qualifications. The law, as passed, fixes the 
number of these appointments at six annually; 
it has since been increased. In the twenty-seven 
years during which the apprentice system has been 
m operation more than fifteen thousand boys have 
attended the course, and those who have not re- 
mained in the service have, in the majority of cases, 
made useful citizens. The apprentice system has 
also been important in bringing about the Ameri- 
canization of the navy. Various measures were 
adopted from the beginning of the Isew 'Nayj 
to displace the foreign element in the service. 



92 THE NEW A3IERICAN NAVY 

At the time of my entrance into the department 
in 1897, almost twenty-five per cent, of the en- 
listed men were foreigners. As a means of 
reducing this projDortion, enlistment stations were 
estabhshed in the interior of the country and 
along the Lakes. The material thus obtained was 
of such an excellent character that when Con- 
gress made substantial increases in the enlisted 
force, these and additional stations were main- 
tained. Recruits are placed on board receiving- 
ships, where they learn the rudiments of their 
future calling, and are subsequently distributed 
among training-ships. When their preliminary 
education is concluded, they are transferred to 
regular cruising vessels. Arrangements had 
been perfected before my retirement from the 
department for the training of four thousand 
landsmen annually. Congress should authorize 
barracks for the accommodation of raw recruits. 
On shore, mider the observation of officers, it 
will be an easy matter to reject those men who 
fail to show aptitude for the service, retaining 
only the best material to be wrought into the fin- 
ished seaman. The effect of the enhstment of 
landsmen on the Americanization of the navy is 
shown by the fact that almost ninety per cent, of 
the enlisted force is to-day American by birth or 
naturalization. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY 93 

Improvements in the materiel of the navy 
have brought about the necessity for an enhsted 
personnel of high intelHgence and skill; and with 
these qualities has come the need of better i^ro- 
vision for enlisted men. The sailors of the old 
navy were subjected to hard conditions; they 
are treated to-day as men. Fifty years ago they 
received whatever training was given them on 
shipboard. Even in the ^N'ew N'avy, mitil 1897, 
only the torpedo school and the gmi foundry 
were open to them. The use of electricity on 
board war-ships grew to such proportions during 
my time that it was deemed advisable to establish 
an electrical school at the New York navy-yard. 
The gmniery course was completed by practical 
training on the monitors Amphitrite and Puritan 
in ISTorth Atlantic waters. To stimulate the men, 
the rating of gmi captain was created. It is a 
gratifying fact that ships to which gmi captains 
were detailed showed considerable and immedi- 
ate improvement in target practice. The clerks 
of the navy are Imown as yeomen. That men 
enlisted for this rating might properly under- 
stand their duties, a yeoman's training-school was 
established at New York. One of the later acts 
of my time was the direction to establish at the 
Norfolk navy-yard an artificers' school. Here 
experience in shipwork will be given to car- 



94 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

penters, shipfitters, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, 
shijj's jDlmnbers, and men of other ship's trades. 
That every ounce of coal may produce the largest 
volume of steam, and that engines and boilers 
may not be raj^idly worn out, a training-school 
was provided for firemen. The Cincinnati, the 
bowels of which are one mass of machinery, was 
selected for use as this school. 

'No description of the personnel of the Ameri- 
can navy would be complete without a reference 
to the marine corps. An early Continental Con- 
gress authorized the organization of a body of 
marines. The Congress of the United States, 
which directed the construction of the first ships 
of the old navy, simultaneously provided for 
the commissioning of marine officers and the en- 
listment of men for the guards. In all om* wars 
the marines have distinguished themselves. On 
nineteen separate occasions Congress has, by 
joint resolution, expressed its sense of apprecia- 
tion of their valor and good conduct. After the 
Civil War a movement was inaugurated to abol- 
ish the corps, but a thorough investigation by 
Congress established the inadvisability of such 
action. Many line officers have expressed the 
opinion that the marine corps is no longer needed 
on board ships, and several years before the 
Spanish "War the attempt to bring about its abo- 



ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY 95 

lition was renewed. Colonel Charles Haywood, 
now major-general, commandant of the corps, 
appeared before the personnel board in 1897 
and earnestly opposed amalgamation with the 
na\'y. The corps was reorganized and enlarged 
by the personnel law — action which met with 
general approval in view of the new laurels 
added to its record by the battalion which served 
at Guantanamo, where the corps rendered espe- 
cially brilliant service, as well as on the ships at 
Manila and Santiago, and ashore in China and 
the Philippines. 



IV 

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 

Geeat results often overshadow and prevent 
due recognition of the merit and vital impor- 
tance of the preparations which make possible 
their achievement. The navy, trimnphant in 
battle, is a very different thing m the eye of an 
admiring comitry from the same navy preparing 
for the conflict. In one scene the actors are 
the picturesque and glorious fighters on deck; 
in the other, the bureau chief at his desk, the 
constructor in his shirt-sleeves, the forger of the 
great guns, the painstakuig ofiicial providmg his 
great coal-pits at easy reach. We laud the suc- 
cessful captains; too often we forget the men 
who made ready at their hands the material that 
made their victory sure. The names of Preble, 
Hull, Decatur, Porter, Farragut, and of recent 
naval leaders, are resplendent names on the 
pages of our history, but who recalls or knows 
the names of the congressmen who secured 
the authorization of the ships on board which 
these heroes won their way to immortality, or of 
the naval ofiicials who designed and built and 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NA\Tr 97 

eqnipiDed them, and on whose shoulders the final 
responsibility for the conduct of vessels and crews 
in hostile operations largely rests ? 

The first war Secretary of the IN'avy was Ben- 
jamin Stoddert, of Maryland, who administered 
the service during the quasi-war with France. 
Robert Smith, of Maryland, sent to the Mediter- 
ranean the forces which humified the Barbary 
States and enforced respect for American citi- 
zenship. Paul Hamilton, of South Carolina, and 
William Jones, of Pemisylvania, directed the 
fitting out and the dispatch to what appeared 
certain defeat but was in nearly all cases sig- 
nificant victory, of our ships in the second war 
with Great Britain. By his effective and ex- 
cellent administration of the fleets of our Civil 
War, Gideon Welles earned the grateful appre- 
ciation of his comitry. 

Too often forgotten are the men who in time 
of war are in subordinate departmental posi- 
tions. The few clerks who faithfully carried out 
the instructions of Stoddert, Smith, Hamilton, 
and Jones, and undoubtedly did a large part of 
their w^ork, are to-day unknown. The navy trea- 
sures the name of Gustavus Y. Fox, the able 
assistant of Secretary Welles; but a small per- 
centage of the present generation of the Ameri- 
can people are aware of his faithfulness, his 



98 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

capacity, and the far-reaching results of the 
labor he performed. Entitled to special remem- 
brance also are the bureau chiefs of the Civil 
War; but only the tons of musty records in- 
cumbering the files of the Navy Department tell 
of the way in which they fulfilled their duties. 
And coming to the war with Spain, are not The- 
odore Roosevelt and Charles H. Allen, the assist- 
ant secretaries, and Arent S. Crowninshield, the 
chief of the Bureau of jN^avigation, and Charles 
0']!^eil, the chief of ordnance, and George W. 
Melville, the engineer-in-chief, and Philip Hich- 
born, the chief constructor, and Koyal B. Brad- 
ford, the chief of equipment, and Edwin Stewart, 
the paymaster-general, and Wilham K. Van Rey- 
pen, the surgeon-general, and Mordecai T. Endi- 
cott, the chief of the Bureau of Yards and , 
Docks, and Samuel C. Lemly, the judge advo- 1 
cate general, and Benjamin F. Peters, the chief 
clerk, and their subordinates, worthy of remem- 
brance in connection with those who actually 
participated in battle ? How promptly Con- 
gress rewarded Dewey and his captains ! How 
quickly would there have been action in behalf 
of the Santiago officers had it not been for the 
unfortunate Sampson-Schley controversy ! On 
the other hand, what indifference when it was 
urged that national acknowledgment be given 



I 



ii 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 99 

to the otRcers who, though aware that only at 
sea could glory be won, placed duty above de- 
sire and patriotically remained at their desks, 
though at first some of them pleaded Avith tears 
in their eyes for service afloat ! 

The central function of the navy is the Navy 
Department at the national capital. This is 
the organ which directs all members of the ser- 
vice, which is bound to detect any weakness in 
the nayj system and replace it with new and 
healthier groA\i;h, and which centralizes all its 
forces for striking the sea power of an enemy. 
That imyj is the most efficient and effective 
which, other things equal, is the most intelli- 
gently administered. The height naval educa- 
tion will reach depends upon the standard fixed 
for its attainment. 

It is to the I^avy Department, therefore, that 
the coimtry looks for an efficient nayj when 
means for the ships and men have been pro- 
vided. And to the department to-day I believe 
the country may so look with confidence. It is 
true that, like any other great institution in which 
the element of human nature is active, it still, 
to some extent, lacks cohesion and harmony, 
and in the transaction of business, even of rou- 
tine character, there are now and then friction 
and wranghng in some details on the part of 



100 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

intelligent and able officials which would not be 
tolerated in a ci\dlian establishment. The sys- 
tem, however, and not the men, are at fault; 
indeed, in the main they work together with 
tremendous effect. Differences of opinion are 
better than lifelessness. ^or is it surprising 
that they should sometimes be accompanied by 
pettiness of personal feeling w^hen one considers 
the way in which the departmental organization 
has grown, how necessity and expediency have 
developed it, and how intangible sometimes are 
the lines of demarcation between the authority 
and duties of the several bureaus. 

The navy of the Revolution did effective 
work in that epochal struggle, but the credit 
for its achievements is little due to the sev- 
eral boards and committees which Congress 
appointed to create and administer it. In spite 
of the successes of the revolting colonies on the 
sea, especially of their persistent and lucky pri- 
vateers, and the importance attached by Europe 
to our naval promise, the fomiders of our fed- 
eral government thought the navy of so little 
consequence that the Secretary of "War was 
charged by the first Congress under the federal 
Constitution with supervision of naval affairs. 
Soon, however, unfamiliarity with the construc- 
tion of vessels of war, and with naval business 




i;i:ak-al)mikal mokdecai p. exdicott 

Now Chief uf the Bureau of Yards and Docks 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 101 

generally, led the war authorities to make the 
blunt confession that a separate department for 
the navy was absolutely essential, and an act, 
approved April 80, 1798, established the Navy 
Department, the head of which was named the 
Secretary of the Navy and made a cabinet offi- 
cer, subordinate to whom were a principal clerk 
and such other clerks as he required. This 
organization carried the navy through the war 
with France, the war with the Barbary States, 
and the war Avith Great Britain. Defects, how- 
ever, developed which demanded correction. A 
Secretary miprovided with expert professional 
assistance, and untrained in the technicalities 
of naval affairs, might have become at critical 
times a dangerous instead of a helpful factor 
in the service. " The multifarious concerns of 
the naval estabhshment," wrote Secretary Jones 
in 1814, " the absence of wholesome regulations 
in its civil administration, and the imperfect 
execution of duties due to want of professional 
experience, lead to confusion and abuses." 

This plain statement convinced Congress that 
no further time was to be lost in reorganizing 
the department, and by an act approved Feb- 
ruary 7, 1815, six weeks after the signature of 
the Treaty of Ghent which closed the war with 
Great Britain, a board of navy commissioners 



102 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

was added to the department. This board con- 
sisted of three oflScers of the navy, of rank not 
below that of post captain; and the law re- 
quired it, under the supervision of the Secre- 
tary, to discharge all the ministerial duties of 
the department relative to the procurement of 
naval stores and materials, and the construction, 
armament, equipment, and employment of ves- 
sels of war, as well as other matters connected 
with the naval establishment. It is true that this 
organization sometimes exemplified the truth of 
the old aphorism, " In divided power there is no 
individual responsibility." Also that the navy 
commissioners were usually men unfamiliar with 
the mechanical craft of shipbuilding, although 
by law given the right which they exercised to 
alter or reject plans of a projected ship which the 
constructors, subordinate to them, might submit. 
Also that the Constitution, the United States, and 
the Ohio, designed by Constructors Humphrey 
and Eckford, were the favorite and fastest ships 
of the navy in 1840, while those of later date, 
for which the navy commissioners were respon- 
sible, were clumsier and by no means the equal 
in speed of the fleet and graceful merchant ships 
laid down at American seaports. The board, 
however, was progressive, notwithstanding its 
ignorance of the science of ship-designing, and 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 103 

was earnest to recognize and take advantage of 
improvements in the art of naval warfare. From 
1815 to 1842, the hfetime of the board, the navy 
increased many-fold, and Cooper thus testified 
to its efficiency: "As respects the navies of this 
hemisphere, it was (in 1845) supreme, the imited 
marines of all the rest of the continent being 
unable to contend against it for an hour." Still, 
due in part to the fact that the law required the 
board to act as a unit, and in part to other de- 
fects of the system, the abuses of which Secre- 
tary Jones complained continued to some extent 
either in the same or new forms under the navy 
commissioners, causing the celebrated Matthew 
Maury, then a young ensign in the navy, to wTite 
this criticism: — 

" To what page soever I turn, I find my note- 
book filled with memoranda which exemplify the 
evils of the present system. However distinctly 
within the walls of the Navy Department usage 
may have drawn the line of demarcation between 
the duties of Secretary and navy board, or how- 
ever well it may be imderstood there, you will 
find but few able to trace it out of that building. 
Ask officers of the navy where the duties of the 
navy board begin ? or where its responsibilities 
end ? or where rests its accountability ? — and 
no two will agree in their reply. Ask the best- 



104 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

informed citizens the same questions. Some will 
tell you that the navy board is a power behind 
the Secretary, greater than the Secretary him- 
self — that there is a master spirit in that board 
which rules the navy. Others will tell you that 
the evil genius of the navy presides at that 
board. Him they unjustly charge with every- 
thing that goes amiss, and would hold respon- 
sible for the present condition of the navy." 

All which, even at the present day, has 
rather a familiar sound to anybody who recalls 
those criticisms of the ISTavy Department or any 
other department, which are always in the air. 
" The evils of the present system " are always 
with us and always will be. 

Congress, cognizant of imperfections in the 
departmental system, in 1839 called upon the 
Secretary of the ISTavy to suggest a plan of 
reorganization which should make a proper 
division of the duties performed by the naval 
commissioners. Disheartened by criticism and 
oppressed by the growing biu'dens which the 
increase of the navy and the new problems 
which developments in the science of naval war- 
fare had laid on them, the commissioners at 
last officially admitted that their usefulness had 
gone, and recommended the introduction of a 
system of bureaus practically identical with that 




CAPTAIN SAMIEL CONIIAD LEMLV 

.Iiidgf- Advocate General 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 105 

which exists to-day, with the exception of the 
Bureau of Steam Engineering. Steam was then 
in its infancy, and was not considered suffi- 
ciently important to warrant supervision as a 
separate feature of the naval establishment. 
The Senate adopted the recommendation of the 
commissioners, which contemplated the organ- 
ization of seven bureaus, but the House re- 
duced the number to five, and in this reduction 
the Senate concurred. The bureaus created by 
the act of August 31, 1842, were IS'avy- Yards 
and Docks; Construction, Equipment, and Re- 
13airs; Provisions and Clothing; Ordnance and 
Hydrography; and Medicine and Surgery, the 
titles indicating the duties respectively assigned 
to each. A line officer of the rank of captain 
was made chief of each bureau, with the exception 
of the two bureaus of Provisions and Clothing, 
and Medicine and Surgery. In 1853 John Len- 
thal, a naval constructor, was appointed chief 
of the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and 
Repairs. 

The bureau system did not escape criticism 
as sharp as that leveled at preceding organiza- 
tions. The Civil War demonstrated elements of 
inadequacy, and Congress in 18G2 added the Bu- 
reau of Steam Engineering, created the Bureau 
of Navigation, and took equij^ment from Equip- 



106 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

ment, Construction, and Kepairs, making it, with 
recruiting, a separate Bureau of Equipment and 
Recruiting. The rebelhon also brought into ex- 
istence the office of Assistant Secretary of the 
l^avy, which was authorized in 1861 and abol- 
ished in 1869. It was reestablished in 1891 in 
accordance with the recommendations of the 
secretaries who had engaged in developing the 
New 'Nayj. Questions involving interpretation 
and application of the law constantly arising, 
and the need of an officer specially charged with 
the supervision of courts-martial and also with 
the very important and growing matters of con- 
tracts of all kinds to which the ISTavy Depart- 
ment is a party, caused Congress m 1865 to 
direct the appointment of a " Solicitor and IS^aval 
Judge Advocate General." AVith some difficulty 
Congress was induced, just before the construc- 
tion of the New Navy, not to discontmue the 
office. It is to-day a very important branch of 
naval administration, especially m view of the 
dealings, involving many millions of outlay, of 
the Navy Department with contractors of all 
sorts. 

Scandals and abuses had flourished as the old 
navy declined. Regeneration of material was 
accompanied by reform of administration. Sec- 
retary Chandler fomid serious lack of respon- 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 107 

sibility and coordination of work. To obtain 
greater efficienc}'^, he recommended tlie ajjpoint- 
ment of three superintending naval constructors, 
who should have direct charge of all work re- 
lating to construction, steam engineering, and 
equipment, under the supervision of a chief of 
the Bureau of Naval Construction. Secretary 
AVhitney reported that large jDrivate purchases 
were made by the bureau chiefs where the law 
intended that contracts, after due public com- 
petition, should be awarded to the lowest bid- 
der. Instead of being in the hands of regular 
dealers, much of the business of the navy was 
controlled by brokers. During the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1885, seven bureaus, acting 
independently of one another, expended $138,000 
for 166 several 023en purchases of coal, that is, 
without competition; eight bureaus made 299 
open purchases of stationery; six bureaus bought 
lumber and hardware for which the government 
paid .$121,315 in 499 separate open purchases, 
and seven bureaus spent |46,000 for oils and 
paints in 269 separate purchases. Mr. Whitney 
fomid that eight bureaus suppHed ships with sta- 
tionery and three furnished lamps and lanterns. 
As the law authorizing the deijartmental or- 
ganization places the assignment of duties in the 
hands of the Secretary, Mr. Whitney directed 



108 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

comprehensive and wise reforms. He consoli- 
dated the business of conducting purchases in 
the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, and 
made the paymaster-general responsible there- 
for. In order to check muiecessary accumulation 
of suj)plies and to reduce the exjDenditures for 
purchases made, the general-storekeeper system 
was created and the Bureau of Provisions and 
Clothing was charged with the keeiDing of pro- 
perty accomits. During the administration of 
Secretary Tracy the name of the Bureau of Pro^ 
visions and Clothing was changed to that of 
Supplies and Accoimts as more truthfully de- 
fining the duties it performs. 

Secretary Tracy carried on the policy of refor- 
mation. When he assumed the naval portfolio, 
he fomid that " the details of admmistering the 
navy, as an existing force, its vessels in commis- 
sion, its officers and its crews, were scattered, 
without system or coherence, among a variety 
of offices, bureaus, and boards." As illustrating 
the confusion which existed, the Secretary said 
in his report for 1889 : — 

" The assignment of officers to duty, and, to a 
limited extent, the movements of shijDs in com- 
mission, were in charge of an ' office of detail,' 
at the head of which was the chief of the Bu- 
reau of I^avigation, which bureau was, at the 




KEAR-ADMIRAL ROYAL UIIJD BliADFOKI) 



Chief of the Bureau of Eciuipment during the war 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 109 

same time, siippljnng compasses, chronometers, 
and navigating" instruments, electric-light plant, 
ships' libraries, and other miscellaneous articles. 
The enlistment and assignment of seamen be- 
longed to Equipment, which was also engaged in 
the 8U])])ly of another list of miscellaneous arti- 
cles, and in the manufacture of cordage, galleys, 
chains, and anchors. The direction of gmmery 
practice by ships in commission was in charge of 
Ordnance, whose all-important duties in provid- 
ing the na^y with a modern armament left little 
opportmiity for supervising the occupations of 
vessels at sea. The exammation of those ves- 
sels on their return from a cruise was the duty 
of a Board of Inspection which was not associ- 
ated with any bureau. The training of officers 
and men was in part conducted independently by 
the Xaval Academy, and m other parts assumed 
by ]N"a\ngation, Equipment, and Ordnance. To all 
these fragments of authority there was no cen- 
tral unity of direction, except such as could be 
given by the personal attention of the Secretary 
to the exclusion of that broad and general super- 
vision over all executive business which is re- 
quired by a department as comprehensive as the 
na^^^, and cases were not infrequent where a ship 
i-eceived simultaneous orders from three separate 
bureaus which were so directly contradictory that 
it was impossible to execute them." 



110 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Eradication of the defects which Mr. Tracy 
discovered was one of the important works to 
which he devoted his attention. The adminis- 
tration and operation of the fleet, including 
movements of ships and training, assignment, 
enlistment, inspection, and practice of the per- 
sonnel, were assigned to the Bureau of IS^aviga- 
tion. The miscellaneous duties of navigation, 
which properly came within the sphere of equip- 
ment of ships, were transferred to Equipment, 
which lost recruiting. The hydrographic ofiice 
was by law attached to the Bureau of ]S^a^^ga- 
tion. Secretary Tracy recommended that it be 
placed under the Bureau of EquijDment, but it 
was not until 1898 that legislation directing this 
was enacted. 

Another step in the reformation of naval ad- 
ministration was taken by Secretary Herbert, my 
predecessor at the head of the ]^[a\y Department. 
Mr. Herbert, in 1894, issued a general order 
charging the Bureau of Construction and Repair 
with the responsibility for the design, structural 
strength, and stability of vessels built for the 
navy. This order was important for the reason 
that it enabled the department to hold a single 
officer accountable for the success or failure of a 
ship. 

Thus, while examination of the history of the 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 111 

Navy Department in 1897 showed persistent 
effort to place the office upon a soimd business 
footing, it was also found that much remained to 
be done before a satisfactory organization would 
be in operation. Prior to the first inauguration of 
President McKinley, Congress had not provided 
for the improvement of the navy-yards with the 
proportionate liberality which their importance to 
the steel fleet demanded. The demand for na\'y- 
yard reorganization at the time of the birth of 
the New Navy was so insistent that Congress, in 
1882, directed the appointment of a commission 
to make a thorough investigation. This commis- 
sion then advised a reorganization and concen- 
tration of the mechanical departments of the 
yards at New York, Norfolk, and Mare Island, 
the closing of the New London and Pensacola 
yards, the temporary shutting down of the League 
Island yard, and the retention of the Washing- 
ton yard for the manufacture of standard articles, 
but not as a shipyard for the repair of vessels. 
Difference of opinion existed as to what should 
be done with the Boston and Portsmouth yards. 
^ The Secretary designated the Washington 3^ard 
as the place where all ordnance work should be 
centered, directed that most of the construction 
and repairs of ships should be effected at the 
New York, Norfolk, and Mare Island yards, and 



112 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

ordered that equipment work should be done at 
the Boston yard. The steady growth of the 
navy and the size it had attained in 1897 con- 
vinced me that the time had come to enlarge the 
capacity of existing yards and to equip others to 
do rejDair work. During my administration the 
yard at Port Royal, S. C, was the only yard 
abandoned, but in its place Congress authorized 
the establishment of an important naval station 
at Charleston, in the same State. 

A step toward the effective reconstruction of 
the yards was the appointment of a competent 
chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. From 
the time of its creation this office had been held 
by officers of the line who possessed little expert 
knowledge in civil engineering. Knowledge of 
this science is essential for the proper planning 
of naval stations, the construction of dry docks, 
and erection of buildings. A vacancy occurring, 
the President, upon my recommendation, ap- 
pointed as chief of that bureau for the term of 
four years — the period fixed by law — Civil En- 
gineer Mordecai T. Endicott, an officer of good 
standing in his profession and for a long time on 
duty in that bureau, who had theretofore given 
evidence of efficiency and skilhj Congress, at 
last satisfied that an effective fleet must have 
bases, and be equipped with aj)pliances for 




ma,I()i;-(;i:nki;al ciiAitLi^ 



IIKVWOOI). r. s. M. c. 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 113 

prompt repairs, authorized extensive navy-yard 
improvements. Five years ago the docking fa- 
cilities of the country were totally inadequate. 
There were but three docks capable of receiving 
battle-shi^Ds — one at New York, known as Dock 
No. 3, a timber structure, which was defective 
on account of both location and workmanship; 
one at Port Royal, built of timber, the cross- 
section of which was too small to permit the 
entrance of a battle-ship fitted with bilge-keels, 
and which could be approached only at high 
tide ; and the third, also timber-built, at Bremer- 
ton, Washington, which was the best of its size 
belonging to the government, but which had the 
disadvantage of being within striking distance 
of the British naval station at Esquimault. The 
prospect of war Avith Spain and the need of a 
dock on the Atlantic coast available for battle- 
ships in case of injury caused the department to 
take measures for putting Dock No. 3, at New 
York, in condition for service, and it has since 
been jiractically in continuous service. A sig- 
nificant indication of our lack of sufficient docks 
was furnished in 1897 by the mortifying neces- 
sity of sending the battle-ship Indiana to Halifax 
to have her bottom scraped and cleaned. 

A board of officers was appointed in 1897 to 
consider the docking requirements of the navy. 



I 



114 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

and in the light of its report, the department 
recommended the construction of stone and con- 
crete docks at Boston, Portsmouth, ]S". H., and 
Mare Island, CaL, a steel jfloating dock at Algiers, 
La., and the enlargement of docks at JSew York, 
League Island, Pa., and N^orfolk, Va. Congress 
investigated the relative merits of timber and 
stone and concrete docks, and in 1898 provided 
for four timber docks and one steel floating dock; 
but authority was afterwards given to the depart- 
ment to build these four docks of the more solid 
material. The construction of these docks of 
masonry has definitely committed the government 
to this type, the advantages of which are greater 
safety, longer hf e, and less repairs. Though these 
docks, which are now nearing completion, were 
at the time of their design the largest ever built 
by the United States, three others, also of stone 
and concrete, which Congress subsequently au- 
thorized, will be even deeper and wider, accommo- 
dating any of the immense battle-ships which arc ■ 
under construction or contemplated. The floL> 
ing dock for Algiers is in successful operation 
at the naval station at that point. During the 
five years of my term Congress authorized the 
construction of seven masonry docks, one steel 
floating dock, and the rebuilding of one timber 
dock in concrete. In addition, the department 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 115 

purchased for the small sum of $250,000 the 
practically new steel floatiii*]^ dock at Havana, 
which had cost Spain |G00,000. In 1897 there 
were eleven government docks, only three of 
which could accommodate battle-shijDS of the first 
class. There are to-day, built or under construc- 
tion, twenty-one government docks, eight of 
which are designed to receive the largest ships 
and three others ships of 10,000 tons displace- 
ment. Even with this number, we are far behind 
the maritime nations of Europe. In the single 
yard at Portsmouth, England, there are more dry- 
docks than we have to-day in our whole ser- 
vice. Germany, the navy of which is about the 
same strength as our own, has seventy docks, 
two of which belong to private companies and 
are capable of receiving any of the Kaiser's 
battle-ships. 

Besides providing docldng facilities, Congress 
also authorized improvements in navy-yard plants. 
The na^^-yard at ^ew York is now equipped to 
construct battle-ships. That at Portsmouth, 
with an additional appropriation of $175,000, 
and the yards at N^orfolk and Mare Island, with 
an additional appropriation of $225,000, can be 
made ready for building vessels of this type. 
The improvements under way at Boston wall, 
witliin two years, fit that yard for this work. 



116 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

The yards are to-day in condition to make repairs 
promptly, efficiently, and economically. The 
comitry should not think, however, that their im- 
provement ought to cease. Much must be done 
to keep them in a state of efficiency. The coal- 
ing facilities of the country have also largely in- 
creased since 1897. A man-of-war leaving San 
Francisco for China or Australia will now find 
coal-piles distributed at convenient points along 
the route. Coal is the food of a modern ship, 
and war will demonstrate the strategical impor- 
tance of these stations. In addition to coaling- 
depots, the United States owns twenty-three 
navy-yards and naval stations, the total value of 
which is not far from |100,000,000. 

The shore stations of the navy have been 
described at some length because knowledge of 
their condition is necessary to obtain an adequate 
idea of the responsibility which rests upon the 
shoulders of those who administer naval affairs. 
The several bureaus, which have departments at 
the various yards and stations, are tenacious of 
their prerogatives and guard them jealously, 
fearing, perhaps, that any innovation will be fol- 
lowed by diminution of their jurisdiction. The 
temptation to step beyond the limits of a bureau's 
authority as fixed by the naval regulations some- 
times proves almost irresistible. The biu-eau 




Photojiriiph copyright In, I. E, I'unly ■ ' 

HON. JOIIX D. LONG 

Secretary of tlie Navy 189T-190'2 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 117 

affected sharply resents the encroachment, and 
there immediately follows an exchange of com- 
mnnications, sometimes highly seasoned. The 
controversy is ultimately loaded upon the Secre- 
tary, who is expected to untangle the snarl in 
which his subordinates have wound themselves. 
The relations between the bureaus are occasion- 
ally so strained that ordinary courtesy is im- 
paired. I recall that one bureau chief became 
highly incensed at another because of the latter's 
recommendations in connection with changes in 
the machinery of a cruiser. " Your recommen- 
dations," wrote the former, " are as inconsistent 
with your ignoring of the suggestion to with- 
draw the same as is your assumption of a ^ best 
way to handle ' these surveys antagonistic to sim- 
ple bureau duties. The ostentatious display of a 
banner marked ' dispatch ' may obtain the con- 
fidence of the unversed, but it is not the joroof 
of ability to secure that desideratum which is 
required to satisfy expert criticism." 

This is one of the many instances of the fric- 
tion which sometimes exists, but which should 
by no means be regarded as the rule. There has 
at times been hke lack of harmony between other 
bureaus. The cause of the trouble any one who 
investigates the matter will readily appreciate. 
Here are three or four bm'eaus charged with the 



118 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

construction and fitting out of vessels, and while 
one, for example, is held responsible for the care 
and repair of all auxiliary steam machinery, it 
has no voice either in the design or installation 
of many of the auxiliaries. It frequently has 
happened that one bureau has brought its work 
to a point where, mider the regulations, it should 
be taken over by another bureau, but the latter 
was not ready for it. Each bureau has a sepa- 
rate force of inspectors and corps of officers. 
As a ship is an integral work, it is evident that 
efficiency and economy could better be obtained 
by placing its construction, as far as possible, 
under one head. The construction and equipment 
of ships would thus be conducted under the sys- 
tem which is successfully employed in the private 
shipyards of the country. Leading up to this 
step, the department began in 1897 the substitu- 
tion of electrical for steam power at navy-yards. 
Investigation had disclosed the astonishing fact 
that the power for operating the machinery of 
the different departments of the yards, instead of 
being supplied by a single plant, was furnished 
by boilers and engines scattered about the yard 
and operated by different bureaus. Of course 
separate gangs of men were required for each 
plant, and the amount of power obtained was 
relatively small for the coal used and the steam 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 119 

consumed. Rectification of this extravagance 
was partial]}' effected by concentration nnder the 
authority vested in the Secretary of the Navy. 
Legishition was, however, necessary before con- 
sohdation of the bureaus could be made. The 
bureaus of Construction and Repair, of Steam 
Engineering, and of Equipment, both as matter 
of economy and efhciency, should be under one 
head. Congress failed to adopt the recommen- 
dation to this end, just as it had neglected to act 
favorably upon recommendations contemplating 
somewhat the same result submitted by Secreta- 
ries Chandler and Whitney. This change must 
some time occur, and with it will come a sound 
business system which will introduce cohesion 
and unity in naval administration. The hydro- 
graphic office and the naval observatory should 
be placed directly under the Secretary of the 
Navy. The observatory is decidedly behind in- 
stitutions of like character in the United States 
and Europe. It has always had as its super- 
intendent a line officer, who sometimes pos- 
sessed thorough and sometimes merely super- 
ficial know^ledge of astronomy. The condition 
of the observatory has for tw^o or three years 
past been brought to the attention of Congress, 
which directed the appointment of a board of 
visitors, whose criticisms have already brought 



120 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

improvement in the work of the institution. It 
was urgently recommended by me that legisla- 
tion be enacted removing all limitations from 
the field from which the selection of a super- 
intendent may be made, but the " pull " was 
too strong. The country is entitled to its best 
astronomer for this great astronomical plant. 
This recommendation provoked strong opposi- 
tion from some officers in the navy and their 
friends in Congress, which took the opposite 
direction, and even directed that the superin- 
tendent should be, " until further legislation," a 
line officer not below the rank of captain, thus 
Hmiting the place to a favored few and ignoring 
entirely the question of their capacity to fill it. 
The phrase, " until further legislation," gives 
some hope that Congress may later take more 
reasonable action with respect to the observatory. 
Good management and results commensurate 
with the expenditures made demand a competent 
head, and the agitation which has been begun by 
the scientific bodies of the country should even- 
tually bring about the organization of a person- 
nel which will make the institution the equal of 
any in the world ; indeed, with its larger expend- 
itures, it should be superior. 

From the time the construction of the old 
navy began, every Secretary of the ^avy has 




rii..t...'ra|.h \<y H.iiry It.ivi .M..,,rc 

NAVY DKi'AirrMKxr r.rii,i)i\(;. wa.mii.ngtux 



TnE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 121 

felt the need of professional assistance. This 
want produced the board of navy commissioners 
and then the bureau system of the dcjDartment. 
But the bureaus, working independently of one 
another and not always in harmony, so appro- 
priated the space of a ship as often to leave her 
defective in some important particular. This 
unfortunate state of affairs was jiartially reme- 
died by Secretary Tracy, who m 1889 consti- 
tuted a board, called the Board on Construction, 
consisting of the chiefs of the five bureaus of 
Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Equipment, Con- 
struction and Kepairs, and Steam Engineering, 
to which he gave general supervision over the 
design, construction, and equipment of ships. 
As the work of the Biu-eau of Yards and Docks 
was confined to shore stations, and as a civil 
engineer had been placed at the head of this 
bureau, it was withdrawn from representation 
on the board and the naval intelligence officer 
substituted. The board deserves great credit 
for the work it has done, especially under the 
presidency of Rear- Admiral 0']S"eil, whose tact 
and judgment, in many controversial questions, 
have facilitated the submission of the intelligent 
recommendations of the board to the depart- 
ment. To it are referred questions of general 
construction, differences of opinion between 



122 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

bureaus, and especially the plans and specifica- 
tions for new ships. 

Beyond the Secretary of the Kavy and the 
chief of the Bureau of Navigation there was, 
till recently, no well-organized system for the 
intelligent direction of the fleet after its con- 
struction and commission. The experience of 
the war with Spain showed the need of a gen- 
eral staff. The office of naval intelligence and 
the naval war college, both of which owe their 
creation to Secretary Chandler, were the first 
stage in the formation of the general staff; but 
they were not adapted to comprehensive super- 
vision of the training and the operation of the 
navy in war. When the Carnegie Steel Company 
was first established, only a few officers were 
required for the administration of its affairs ; but 
when its interests became large, a board of 
directors was necessary successfully to conduct 
its business. The general staff of the navy 
approximates the board of directors of a manu- 
factiu"ing concern. Its duties include the col- 
lection of information respecting foreign navies, 
their bases in time of war, and the theater of 
action in which they will move. This infomia- 
tion will permit an appreciation of the aims and 
purposes of those navies, and a comparison of 
their strength with that which we will be able to 




I'liotosraph by lUnry lloyt Mi.nri' 

HON. WILLIAM IL MOODY 

Sfcietary of tlic Navy since M;i,v 1, limj 



THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY 123 

muster against each or several of them. Based 
upon it, comprehensive phins can be prepared 
for the most effective operations hj our navy 
and the utilization of auxiliary forces such as 
the naval militia and reserves, and cooperation 
with the army. The formulation of these plans 
and their execution in time of peace under the 
simulated conditions of war will train officers 
and men and prepare them to grajople with hos- 
tile situations when they arise. 

After the war with Spain, Ca^Dtain H. C Tay- 
lor, now chief of the Bureau of I^^avigation, 
who had given long and diligent study to the 
plan, and is to be credited with its adoption, 
submitted to me a memorandum on a general 
staff for the nnyj. This memorandum jDointed 
out the value and purpose of the general staff, 
much as stated above. The navy w^as not quite 
ready for such a comprehensive change as w^ould 
occur m case of the adoption of the full gen- 
eral staff system, though it had been a subject 
of discussion for many years. The department 
did not see its way clear to go further than to or- 
ganize what is designated as the General Board, 
with the admiral of the na\'y as its president, 
and the whole thing under the direct super- 
vision of the Secretary. This board meets often, 
and at times consults with the commanders- 



124 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

in-chief of the various squadrons, especially the 
North Atlantic, which practices the war plans 
which the board devises. The work promises 
well, and tends to keep the navy in full 
preparation for war, although there is also a 
tendency in the board to seek undue control 
and secure legislation which would really sup- 
plant the authority of the Secretary. This 
would fundamentally upset our governmental 
administrative system, and would also result 
in unlimited expense. 

In the navy a system of administration so 
compact and yet so elastic that jealousies and 
friction will be minimized and the most effective 
cooperation obtained is always the desideratum. 
What the navy has accomplished must be at- 
tributed in large measure to the strength and 
character of its administrative and fightmg offi- 
cers. They have done splendid work, and they 
will do better yet. They are zealous, full of 
ability, honesty, force, and full, of course, of 
human nature. With these qualities the naval 
administrative organization is tending still more, 
as fast as it can, towards a system which will 
harmoniously labor for only one aim and pur- 
pose — the honor and safety of the country. 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 

CiHiA projected a sinister shadow across the 
foreign rekitions of the United States at the time 
when Wilham McKinley was inaugurated Pre- 
sident, March 4, 1897. RebeUion had raged in 
the ishind for years. The sound of the crack of 
its rifles and the swish of its machetes reached 
across the sea and grew more and more audible 
in the ears of the great Repubhc which for 
more than a century has been the ideal of free- 
dom to all oppressed people. 

Throughout the United States were mani- 
fested deep sympathy for the insurgents and a 
general wish for their success in their struggle. 
This feeling was intensified by the inhumane 
and barbarous methods of warfare employed by 
Spain to crush the revolt, and by the injury to 
American citizens and their industrial and com- 
mercial interests attendant upon the destructive 
operations of both insurgents and Sj^aniards. 
Responding to the loudly exj^ressed demand of 
the people for some action on our jjart. Pre- 



126 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

sident Cleveland, on April 4, 1896, tendered to 
Spain his good offices for the pacification of the 
island. The national pride of the Castilians in 
the integrity of their possessions rejected the 
offer. The note of the United States, however, 
had hardly reached the Spanish government be- 
fore our House of Representatives, answering 
the national insistence, concurred, by an almost 
mianimous vote, in a Senate resolution recog- 
nizing the belligerency of the republic of Cuba. 
As they lacked the attributes of belligerents. 
President Cleveland declined to grant the insur- 
gents recognition of belligerency. When Pre- 
sident McKinley entered the White House, he 
found the nation enthusiastic in the cause of 
Free Cuba, and the Congress feverishly seeking 
a means to further it. 

With that infinite tact and diplomacy charac- 
teristic of President McKinley, he immediately 
addressed himself to the task of holdmg the 
people and their representatives in check, and 
at the same time accomphshing by negotiation 
the restoration of peace in disturbed Cuba under 
conditions that would satisfy the just aspirations 
of the fighting patriots. He initiated his for- 
eign policy with a declaration of amity toward 
all nations, which perhaps contributed to cause 
Spain to listen more considerately to the pro- 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 127 

posals submitted by John Sherman, then Secre- 
tary of State. The inaugural address of the 
President contained this statement, " War 
should never be entered upon until every agency 
of peace has failed; peace is preferable to war 
in almost every contingency." 

Judicious as were these words, they yet failed 
to restrain the Senate, and that body, in the 
extra session called to enact the tariff bill, passed 
a joint resolution in behalf of Cuban independ- 
ence. The Kepublican House, less headstrong 
than the Senate, stood by the President, and, in 
spite of public clamor, refused to take action 
which at once would have precipitated war and 
which certainly would have gravely embarrassed 
the diplomatic correspondence then pending. 

Looking back over the negotiations conducted 
with Spain, one cannot but remark the high plane 
upon which they were placed ; how McKinley 
made humanity and civilization, with protection 
of American interests, the cardinal principles 
of his policy. In dealing with the Cuban ques- 
tion no selfish desire for territorial aggran- 
dizement affected the treatment he gave it. 
Spain was sovereign in Cuba; her rights as sov- 
ereign must be respected. The obligation which 
we, as a friendly nation, owed to her, no less 
than the necessity of preventing the reproach 



128 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

that we were assisting the insurrection, led Pre- 
sident Cleveland to establish an extensive marine 
patrol of our Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The 
same reasons actuated President McKinley in 
continuing it. Filibustering expeditions reached 
Cuba, it is true, but, annoyed as Spain was, 
she found herself unable to substantiate the 
claim that the United States failed to observe 
that "due diligence" which international law 
requires of a neutral. 

The revolution, knowTi as the Ten Years' War, 
which began in Cuba in 1868, was brought to a 
close in 1878 only by the exhaustion of Spain 
and her rebellious subjects. When President 
McKinley and his cabinet began the study of 
the Cuban question, the conclusion was quickly 
reached that a policy of exhaustion had been 
adopted alike by each party to the later conflict, 
the one to vindicate its sovereignty, the other 
to achieve independence. Spain had sought to 
crush the rebellion in its incipiency by quar- 
tering two hundred and fifty thousand men on 
the island. The effort was futile. Acquainted 
with the soil, acclimated and hardy, the Cuban 
volunteer demonstrated that he was a match for 
the soldier of the Peninsula. The sword proving 
ineffectual to suppress the insurrection, Spain 
resorted to the blunter weapon of starvation. 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 129 

The rural folk were compelled to abandon their 
homes. Males too weak or too old to have joined 
the insurgents were herded with women in camps 
of concentration where lack of food and unsan- 
itary surromi dings begot frightful mortality. A 
conservative estimate of the result of this method 
of conducting war has been put at half a million 
deaths. The country, rid of its residents, was 
laid waste by the torch. Determination to make 
the war expensive to Spain caused the insur- 
gents to vie with her soldiers in the work of 
devastation. The island, upon which natui-c lav- 
ishes her richest bounty, was transformed into 
a smoldering desert in which want and misery 
stalked. Years of work and of American cap- 
ital and industry had been necessary to lift 
Cuba from the enfeebled condition caused by 
the di'ain of the Ten Years' War; the revolu- 
tion of 1895 was forcing it back to the unhappy 
state of 1878. 

The unfortunate situation of the Cuban peo- 
ple and of American interests and investments 
in the island provoked the President to action. 
In the name of humanity and civilization, an 
earnest protest was offered against the cruel 
tactics enforced, and demand was made that the 
war be conducted in accord with the military 
code of civilized nations. Small concessions were 



130 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

made to the just expressions of our horror, but 
the policy of concentration was only completely 
abandoned under the spur of our indignation. 
The right to care for its own is an inherent right 
of every nation. President McKinley obtained 
from Congress an apjoropriation for the relief 
of American citizens in Cuba brought to des- 
titution and sickness by the devastation policy 
pursued in the island. This money, judiciously 
expended, succored many who were starving. 
The good it wrought was an indication of the 
greater good which could be accomplished by 
affording relief to the victims of the reconcen- 
tration camps. On December 24, 1897, the eve 
of the birth of the Master who taught the 
blessed lesson of charity. President McKinley 
aj)pealed to the American people to give of 
their plenty to the suffering Cubans. The re- 
sponse was generous. His own personal contri- 
bution, of which few knew, was far beyond his 
means to give. Distribution of the money and 
supplies collected caused immediate alleviation 
of distress, and thousands were saved from death. 
The President's action was humane in its con- 
ception and execution, as it was also s^^ecially 
characteristic of his own generous nature, but it 
was also internationally significant, for it marked 
the beginning of American intervention in Cuba. 




Phntosraph hy J. K. Punly i Co. 

RKAK-AD.MIRAL FREDERICK RODGERb 

President of the Board for insi^cting neuly acquired war-ships during the wj 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 131 

Temporary amelioration of the condition of 
the Cuban sufferers was the immediate object of 
the presidential appeal for contributions for their 
sustenance. Eradication of the evils in the po- 
litical system of Cuba, which made such a condi- 
tion possible, w^as the only remedy which could 
prevent its return. Moreover, the United States 
owed it to itself and to its people to insist upon 
the termination of a situation which was pro- 
ductive of disaster to American capital, industry, 
and commerce, which caused constant irritation 
and disturbance of domestic, social, and business 
affairs, and which menaced the health of the na- 
tion through the danger of the introduction of 
infectious diseases from the reconcentration 
camps of the island. These obligations were 
far more pressing upon the President than, and 
in fact superseded, the obligation to respect the 
sovereignty of Spain. The first step in their ob- 
servance was intrusted to General Stewart L. 
Woodford, of Xew York, who w^as appointed 
Minister to Spain. On September 18, 1897, Gen- 
eral Woodford tendered to the Madrid govern- 
ment, on behalf of the President, the most kindly 
offices of the United States. This offer was 
couched in language decidedly more emphatic 
than that employed by Secretary Olney seventeen 
months before. " I cannot disguise the gravity 



132 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

of the situation," General Woodford said, " nor 
conceal the conviction of the President that, 
should his present effort be fruitless, his duty to 
his countrymen will necessitate an early decision 
as to the course of action which the time and the 
transcendent emergency may demand." This 
was practically the text of the instruction given 
to General Woodford before his departure for 
his post, and carefully considered by the Presi- 
dent and his cabinet during the hot summer days 
of the preceding July. 

Spain suffered a cabinet crisis eleven days after 
the presentation of the American note, and a 
new Ministry was formed, with the Liberal 
Seiior Sagasta as its president. Sagasta ap- 
preciated the power of the United States and 
the temper of our people. The note of General 
Woodford, our able Minister to Spain, was an- 
swered by the announcement that an autonomist 
government would be established in the island. 
The innovation was one that to the President 
and his cabinet indicated a hopeful change of 
policy on the part of the Spanish Crown. But 
though autonomy was established in Cuba within 
limited areas and with evidence of good faith on 
the part of Spain, it promjDtly developed its insuf- 
ficiency to restore peace to the belligerent island. 
Those loyal to Spain derided it; the insurgents 
contemptuously refused to accept it. 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 133 

Americans must review these negotiations with 
a feehng of satisfaction, for they clearly show 
that every opportunity and ample time were given 
to Spain to meet the demands of our President, 
and to effect a settlement honoral^le and right to 
herself and her rebellious subjects. During the 
consideration of the notes exchanged, I was often 
struck by the concern manifested by President 
McKinley and his advisers of the cabinet to be 
considerate of the susceptibilities of the Spanish 
people, and at the same time to attain the one 
object in view — the permanent pacification of 
Cuba. It was of vital importance that the Xavy 
Dejiartment should be advised of every devel- 
opment in the negotiations, as the maintenance 
of the naval anti-filibustering patrol was in its 
charge, the protection of American life and pro- 
perty in foreign lands was the first duty of our 
men-of-war, and there was, finally, the probability 
that Avar — especially involving the navy — might 
be the ultimate result. 

His conscientious view of the situation had 
deterred President Cleveland from sending a 
man-of-war to Cuban waters, though consular 
officers had not failed to call attention to the 
advisability of such action. American citizens 
had been arbitrarily thrown into jail, and one, 
Dr. Ricardo Ruiz, died in prison under circum- 



134 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

stances which indicated that he had been foully 
murdered. Energetic representations made by 
the State Department during the Cleveland and 
the first few months of the McKinley admin- 
istration resulted in the release of all Americans 
confined in Cuban prisons. ISTevertheless, Gen- 
eral Fitzhugh Lee, our consul-general in Ha- 
vana during both administrations, fomid his re- 
presentations in behalf of American property and 
commercial interests hampered by the absence 
of a naval force, and the known determination of 
the prior administration not to order a war-ship 
to Cuban waters. In the first meetings of 
President McKinley's cabinet consideration was 
given to the suggestion to dispatch a man-of- 
war to Havana. But because it was desirable 
not to arouse the suspicion that the United 
States was applying pressure to SjDain to compel 
acceptance of the President's proposals for the 
termination of the insurrection, it was decided 
to defer such action. Time, however, only accen- 
tuated the gravity of the Cuban situation, and 
there were indications that Havana might become 
the scene of disturbances anti- American in char- 
acter. Such demonstrations, especially if directed 
against the American consulate, could only have 
had consequences disastrous to the peace of the 
two nations. As a measure of precaution, there- 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 135 

fore, President Mclvinley, in October of 1897, 
decided that a war-ship onght to be stationed 
within a short distance of the Cnban capital. 
Instructions were accordingly given to the 
second-class battle-ship Maine to proceed to 
Port Royal, S. C. Early in December she was 
ordered to Key West, with instructions to open 
communication with General Lee, proceed to 
Havana at such time as, on notice from him, 
conditions in that city should warrant, and to 
grant an asylum to American citizens should 
they appear to be in danger. The wisdom of 
this action was proven by disturbances which 
occurred in Havana on January 12, 1898, as 
a result of the hostility of the Spanish royal- 
ists there to the plan of an autonomic govern- 
ment. General Lee cabled to the State De- 
partment that uncertainty existed whether the 
Spanish captain-general could control the situ- 
ation, and advised that shijjs be prepared to 
move promptly. Obviously, there was but one 
thmg to do. Through Minister "Woodford and 
General Lee the Spanish authorities had been 
advised of the purpose of the United States 
to have its war-ships resume friendly visits to 
Cuban ports. Carrying out this decision, the 
Maine went to Havana, and the cruiser Mont- 
gomery to Santiago de Cuba and Matanzas. 



136 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Spain affected to see an ulterior motive in this 
action, and declared that the presence of Ameri- 
can war-ships would obstruct autonomy and 
cause disorder, but responded to the announce- 
ment of the purpose to dispatch war- vessels to 
Cuban waters by declaring her ajDpreciation of 
the proposed visits, and stating that she would 
return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to 
the principal ports of the United States. 

Several reasons were responsible for the se- 
lecting of the Maine for service at Havana. 
She was a second-class battle-ship, really an 
armored cruiser, sufficiently powerful to impress 
the Sj)anish troops and loyalists, and at the same 
time capable of making a good defense in case 
of an attack by shore batteries and their support- 
ing ships in the harbor. She was under an officer 
in whom the department had confidence — Cap- 
tain Charles D. Sigsbee, who had been ordered 
to command her in April, 1897. A few months 
before the Maine was sent to Key West, Captain 
Sigsbee had shown good judgment in avoiding ' 
in the East River, ^N^ew York, a collision with an 
excursion steamer loaded with women and chil- 
dren. Captain Sigsbee's conduct in Havana 
demonstrated that the department had justly 
estimated his character. He was as punctilious 
as the Spaniards in official courtesies. He dip- 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 137 

lomatically refrained from involving himself in 
Cuban politics. At the same time, he served as 
the eyes and ears of the Navy Department, and 
transmitted to it all the information he could 
collect concerning political and mihtary condi- 
tions in the island. 

AVhen the Maine was ordered to Havana, it 
was not intended that she should remain for a 
long time. In the judgment of the medical offi- 
cers of the department, sanitary reasons forbade 
a protracted stay. Political necessity demanded, 
however, that the advantage gained by the dis- 
patch of a vessel should not be lost by her im- 
mediate withdrawal. General Lee expressed the 
opinion that conditions required the presence of 
a war-ship; that the retirement of the Maine 
and neglect to order another ship in her place 
would aggravate them, and that to counteract the 
Spanish estimate of our navy a first-class battle- 
ship should be sent in case the Maine were re- 
lieved, and with it a torpedo-boat to preserve 
communication with the commander-in-chief of 
the North Atlantic Squadron. General Lee's 
views prevailed. The Maine remained in Havana 
harbor, and the torpedo-boat Gushing conveyed 
dispatches to and from her to the commander- 
in-chief at Key AVest. 

"While representatives of the United States, 



138 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

diplomatic, consular, and naval, were according 
to Spain the courtesy due to a friendly nation, 
the envoy of the Spanish government in Wash- 
ington, Enrique Dupuy de Lome, committed an 
unfortunate breach of etiquette and propriety. 
In a letter to a friend in Havana the Minister 
referred to the President in coarse and abusive 
terms. The letter, brought to hght, Avas sub- 
mitted to the State Department. The usefulness 
of its author ceased at once. His recall was 
demanded, but before the demand was presented 
he anticipated it by tendering his resignation. 
Desire to preserve its agent from humiliation 
prompted immediate acceptance of the resigna- 
tion, but the Spanish government subsequently 
expressed regret and disclaimed the views ex- 
pressed in the objectionable missive. Neverthe- 
less, mijustifiable criticism of our President by 
the representative of Spain and the revelation 
he had made of Spanish insincerity aroused in- 
dijrnation and distrust, and added further irrita- 
tion to a situation already brimful of dangerous 
possibilities. 

The widening rift in the relations between the 
United States and Spain seemed to have no effect 
upon the treatment of the Maine by the Spanish 
authorities. Captain Sigsbee reported an evident 
inclination on the part of Spanish officials to limit 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 139 

their relations with him to those prescribed by 
official etiquette, but he experienced no dis- 
courtesy, and the Maine's arrival and stay pro- 
duced no appreciable excitement. A few days 
later the vessel was made fast to the buoy desig- 
nated by the captain of the port, from which she 
never moved. Captain Sigsbee, to show his good 
relations with the island, attended a bull-fight 
with some of his officers, but while returning from 
the exhibition a small printed sheet vehemently 
protesting against the visit of the Maine was 
placed in his hand. The following is a para- 
graph: "And, finally, these Yankee pigs, who 
meddle with our affairs, humiliate us in the last 
degree, and, for a still greater taunt, order to 
us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron, after 
insulting us in their newsjDapers with articles 
sent from our own home." 

As circulars containmg unexecuted threats 
against the life of General Lee had been fre- 
quently received by that officer, no attention was 
paid by Captam Sigsbee to the paper delivered 
to him; nor was it possible of belief that Spain, 
with many noble traditions, could descend to the 
depth of authorizing the destruction of the ship 
of another nation, w^ith which she was still at 
peace, lying peacefully within one of her harbors. 
Captain Sigsbee had natm*ally taken jDrecautions 



140 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

for the care and safety of his command, without 
making his action offensively obvious to the Span- 
ish authorities, but his procedm^e related entirely 
to internal administration and could not ex- 
tend to external surveillance. Spain's interna- 
tional duty required her to protect the Maine from 
outside in jm-y. The same duty imposed upon the 
United States the preservation from harm of the 
Spanish cruiser, the Yizcaya, during her visit to 
]N"ew York. Though the Yizcaya lay in 'New 
York harbor immediately after the destruction of 
the Maine, she rested in perfect security, guarded 

— unnecessarily — by tugs and launches, and she 
sailed undamaged to ultimate destruction in battle 
on the south shore of Cuba. 

The Maine was blown up at forty minutes past 
nine in the evening of February 15, 1898. Two 
officers and two hmidred and sixty-four enlisted 
men lost their lives in this catastrophe. I was 
awakened about two o'clock on the morning of 
February 16, by a dispatch from Captain Sigsbee 

— shall I ever forget it, or the gentle hand that 
brought it ? — briefly announcing the appalling 
disaster. It was a supreme moment, and that 
telegram was a spark that fired an explosion of 
popular feeling throughout the country far more 
pregnant of death and destruction than the explo- 
sion of the Maine. The bright representatives of 




Photdfe'rapli by lloUinser 

CAPTAIN CHAKLES DWIGHT SIGSBEE 

lu couiuiaiul of the battle-sliip Maine when she was blown up in Havana Harbor, and of 
the cruiser St. Paul durin? the war 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 141 

the pi'oss were at my door, and the news was swift 
upon the telegraphic wires. Commander Fi'ancis 
W. Dickins, acting chief of the Bureau of JSTavi- 
gation, was at once sent for and directed to notify 
the President. It was manifest that the loss of 
the Maine would inevital)ly lead to war, even if 
it were sho^vii that Spain was innocent of her 
destruction. Time was necessary, however, to 
enable completion of our preparations for conflict. 
From every point of view hasty action was inad- 
visable. The President desired to give the civil- 
ized world no ground for criticising the American 
Republic. His policy had not changed from that 
declared eleven months before. He sought to 
preserve peace, but to be prepared for war in case 
it was forced upon him. In his dispatch Captain 
Sigsbee had suggested that " public opinion should 
be suspended mitil further report." This advice 
from the commanding officer of the destroyed 
vessel was taken by the country — w^hether 
correctly or not — to refer to the suspension 
of its oj^inion as to the responsibility of Spain 
for the act, and was followed in that spirit. 
With admirable poise, but with unrelenting de- 
termination to avenge an injury if it had been 
done them, the people, after the first outburst 
of horror and indignation, sternly and deliber- 
ately awaited the verdict of the naval court of 



142 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

inquiry which had been ordered to make a full 
and thorough investigation. Appreciating the 
grave consequences apt to ensue from its decision, 
the personnel of the court was selected with the 
utmost care. Captain "William T. Sampson, com- 
manding the battle-ship Iowa, was named as 
president 5 Captain French E. Chadwick, com- 
manding, and Lieutenant-Commander AY. E. 
Potter, executive officer of the l^ew York, were 
appointed members, and Lieutenant-Commander 
Adolph Marix was ordered as judge advocate. 
These officers had high professional standing, and 
the President and his cabinet believed that their 
foldings would be accepted. Captain Sampson 
had served as chief of the Bureau of Ordnance 
and as head of the torpedo-station at ^N'ewport. 
He was, therefore, well qualified to determine 
the question whether an internal or external 
explosive agent had destroyed the Maine. Prior 
to assuming command of the IS'ew York, Captain 
Chadwick had occupied the office of chief of the 
Bureau of Equipment. He was an expert in 
all matters relating to coal and electricity. Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Potter was an officer of tech- 
nical experience and calm judgment. Lieutenant- 
Commander Marix had been executive officer 
of the Maine, and was familiar with the details of 
her structure and organization. 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 143 

Conscious of the awful responsibility placed 
upon her by the destruction in her harbor of a 
friendly man-of-war, particularly one flying the 
flag of the United States, Spain at once gave 
assurance of sincere sympathy for the American 
nation. The Queen Regent, whose attitude 
seems always to have been considerate, person- 
ally expressed profound horror and regret. The 
Spanish government conveyed its condolence 
through our Minister Woodford at Madrid, and 
its charge d'affaires at Washington. Gover- 
nor-General Blanco and the Ayuntamiento of 
Havana declared their grief. From every nation 
and from every quarter messages of sorrow were 
received. The world was shocked by the disas- 
ter, and was prepared to hold the authors of it, 
if they could be discovered, to strict accomit- 
ability. Spain's situation was delicate. Her 
honor and her position in the family of nations 
were jeopardized by the investigation which the 
United States had set on foot. She proj^osed 
that a joint inquiry be made. The adoption of 
this proposal was impracticable. Spanish ofii- 
cers then sought to throw obstacles in the way 
of our independent inquiry. A sharjD j^rotest 
ended this procedure. The wreck of the Maine 
was closely inspected by wreckers and divers and 
United States naval officers. Their discoveries 



144 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

and the evidence of survivors of the Maine and of 
persons who witnessed the explosion were heard 
by the court. On March 21 Captain Sampson 
and his associates submitted their report to the 
department. They found that the Maine had 
been destroyed by the explosion of a submarine 
mine, but responsibility for her destruction was 
not specifically placed upon any person or persons. 
Unable to obtain a joint investigation, Spain 
ordered an independent one, which ascribed the 
catastrophe to internal causes. Spain subse- 
quently suggested that an international court be 
convened to inquire into the Maine's destruction. 
The United States accepted neither this sugges- 
tion nor the Spanish findings. Immediately upon 
the receipt of the report of the Sampson court, 
Spain was advised of its character, and informed 
that the President did not permit himself to 
doubt that her sense of justice would dictate a 
course of action suggested by honor and the 
friendly relations of the two governments. 
However, the soon-following declaration of war 
terminated all negotiations in regard to the Maine. 
The mystery of her loss yet remains to be solved, 
but the facts will some day come to light, and it 
will probably be found that, so far as the Spanish 
government itself was concerned, it was innocent 
of the design, though it is possible that some 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 145 

of its subordinates or 2)ossibly some insurgent 
Cuban foreseeing the effect, may have been re- 
sponsible for the fact. 

Tlie destruction of the Maine severely aggra- 
vated the situation and precipitated the crisis. 
The certainty that war v^as inevitable in case 
Spain failed to grant generous concessions to the 
insurgents had caused the Kavy Department for 
some time to maintain the navy on a semi-war 
footing. The measures to prejDare the service 
for conflict were, as far as possible, of a nature 
not calculated to arouse public anxiety. Prema- 
ture disclosure might have jeopardized pending 
negotiations; and it is a fact that unwise publi- 
cations materially hampered the President and 
the department in dealing with the Cuban ques- 
tion. As quietly, however, as it could be done, 
preparations were made. Ships under construc- 
tion were completed and immediately commis- 
sioned; those undergoing repairs were finished 
and added to the fleet. The several squadrons, 
particularly those of the N'orth Atlantic and 
Asiatic stations, were required to engage in 
evolutions and target practice, so that, when con- 
fronted with an enemy, they would be able to 
maneuver as a unit, and shoot with judgment, 
rapidit}^, and precision. Plans of operations 
against Spain were devised, and all information 



146 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

regarding the Spanish navy that could be ob- 
tained was collected and considered in its various 
relations to hypothetical war situations. 

With the further development of the war cloud 
our preparations assumed larger proportions. 
Beginning with January 11, 1898, instructions 
were cabled to commanders-in-chief of the sev- 
eral squadrons to retain in service men whose 
terms of enlistment were about to expire. The 
[NTorth Atlantic Squadron and a torpedo-boat 
flotilla were sent to the Florida drill-grounds. The 
gmiboat Helena, en route to the Asiatic Station, 
was stopped at the Azores, subsequently was or- 
dered to join at Lisbon the San Francisco and 
Bancroft, comprising the European Squadron, 
and, after the destruction of the Maine, was 
brought to Key West. The Bancroft accom- 
panied the Helena to the United States, putting 
in at [N'orf oik for repairs, and again saluted her 
on the Cuban blockade. The South Atlantic 
Squadron, consisting of the Cinciiuiati and the 
Castine, which were at Montevideo, was advised 
on January 17 that affairs were much disturbed 
in Cuba, and that it should, without causing com- 
ment, proceed to Para, Brazil. Two days after 
the destruction of the Maine the squadron was 
directed to proceed north from Para, and reached 
Key West on March 26. The Wilmington, wliich 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 147 

had been assigned to the South Atlantic Station, 
was canght by cable at Guadeloupe, and diverted 
to La Guayra. She dropped anchor in Key West 
harbor on the same day on which the Cincinnati 
and Castine arrived. The Annapolis, which was 
cruising in the West Indies, was also ordered to 
Key West. In this way the dejDartment mobilized 
within ninety miles of Cuba a fleet ready, upon 
declaration of hostilities, to establish a blockade 
of the principal ports of the island, and to do 
battle with the hostile squadron of the Peninsular 
kingdom whenever it should appear. 

Li preparing for war the dej^artment did not 
confine its attention to the Atlantic Ocean. Com- 
modore George Dewey, commander-in-chief of 
the Asiatic Station, was directed to assemble his 
squadron, with the exception of the unseaworthy 
Monocacy, at Hongkong. The Olympia, his flag- 
ship, had been ordered home for repairs, but this 
order was revoked as the certainty of war loomed 
upon the horizon. The cruiser Baltimore was at 
Honolulu. The Mohican, at Mare Island, was 
ordered to convey to the Baltimore a large quan- 
tity of ammunition, and after its transfer the 
Baltimore started at once to join Commodore 
Dewey at Hongkong, who was thus amply sup- 
plied with ammunition from the beginning. The 
battle-ship Oregon, which was at Bremerton, 



148 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Washington, early in March, was directed to pro- 
ceed to San Francisco and receive ammunition. 
On March 12 she was ordered to prepare for a 
long- cruise, and on March 19 she started on that 
voyage back around the Horn which will be fa- 
mous so long as the American nation takes pride 
in gallant deeds. The gunboat Marietta, which 
was at San Jose de Guatemala, was ordered to 
precede the Oregon and arrange for coal and 
otherwise facilitate the battle-ship's passage to 
Key West. 

Thus were the regular squadrons mobilized 
and augmented. New squadrons were formed. 
The armored cruiser Brooklyn, which was on 
detached service in the Caribbean Sea when the 
Maine was destroyed, was ordered from La Guayra 
to Hampton Roads, where were assembled the 
battle-ship Massachusetts, the second-class battle- 
ship Texas, and the commerce-destroyers Minne- 
apolis and Columbia. These ships comprised 
the Flying Squadron which was held in readiness 
to defend any point on the American coast or to 
assail a port of Peninsular Spain. Though. the 
department felt assured that the West Indies 
were to be the theater of military operations, some 
of the Atlantic coast cities and towns were ner- 
vously excited over the possibility of an attack 
by a Spanish man-of-war, and to allay alarm the 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 149 

Northern Patrol Squadron, under Commodore 
Howell, Avas organized on April 20. The San 
Francisco, brought home from Europe, was made 
the flagshijD of this squadron, and attached to the 
flag were the cruisers Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, and 
Yosemite. The Columbia and Minneapolis and 
two auxiliary cruisers, Badger and Southery, 
were also from time to time attached to this squad- 
ron. It turned out that there was never any 
real need for its organization, although it pa- 
trolled the coast northward, and it was finally 
disbanded and the vessels comprising it assigned 
to more pressing duty. 

The department early appreciated that the work 
cut out for the navy was too comprehensive for 
it to perform Avithout considerable augmentation. 
The Secretary had exhausted his legal authority 
in enlisting men and apprentices over and above 
the quota allowed by law. There was not 
sufficient money, however, with which there 
was authority to buy material. On March 9 
Congress, therefore, gave to Spain, and other 
powers not inclined to regard our policy Avith 
friendly eyes, a striking indication of our po- 
tential strength. It appropriated $50,000,000 of 
the ample fmids in the Treasury " for the na- 
tional defense." To shoAV the confidence of the 
people, irrespective of political affihation, in our 



150 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

President, this appropriation was placed at his 
disposal, to be spent in his discretion — which 
discretion he extended to his Secretaries. The 
President made allotments to the Kavy Depart- 
ment which, in the aggregate, amounted to 
129,973,274.22, all of which, with the exception of 
$618,447.17, was expended by it. Congress sub- 
sequently appropriated $25,000,000 for an emer- 
gency fmid to meet unforeseen contingencies, 
and $3,000,000 for the organization and enroll- 
ment of the United States auxiliary force. There 
was thus given to the Navy Department, for use at 
its discretion in strengthening the navy, the sum 
of $57,973,274.22. Of this amount there was mi- 
expended on IN'ovember 15, 1898, $25,056,131.21 
— more than the whole emergency fmid, which 
unexpended balance, of course, remained m the 
Treasury. 

All the money disbursed by the department 
was honestly spent and every purchase made in 
good faith. Even before Congress granted its 
appropriation for national defense, the depart- 
ment had given consideration to the question of 
purchasing foreign men-of-war. The navy list 
of every nation likely to sell had been scanned. 
Reports were obtained in regard to war-ships 
nearing completion in the private shipyards of 
Europe. Captain W. H. Brownson had been 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 151 

sent abroad to pursue inquiry and initiate nego- 
tiations of purchase. Mr. Charles R. Flint, of 
New York City, through his large maritime con- 
nections, was also helpful. The department 
swarmed with agents of foreign firms anxious 
to make sales to the United States. Sight was 
not lost of the fact that Spain, too, was anxious 
to buy, and that it was more desirable that we 
should pay a high price for a ship than to per- 
mit it to be incorporated into her service. As a 
result of the efforts of the department and its 
agents, two protected cruisers, the Amazonas 
and the Abreu, both building at Elswick, Eng- 
land, for Brazil, also the gunboat Diogenes, be- 
longing to the Thames Iron Works, of England, 
and two torpedo-boats, were purchased. These 
vessels were christened the Albany, INTew Orleans, 
Topeka, Manly, and Somers, respectively. The 
New Orleans and Topeka did excellent service 
in Cuban waters dui^ing the war; the Manly was 
attached to the auxiliary defense squadron at 
New York ; the Albany was retained in England, 
not having been completed, until after the war. 

The difficulty experienced in adding war- 
ships to the navy when the coimtry was on 
the eve of hostilities shows the danger and 
folly of a policy which trusts to the last mo- 
ment to make preparation. It was soon evi- 



152 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

dent that foreign governments were not dis- 
posed to bring upon themselves the protest of 
Spain by seUing vessels to the United States for 
hostile use against her, and practically the only 
power which served us in this respect was Bra- 
zil, which authorized the sale to us of the Ama- 
zonas and the Abreu. In view of the inability 
largely to add regular men-of-war to the ser- 
vice, it became necessary to improvise war- 
vessels. Ninety-seven merchantmen were pur- 
X chased and transformed into auxiliary cruisers, 
gunboats, and colliers ; five vessels, one the City 
of Pekin of the Pacific Mail Steamship Com- 
pany, and four, the St. Paul, St. Louis, New 
York, and Paris (the latter two renamed the 
Harvard and the Yale), were chartered from the 
International Navigation Company; one iceboat 
and two yachts were loaned to the department, 
and fifteen revenue cutters, four lighthouse 
tenders, and two United States Fish Commission 
vessels were transferred from their especial de- 
partments to the Navy Department. 

The labor of purchasing vessels devolved to a 
great extent upon the ofiice of the assistant secre- 
tary, and Mr. Koosevelt and Mr. Allen were 
successively efficient in procuring ships for the 
service. Several hundred vessels were offered 
to the department, some at extortionate prices. 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 153 

Little political pressure was applied to force 
purchases. Some Americau owuers cli82:)laye(l 
far more greed thau patriotism. Before com- 
petition became active, no doubt the department 
paid a higher price than the vessels would have 
brought at private sale, and in one or two in- 
stances there was rank extortion; but when the 
honor and safety of the nation Avere at stake, 
and time was of the greatest importance, and 
the ships must be had at any cost, the depart- 
ment could not go without them. Once, how- 
ever, the need of the department became gen- 
erally loiown, competition between ship-owners 
grew energetic, with the result that vessels 
were obtained at reasonable prices. All the 
ships acquired were first inspected by a board 
of which Captain Frederick Rodgers was presi- 
dent, or by special boards, and the officers com- 
prising them performed their duties with fidel- 
ity and care; thus the department was assured 
by expert report that every vessel purchased 
was properly built and fitted to jDcrform its part 
in the war. 

The acquisition of vessels was followed by 
their transformation into war-ships. The Bureau 
of Construction and Repair utilized its plants 
at na\y-yards and private shipyards to convert 
them. The ships were strengthened to with- 



154 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

stand the shock of discharge of guns, woodwork 
was ripped out, batteries installed, and they 
were docked and painted and supplied with 
proper equipments. The construction plants 
at five navy-yards, which in January, 1898, 
employed twenty-two hundred men, furnished 
work for a maximum of more than six thou- 
sand during the war. Few of the vessels pur- 
chased had evaporators or distillers, appliances 
essential to continued service afloat, or proper 
outfits of engineering stores and tools, and 
many of them required overhauling in their 
steam departments. The Bureau of Steam En- 
gineering performed this work satisfactorily 
and expeditiously. One novelty which Rear- 
Admiral Melville, the engineer-in-chief, intro- 
duced into the service was a floating steam 
engineermg plant — a floating blacksmith shop. 
The vessel so transformed I named the Vul- 
can, and her service in North Atlantic waters 
showed the great value of having such an 
establishment attached to a fleet engaged in 
offensive operations. The Bureau of Equip- 
ment supplied auxihary vessels with complete 
outfits of rigging, canvas, galleys and cooking- 
utensils, boat supplies, anchors, chams, electric 
supiDlies, searchhghts, bumacles, compasses, sex- 
tants, chronometers, charts, and other mstru- 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 155 

ments and appliances of navigation, sails, awn- 
ings, hammocks, bags, and many other articles. 
The best indication of the quantity of snpj^lies 
it distributed is furnished by the report made 
on the distribution charts. Up to the time when 
the preparations for war began, the quarterly 
output of navigation charts in time of peace 
rarely exceeded 6600. During the Spanish emer- 
gency the division of Chart Construction issued 
43,910 copies of charts. The Bureau of Equip- 
ment was also charged with the purchase and 
transportation of coal. Rear-Admiral Bradford, 
chief of this bureau, urged before the declara- 
tion of war that coaling-stations be established 
in the vicinity of the passages about the An- 
tilles, but this proved impossible, and the most 
that could be done was to direct the Bureau 
of Yards and Docks to construct a station at 
Diy Tortugas, off the coast of Florida, capable 
of storing twenty thousand tons of coal, which, 
however, was not ready for service during the 
war. Unable to establish coaling-depots, the 
department turned to the coasting-fleet, which 
submitted numerous tenders for the transpor- 
tation of coal. When war was declared but 
one firm was prepared to carry out its pro- 
posal. Coal was vital to the success of naval 
operations, and steamers were purchased and 



166 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

transformed into colliers and armed and maimed 
with naval crews. As indicating the state of 
efficiency reached in the matter of coal trans- 
portation, attention may be called to the fact 
that on one occasion forty thousand tons of coal 
were afloat at Hamj)ton Roads ready to be sent 
at an hour's notice to any point the department 
should designate. The department was also con- 
fronted with the problem of supplying the ships 
with fresh water for steaming purposes, and it 
was necessary to purchase water, though the effort 
was made to meet this want by converting large 
steamers into distillery and tank ships. 

Five hundred and seventy-six gmis were 
placed on board the vessels transformed into 
men-of-war. Besides purchasing many of these 
gmis, the Bureau of Ordnance contracted for 
and obtained prompt deliveries of large quan- 
tities of powder, projectiles of all kinds and 
calibers, fixed ammmiition, and small arms. To 
meet the demands of the service, the contractors 
were compelled to increase their plants and 
work without intermission. As a result of sev- 
eral years of study and development, a purely 
smokeless powder, combining the qualities of 
safety, permanency, and strength, was devel- 
oped just prior to the war with Spain. The 
department, however, was prevented by lack of 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR AVITH SPAIN 157 

time from supplying all its vessels with a com- 
plete outfit of this. In view of the fact that one 
gun using brown powder would with its smoke 
have nullified the effect of another of the same 
ship employing smokeless powder, it was neces- 
sary to move cautiously. Consequently, a few 
vessels only were given this kind of ammunition. 
The magazines of every ship in the service are 
now filled with it. Just prior to and during 
the war the Bureau of Ordnance prepared gmi- 
cotton mines and mining outfit, and launching- 
tubes for seventy-five torpedo-boats were manu- 
factured. 

The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery made 
preparations for putting the medical depart- 
ments of the ships in condition to care for the 
sick and wounded; and the hospital-ship Solace, 
under the surgeon-general, was a creation of 
mercy to those who suffered from war and dis- 
ease. 

The Bureau of Sujiplies and Accounts, which 
was charged with making all purchases, upon 
requisition from the different bureaus, provided 
provisions and clothing for the men, and pro- 
vided them with clockrw^ork promptness. The 
lack of docking facilities, a matter of especial 
concern, was partially met for small ships by the 
purchase of the floating dock. 



158 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

In other words, the splendid preparedness of 
our navy was due, as should never be forgotten, 
to the chiefs of bureaus who were charged with 
that duty in their respective lines. The attempt 
to persuade the country to a full appreciation 
of their desert in this respect is almost hope- 
less, for it rarely takes the pains to go beyond 
the picturesque and conspicuous, or to recog- 
nize in the plodding official at his desk and 
out of his miiform the man who does the work 
of preparation but shares none of the glory of 
achievement. 

What has been stated shows that the Navy 
Department was buzzing with the activity of 
a beehive during the few weeks between the 
destruction of the Maine and the beginning of 
war with Spain, and this activity continued 
throughout hostilities. There has not yet been 
mentioned, however, one of the most important 
of the many important problems which confronted 
the department. That was the increase of the 
commissioned and enlisted forces of the navy to 
man the greatly augmented material. Additions 
to the crews of regular men-of-war were re- 
quired. Crews were needed for the auxiliary 
navy and for vessels assigned to the defense 
of the coast other than those of the seagoing 
patrol squadron. These ships included monitors 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 159 

of the Civil War, converted ferry-boats, yachts, 
and tags. Signahnen were required to operate 
the coast signal-stations. At the time of the 
destruction of the Maine, the commissioned sea- 
going force of the navy consisted of 1232 offi- 
cers, distributed among the line, engineer, med- 
ical, and pay corps, and including chaplains 
and cadets undergoing their final cruise before 
graduation. The authorized enlisted force, in- 
cluding men and apprentices, numbered 11,750. 
Eight hundred and fifty-six volunteer or acting 
officers were appointed during the war, and 
there were innmnerable applications of bright, 
eager, exjDerienced men from all over the coun- 
try, making the total commissioned force 2088, 
while the enlisted strength reached a maximum 
of 21,123. More than 4200 men were mustered 
in from naval militia organizations; while these 
had not had extended training and experience, 
their mtelligence and education enabled them 
to make themselves quickly proficient in their 
duties, especially when associated with trained 
men-of-warsmen. The St. Paul, St. Louis, Har- 
vard, and Yale were taken into the service on 
the condition that their crews should accompany 
them. They were placed imder command of 
naval officers. The suggestion was made that 
some of the older organizations of the naval 



160 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

militia were competent to handle men-of-war, 
and Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, and 
Michigan were called upon to furnish officers 
and men for the Prairie, Yankee, Dixie, and 
Yosemite. The promptness with which the call 
was answered is shown by the fact that the 
[^Tew York naval brigade reported, uniformed, 
armed, equipped, and ready for duty, within six 
hours, and the Massachusetts naval brigade in 
similar condition withm eight hours. Many of 
the organizations of other States, such as Illinois 
and others, were willing, with very creditable 
generosity, to be distributed among such ships 
as needed men. 

In January, 1898, organizations of naval mih- 
tia existed in fifteen States, and aggregated 200 
commissioned officers and 3703 petty officers 
and enlisted men. The department had directed 
on March 23, 1898, the preparation of a scheme 
for a " mosquito flotilla " for coast defense, and 
while only a part of the plan had been worked 
out Avhen war was declared, it was rapidly car- 
ried into execution, and the auxiliary naval force 
finally comprised forty-one vessels, distributed 
so as to protect important strategic points of the 
United States, and to patrol the mine-fields laid 
in the harbors. 

As a part of the system of defense, a board 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 161 

was formed in October, 1807, to consider the 
establishment of coast signal-stations. In accord- 
ance with the plan as outlined, arrangements for 
establishing the stations were made early in the 
following Aj^ril. They were so complete that 
within two days after Rear- Admiral Sampson's 
fleet began the blockade of Cuba, competent 
quartermasters, signalmen, and telegraph opera- 
tors from the naval militia organizations started 
for the points where the stations were to be 
located, and many had reported their arrival. In 
two weeks all the stations, save two located at 
points on the Florida coast difficult of access, 
had been equipped. These stations during the 
war, under the direction of Captain John R. 
Bartlett, then on the retired list, cooperated w^ith 
those of the Life-saving service, the United States 
Lighthouse service and Weather Bureau system. 
By this means the department had constantly on 
the lookout for suspicious craft a force of 2526 
men, most of whom were experienced and pro- 
vided with exceptional facilities for reporting the 
appearance of vessels. Though no hostile man- 
of-war was sighted, yet the value of this system 
was demonstrated by the promptness with which 
the battle-ship Oregon w^as reported off Jupiter 
Inlet, Florida, after her famous rim aromid the 
Horn. 



162 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Any description of the work of the depart- 
ment in preparation for war would be lacldng m 
an essential particular if reference were not made 
to the IS^aval War Board. Lacking professional 
experience, and the navy being without a general 
staff, it was necessary that the Secretary should 
have the assistance of such a board. Assistant 
Secretary Roosevelt, Captain A. S. Crownin- 
shield, chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Cap- 
tain A. S. Barker, and Commander Richardson 
Clover, chief of INTaval Intelligence, were asked 
to act in that capacity just before the war began ; 
but it was only a few days before Mr. Roosevelt, 
Captain Barker, and Commander Clover were 
called to more active service. Thereupon Rear- 
Admiral Montgomery Sicard and Captain A. T. 
Mahan, of the retired list, were appointed mem- 
bers with Captain Crowninshield of the ISTaval 
War Board, and they acted as such during the 
war. It was eminently fitted to coordmate the 
work of the department and the fleet, and to 
keep a general surveillance over the larger stra- 
tegical and technical questions which could not 
be dealt with by the commanders-in-chief of the 
several squadrons. Rear -Admiral Sicard had 
commanded the ISTorth Atlantic Squadron, and 
just prior to the war had been compelled, be- 
cause of ill health, to relinquish this position. 



I 



PREPARING FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN 1G3 

He was thus well acquainted with the peculiari- 
ties and capabilities of each ship and the state 
of elliciency of the entire squadron. Captain 
Crowninshield, as chief of the Bm*eau of Nav- 
igation, with the rank of admiral, was informed 
as to the distribution and movements of vessels. 
Captain Mahan is laiown as an authority on naval 
strategy. To my mind the board possessed high 
intelligence and excellent judgment, and its ser- 
vice was invaluable in connection with the success- 
ful conduct of the w^ar. 

On April 15, four weeks before the arrival of 
Admiral Cervera's fleet in the Caribbean Sea, the 
New Navy was in condition to wage war against 
Spain. The ships of the service, which for 
months before had been scattered in all direc- 
tions, engaged in works of joeace, had been mo- 
bilized and fully manned and equipped and rein- 
forced by auxihary vessels. Two strong fleets 
were stationed at points which insured both 
the assault of Spam's vital j^ositions and the de- 
fense of our owm shores. Four days before this 
state of preparedness was reached, President 
McKinley remitted the entire Cuban question to 
Congress. Released from the rein of the Ex- 
ecutive, the two houses hastened to act. By 
the resolution apj^roved April 20, 1898, Spanish 
withdrawal from Cuba was demanded. On the 



164 THE NEW AlVIERICAN NAVY 

following day President McKinley issued instruc- 
tions for the hostile movement of the fleets which, 
as a member of Congress and as President, he 
had aided in bringing into existence. And my 
telegram went to Acting Admiral Sampson to 
blockade Cuba at once. 

All this time the enthusiasm of the country was 
at fever-heat. The department was thronged 
with congressmen and citizens at large. Tenders 
of sei'vice came in from every quarter; contri- 
butions of money were made, notably that of 
1100,000 by Miss Helen M. Gould. Private 
yachts were tendered. Officers whose duty held 
them on shore or at the department pleaded with 
me with tears in their eyes for transfer on ship- 
board and to the scene of action afloat. The 
cabinet was in frequent session, and daily and 
nightly those of its members who were more 
closely related to the war were in consultation 
with President McKmley at the White House. 
And all the while, with the tremendous respon- 
sibilities that lay on him, he kept his poise in 
serenity of spirit and clearness of judgment. 



VI 

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 

OuTLTENG colonies, inadequately defended, 
are, in time of war, sources of serious weak- 
ness to the mother coimtry. This military axiom 
was never better exemplified than in the case 
of Spain at the time of her struggle with the 
United States. The naval strategist saw at a 
glance that her undoing lay in her possessions 
in the East and West Indies, and that a cam- 
paign m the Peninsula was inadvisable unless 
control of the sea were first obtained, and that, 
if attempted, it would be productive of great 
loss without compensating advantage. On the 
other hand, destruction of Spanish power in the 
Philippines, Cuba, and Porto Kico would force 
the Madrid government to terms. Wliile Con- 
tinental Europe, unfriendly to our action and 
policy, would not be disposed to regard with 
approval an American invasion of the home 
territor}'^ of one of its powers, yet it could not 
properly question the destruction of Spanish 
power in the Philii^pincs, Cuba, and Porto Rico, 



166 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

although the result would be to compel Spam to 
surrender those msular possessions. 

These conclusions caused the ]^avy Depart- 
ment, in preparing plans for war, to fix pri- 
marily on the East and West Indies as theaters 
of naval operations. Amiihilation of the Span- 
ish squadrons in those regions would require the 
dispatch from Spain of new forces, which, de- 
prived of support at points of destination and 
embarrassed by voyages far distant from their 
initial bases, could be met and overcome by 
superior commands. Observance of a policy 
predicated upon these deductions assured com- 
plete defeat of the enemy, protection of our own 
shores and commerce, and achievement of the 
humanitarian purj)oses of the war, — freedom 
of Cuba and accordance to its people of the in- 
alienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness. 

Thus the campaign adopted by the N^avy De- 
partment had two main objectives, — the absolute 
crushing of the Spanish squadron in Philippine 
waters and the control of the sea in the Atlantic 
Ocean. Strategical and tactical blunders by the 
Spanish admiral in the Far East, the demoral- 
ized condition of his command, and the prompt- 
ness, magnificent courage, and high efiiciency of 
the ofiicers and men who fought mider the Stars 




I 



I'hoto'iniiili i'i.|n riL'lit Iv.f.i by F. U. J*ilinstcin 

ADMIRAL GEOKGE DEWEY 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 167 

and Stripes, enabled the attainment of the for- 
mer object first. The victory gained in IVIanila 
Bay was important from a strategical standpoint, 
but, of far greater consequence, was productive 
of far-reaching international and territorial re- 
sults. It must, therefore, take rank as one of 
the foremost achievements of modern wars. 

Seven hours only were required by the Ameri- 
can squadron to place the Philippine Archi- 
pelago at the mercy of the United States, and 
relieve this government of anxiety for the Pa- 
cific slope and its trans-Pacific trade. More than 
seven years, how^ever, had been needed to pro- 
vide the ships and perfect the personnel which 
accomplished this result. The men-of-war par- 
ticipating in the actual fighting on that famous 
1st of May, 1898, were born of the ISTew N^avy, 
and well they demonstrated their birthright. The 
flagship was the protected cruiser Olympia, of 
5800 tons displacement, which had been laid 
down in San Francisco in 1890. Following her 
lead were the protected cruiser Baltimore, of 
4600 tons, built at Philadelphia in 1887-88; the 
protected cruiser Raleigh, of 3217 tons, built 
at the Norfolk na\y-yard between 1889-92 ; the 
protected cruiser Boston, of 8000 tons, one of 
the pioneers of the Xew IS'av}^, the keel of which 
was laid at Chester, Pa., in 1883; the gunboat 



168 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Concord, 1710 tons, contracted for in 1888 ; and 
the gunboat Petrel, 892 tons, of date of 1887. 
Accompanying' them were the modern revenue 
cutter McCulloch, 1400 tons, used as a dispatch- 
boat, the collier IN'anshan, and the supply-ship 
Zafiro, the last two purchased at Hongkong just 
before the outbreak of the war. 

The possibility of a rupture with Spain ex- 
isted during the closing year of the admmis- 
tration of President Cleveland, and Secretary 
Herbert had taken precautionary measures to 
maintain an effective naval force in Asiatic wa- 
ters. Examination of the hst of vessels on for- 
eign stations in 1898 shows that the fighting ships 
in the East were the Olympia, Boston, gunboat 
Machias, and gmiboat Yorktown. The Machias 
and Yorktown required overhauling, and were 
ordered to return to the United States, but, that 
there should be no diminution of the strength of 
the squadron, they were replaced by the Petrel 
and Concord. 

Portentous signs of war caused the depart- 
ment under Mr. Herbert's successor to give the 
closest study to the number and character of the 
fleet stationed by Spam in the Philippine Islands. 
Lieutenant George L. Dyer was aj^pointed naval 
attache in Madrid in the summer of 1897, and 
it was a comparatively easy matter to ascertain 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 1G9 

through him the exact number of Sj^aiiish ships 
in the East, and whether dispateh of reinforce- 
ments was contemphited; but it was far more 
difficult to fmd out the condition of the vessels. 
As a matter of fact, the department was unable 
to leai-n the state of their effectiveness. It loiew 
that the Spanish force comprised the iron cruiser 
Reina Cristina, flagship, of 3520 tons, built at 
Ferrol, Spain, in 1887; the wooden Castilla, 3260 
tons, lamiched at Cadiz m 1881; the iron gmi- 
boats Don Juan de Austria and Don Antonio 
de Ulloa, 1159 tons each, constructed at Carta- 
gena and Carraca resj^ectively, in 1887 ; the steel 
gunboats Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon, 1015 
tons, laid do\\Ti at Elswick, England, in 1886; 
the Yelasco, 1152 tons, constructed at Black- 
wall, England, in 1881; gmiboats Marques del 
Duero, 500 tons, and General Lezo, 525 tons; 
surveying-ship Argos, 508 tons; and a score of 
mosquito gunboats. The march of events point- 
ing inevitably to war, Spain made a little at- 
tempt to augment her shore defenses, and sent 
to Manila the Isla de Mindanao, one of her large 
auxiliary ocean liners, heavily laden with guns 
and other munitions of war. 

JSTone of the Spanish vessels in the Philippines 
was capable of operating at a considerable dis- 
tance from a well-furnished and protected base, 



170 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

but, if in effective condition, they comprised, 
with the shore defenses, a formidable force for the 
small United States squadron to attack, especially 
as the latter was certain to have the ports of Asia 
barred by the institution of unyielding neutraUty, 
and was seven thousand miles from a port where 
it could hope to obtain assistance. In estimating 
Spain's strength in the East Lidies, therefore, it 
was necessary to consider the batteries placed at 
the points at which it was likely her fleet would 
take station for the battle. A dispute with Ger- 
many over the Caroline Islands had threatened 
war a few years before Spanish- American rela- 
tions became acute; and to defend her posses- 
sions in the Pacific from German assault, Spain 
installed at Manila and other important pomts 
high-powered gmis capable of sinking any of the 
ships of our Uttle squadron. Manila was defended 
in the fall of 1897 by four 9.5-inch muzzle-load- 
ing rifles ; four 5.5-inch converted breech-loading 
rifles, and fifteen 6.3-inch obsolete muzzle-load- 
ing bronze rifled guns, distributed in front of and 
along the medieval wall located on the bay shore 
of the city. A casemated earthwork of entirely 
modern character, over which poked the muzzles 
of two 15-centimeter Ordonnez rifled guns, was 
built at Sangley Point. A stone redoubt at Cavite 
and the antiquated Fort San FeHpe adjacent were 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 171 

the sites of three 6.3-iiich Armstrong miizzle- 
loadino- rifles. The entrance to the Bay of Ma- 
nihi is divided by the ishmd of Coi'regidor into 
two channels, one known as the Boca Grande 
and the other as the Boca Chica. Boca Grande 
was covered by three 6-iiich Armstrong breech- 
loading rifles, three 12-centimeter bivech-loading 
rifles, and three IG-centimeter Palliser mnzzle- 
loading rifles, and Boca Chica by three 8-inch 
mnzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, three 18-centi- 
meter Palliser mnzzle-loading rifles, and two 16- 
centimeter Ilontoria breech-loading rifles. Within 
twenty-four days the defenses of the entrance of 
Manila Bay were put in condition for action, and 
just before the declaration of war the battery .at 
Sangley Point was reinforced by one 14-centi- 
meter breech-loading rifle. Several hulks were 
sunk in the northwest channel of Subig Bay ; 
but four 15-centimeter guns sent to defend this 
harbor lay unmounted when the American squad- 
ron arrived. 

Every effort was made by our Navy Depart- 
ment to learn the number and caliber of the guns 
comprising the batteries defending Manila and 
Subig Bay, and while some information was ob- 
tained through our naval attache, and confiden- 
tial sources in Madrid and through United States 
Consul O. F. Williams, who remained in Manila 



172 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

until forced to leave, it was not sufficiently accu- 
rate to be of much value. The condition of the 
defenses in 1897 was reasonably well knowai. 
As war approached, additional guns were placed, 
but in what numbers and at what positions could 
not be ascertained. Mines were also reported 
to have been laid. 

The mistake of underrating the strength of 
the enemy was not made. It was advisable that 
our squadron should be superior to that of Spain 
in order to offset the advantage lent to the latter 
by the shore batteries. The Olympia comi:)leted 
her tour of duty on the Asiatic Station in the 
winter of 1897-98, and was ordered to San Fran- 
cisco for repairs and alterations. Ten days after 
the destruction of the Maine, these orders were 
revoked and she was directed to remain in the 
East. The Raleigh was attached in 1897 to the 
European Station, which was certain to be aban- 
doned in case of war, and instructions were sent 
to her in December of that year to jom the 
Asiatic Squadron. The Baltimore was placed 
in commission in October, 1897, and relieved the 
Philadelphia as flagship of the Pacific Station. 
She was destined to remain but a short time on 
this duty. The department had selected her to 
replace the Olympia on the Asiatic Station, but 
in March of 1898 she was ordered to reinforce 



THE BATTLE OF I^IANILA BAY 173 

that vessel. Besides the additional streii^h she 
gave the Asiatic Squadron, her assignment to it 
was important for another reason. While all of 
the ships were provided with ammunition suffi- 
cient for battle, their magazines contained the 
allowances of peace. Hostile operations require 
abundant supplies. The wooden cruiser Mohi- 
can, at Mare Island, California, was loaded with 
powder and projectiles and was hurried to Hono- 
lulu, where the Baltimore was anchored. The 
transfer of her precious cargo to the Baltimore 
was promptly effected, and on March 25 the Bal- 
timore sailed for Hongkong via Yokohama. By 
utilizing the Baltimore instead of a merchant ship 
for the transportation of the munitions, there was 
less chance of their capture in case the Spaniards 
should enterprisingly seek to gain possession of 
them ; but it was within the bounds of possi- 
bility that a bold plan to mtercept the cruiser 
would be attempted, and a feehng of intense 
anxiety pervaded the White House and ^N'avy 
Department until news of her safe arrival at 
Hongkong on April 22 reached the Bureau of 
Navigation. After the war with Spain, a report 
gained credence that, in order to provide the 
Asiatic Squadron with sufficient ammimition to 
engage the Spanish force, the department had 
found it necessary to send a s^DCcial train carry- 



174 THE NEW AJNIERICAN NAVY 

iiig supplies across the continent to San Fran- 
cisco, where the freight was transferred to the 
Mohican. As a matter of fact, with the ammu- 
nition brought by the Baltimore the Asiatic 
Squadron was amply supplied, and did not expend 
a tliird of its ammunition at the battle of Manila. 
As to the railroad train, the only one sent across 
the continent consisted of fourteen cars, and was 
assembled at Harrisburg, Pa., on June 30, 1898, 
almost two months after the battle. The muni- 
tions it carried were intended to form a large 
reserve supply for the Pacific and Asiatic squad- 
rons, there existing at the time some apprehen- 
sion that Spain might send a fleet from Europe 
to the Philippines and that Germany might pro- 
voke us to war. At no time, however, was any 
American squadi^on so short of ammmiition that 
it would have been miable to engage an enemy's 
fleet. 

The last reinforcement given to the Asiatic 
Squadron comprised the auxiharies McCulloch, 
IS'anshan, and Zafiro. The McCulloch had been 
built on the Atlantic coast and was ordered to 
San Francisco xia the Suez Canal to perform 
revenue cutter service. Under the law authoriz- 
ing: the transfer of revenue cutters to the control 
of the navy in time of war, she was attached to 
the Asiatic Squadron, and on April 8 was caught 




CRUISEK OLYMPIA 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 175 

by cable at Singapore and directed to proceed to 
Hongkong, avoiding Spanish ports and vessels 
en route. As the Asiatic Sqnadron had no base 
nearer than San Francisco, thongh snpplies could 
have been obtained at Honolulu, then the caj^ital 
of an independent republic, it was necessary to 
provide it with a collier and a supply-ship, and 
the British steamers Nanshan and Zaiiro were 
purchased at Hongkong and loaded with coal 
and other necessary supplies. On the eve of 
war the Kavy Department was able to make the 
following comparison of the strength of the naval 
forces of the United States and Spain in the 
East: — 

United States. Spain, 

Vessels: Cruisers 4 2 

Gunboats .... 3 11 

Mosquito craft ... 25 

Armed tonnage 20,619 20,693 

Guns in main battery .... 53 44 

Guns in secondary battery ... 84 81 

Broadside discharge main battery guns 3,700 3,000 

Afloat, the United States was superior, but 
Spain was stronger so far as materiel was con- 
cerned, taking her land and naval forces together- 
The batteries defending Manila Bay were cap- 
able of firing at a single discharge 3750 pounds 
of metal. It is the testimony of experts that 



176 THE NEW AI^IERICAN NAVY 

guns ashore are, by reason of steadiness of plat- 
form and protection afforded to the gimners, 
capable of more effective results than guns 
installed on men-of-war. 

Personnel is largely the deciding factor in 
naval engagements, and this fact was to be de- 
monstrated in the battle of Manila Bay. The 
commander-m-chief of the American force was 
Commodore George Dewey. The selection of 
Commodore Dewey to command the Asiatic 
Squadron was made during the fall of 1897. 
Rear- Admiral A. S. Crowninshield, chief of the 
Bureau of ISTavigation, called the attention of the 
Secretary to the fact that the tours of duty of 
Rear-Admiral Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., in com- 
mand of the European Squadron, and Rear- 
Admiral Frederick Y. MclSTair, in command of 
the Asiatic Squadron, would expire within a few 
months, and that it was advisable to reheve them. 
The Secretary examined the naval register, and 
found that there were three officers whose turn 
for sea had come: Commodore E. O. Matthews, 
Commodore John A. Howell, and Commodore 
George Dewey. Commodore Matthews was 
chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, from 
which place it was not thought desirable to take 
him; Commodore Howell was commandant of 
the League Island navy-yard, and Commodore 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 177 

Dewey was president of the Board of Lispection 
and Survey. Both had had long service and 
vahiable experience; Howell had reputation as 
an ordnance expert of marked ability; Dewey 
had served as chief of the Bureau of Equipment 
of the jN^avy Department, and subsequently as a 
member of the examining and retirmg boards, 
receiving in 1895 his orders to the Board of In- 
spection and Survey. The Asiatic Squadron, in 
case of war with Spain, offered the larger prob- 
able opportmiity for distinction, although the 
European Squadron was a choice flag command 
of the nayj and included the Spanish waters. 
I decided to give Dewey the Asiatic and Howell 
the European Station, and this arrangement, on 
my submitting it to President McKinley, who 
had made no suggestion in the matter, and who 
always left such matters to the Secretary, was 
approved by liim. I remember his simjjly saying 
to me, in his characteristically pleasant way, 
" Are you satisfied that Dewey is a good man 
for the place and that his head is level ? " to 
which I affirmatively answered. Political or 
personal mfluence had nothing to do with his 
selection, which was entirely my own. Indeed, 
war w^as not then — in the fall of 1897 — so 
imminent that there was reason for departing 
from the routine of making in the usual regular 



178 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

sequence the selection of the two or three officers 
whose turn to go to sea had come. A month 
before war was declared, Commodore Howell was 
withdrawn from Europe, the European Squadron 
havmg been broken up, and was placed in com- 
mand of the IN'orthern Patrol Squadron, organ- 
ized to defend the IS'oi'th Atlantic coast; he was 
subsequently ordered to Cuban waters as com- 
mander of the First ^North Atlantic Squadron. 

The orders to Dewey were signed on October 
21,1897, and he was directed to sail for IN^agasald, 
Japan, and there reheve Rear- Admiral MclSTair. 
He gave immediate evidence of the fact that the 
department was warranted in placing faith in 
him. As soon as it was definitely decided that 
he should assume command of the Asiatic Station, 
he began collecting data in regard to the Spanish 
forces in the Phihppines, and the department 
assisted him in every possible way. Moreover, 
before and during the war the department made 
it a first duty to advise him of every development 
which would be of interest or importance in the 
conduct of military operations. Before he sailed, 
the policy of the admuiistration toward Spain 
was outhned to him, and he received instructions 
as to the course to pursue m the contingency of 
war. 

When Dewey assumed command of the Asiatic 



THE BATTLE OF ]\IANILA BAY 179 

Station on January 3, he found there a tliorouglily 
ellicient and well-trained force, and the credit 
for this condition is largely due to Rear- Admiral 
McNair. When the latter arrived in Washing- 
ton, he stated that he had tiu-ned over to Dewey 
plans for an attack upon the Spanish forces, 
which were similar in many respects to those 
afterwards followed. 

Protection of American interests had required 
the scattering of the ships of the Asiatic Squad- 
ron along the Chinese and Korean coasts. Be- 
heving the time for action not far distant, orders 
were cabled to Dewey on February 25 directing 
him to mobilize his squadron, with the exception 
of the miseaworthy Monocacy, at Hongkong, 
and to keej) his ships filled with coal. " In the 
event of dechiration of war with Spain," he was 
advised, " your duty will be to see that the Span- 
ish squadron does not leave Asiatic coast, and 
then offensive operations in Philippme Islands." 
Other ^preliminary orders w^ere issued, including 
an instruction, cabled on April 7, to land all 
woodwork and stores not considered necessary 
for operations, and on April 21 the commander- 
in-chief was informed that the naval force on 
the IVorth Atlantic Station was blockading Cuba 
and that war might be declared at any moment. 
Commodore Dewey had been active in carrying 



180 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

out his instructions to prepare for war. Every- 
thing had been done that promised increase of 
the effectiveness of his command. Machinery 
was examined and repairs made where needed; 
gmis were overhauled; magazines, magazine 
hoists, signal apparatus, in fact, every httle de- 
tail which went to make up the complex engines 
so soon to be put to test, underwent careful 
and conscientious scrutiny. Arrangements were 
made with the British authorities to dock the 
Baltimore immediately upon her appearance in 
the harbor, and two days after her arrival she 
was cleaned and coaled and reported ready for 
war. White is the peace garb of American naval 
vessels, and so decorated they form splendid 
targets. To make the ships as inconspicuous as 
possible, the department ordered that they be 
painted slate color. Thus clad, they awaited 
instructions to advance on the Spanish force. 
Great Britain, mider international rules, did not, 
however, permit them to remain in the harbor. 
She gave recognition of a state of war by issu- 
ing on April 24 her proclamation of neutrality. 
Dewey at once ordered the Boston, Concord, 
Petrel, McCulloch, l^anshan, and Zafiro to Mirs 
Bay, an inlet on the Chmese coast, distant thirty 
miles from Hongkong, which he had selected 
as a rendezvous. The Olympia, Baltimore, and 




TIIK LATH CAPTAIN niAULI->< V. GKIDLIA' 
lu command of the cruiser Olympia at the battle of Manila Biy 



I 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 181 

Raleigli took advantage of the twenty-four hom-s' 
grace allowed by the j^roclamation to remain 
until the expiration of that time. The pm-pose 
of their stay was twofold: Commodore Dewey 
desired to confer with the United States consul at 
Manila, who was en route to Hongkong on board 
an overdue steamer, and certain parts of the ma- 
chinery of the Raleigh were undergoing repairs 
in a machine-shop ashore. Neither the consul 
nor the macliinery came w^ithin the time-hmit, as 
the commodore received from the department the 
mstruction which moved him at once to action. 

This instruction was not striking in its origi- 
nality; in fact, it was simply in line with the pro- 
gramme of procedure which Dewey knew so 
well. As soon as war was declared it was the 
imanimous opinion of the department, agreed on 
by the Secretary, the assistant secretary, and the 
chief of the Bureau of l^avigation, indeed by all 
who expressed an opinion, that we should strike 
at once at the Spanish fleet in the Pliilippines. 
On Thursday, April 21, I urged this action on 
President McKinley. He thought it not quite 
time. But early Sunday forenoon, the 24th, I 
conferred with him at the White House. So 
vivid is the picture he presented on that memor- 
able occasion that it has remained in my memory 
with the distinctness of a fii'st impression. It 



182 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

was a lovely, suiiny spring day, a bright contrast 
to the grim business in hand. "We sat on a sofa, 
he thoughtful, his face showing a deep sense of 
the responsibiUty of the hour. My memory is 
that I took to him for approval the now famous 
dispatch, and that it had been prepared by the 
Bureau of IN'avigation before I went to the White 
House. I am advised, however, by officers of 
that bureau that it was not prepared till after my 
return. At any rate, the President gave me that 
morning the desired authority, and the dispatch, 
whether drafted by Rear- Admiral Cro^vninshield 
before or after I went to the White House, was 
put in cipher and cabled. It was as follows : — 

"Washington, April 24, 1898. 
Dewey, Hongkong : — 

War has commenced between the United States and 
Spain. Proceed at once to the Phihppine Islands. Com- 
mence operations at once, particularly against Spanish 
fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost 

endeavors. 

Long. 

It was sent none too soon. Just after it had 
gone, word was received from Dewey that the 
governor of Hongkong had issued a proclama- 
tion of neutrality, which required the departure 
of the American ships. With this famous dis- 
patch ceased all immediate control by the de- 
partment of Dewey's conduct. He was left 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 183 

unfettered, and to him and to his subordinates 
was confided the responsibihty of achievino- liis 
task. Accompanied by the Raleigh and Balti- 
more, the Olympia left Hongkong, and with the 
bands playing the " Star-Spangled Banner," and 
followed by the ringing cheers of British sailors 
and soldiers, steamed for Mirs Bay. Consul 
Williams and the completed parts of the Raleigh's 
machiner}^ arrived twenty-four hours later, and 
on April 27 Commodore Dewey signaled his 
command to get under way. Shortly after leav- 
ing Mirs Bay the crews were assembled, and 
to them was read the bombastic and abusive 
proclamation issued at Manila on April 23 by the 
captain-general of the Philippines. This procla- 
mation is worthy of examination because it shows 
the contemptuous view of us entertained at the 
time by the officials of Spain. 

Spaniards ! Between Spain and the United States of 
North America hostilities have broken out. 

The moment has arrived to prove to the world that we 
possess the spirit to conquer those who, pretending to be 
loyal friends, take advantage of our misfortunes and 
abuse our hospitality, using means which civihzed nations 
count unworthy and disreputable. 

The North American people, constituted of all the social 
excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked 
war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of 
treachery, vnth their outrages against the law of nations 
and international conventions. 



184 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of 
Victories will give us one as brilUant and complete as the 
righteousness and justice of our cause demand. Spain, 
which counts upon the sympathy of all the nations, will 
emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and 
blasting the adventurers from those States that, without 
cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only 
infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of Cham- 
bers in which appear united insolence and defamation, 
cowardice and cynicism. 

A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither 
instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this 
archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of 
all that means life, honor, and liberty. Pretending to 
be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable, the 
North American seamen undertake, as an enterprise cap- 
able of reahzation, the substitution of Protestantism for 
the Catholic religion you profess, to treat you as tribes 
refractory to civilization, to take possession of your riches 
as if they were unacquainted with the rights of property, 
and to kidnap those persons whom they consider useful 
to man their sMps or to be exploited in agricultural or 
industrial labor. 

Vain designs ! Ridiculous boastings ! 

Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the 
attempt to carry them into realization. You will not 
allow the faith you profess to be made a mock of ; impious 
hands to be placed on the temple of the true God ; the 
images you adore to be thrown down by unbelief. The 
aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, 
they shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of 
your wives' and daughters' honor, or appropriate the pro- 
perty your industry has accumulated as a provision for 
your old age. No, they shall not perpetrate any of these 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 185 

crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousncss, 
because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish 
and abase the people that, claiming to be civilized and 
cultivated, have exterminated the natives of North 
America, instead of bringing to them the life of civili- 
zation and of progress. 

Filipinos, prepare for the struggle, and, united under 
the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with 
laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will 
crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies let us 
oppose, with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, 
the cry of " Viva Espana." 

Your General, 

Basilio Augustin Davila. 
Manila, 23d April, 1898. 

"Mr. Dooley" could have written nothing 
funnier. 

Following the reading of this proclamation, 
the crews were informed that the squadron was 
bound to Manila, there to " capture or destroy 
the Spanish fleet." The cheers that resounded 
and the delight manifested constituted a patriotic 
reply to the vainglorious utterances of the Span- 
ish officer. It was a spontaneous declaration by 
the men who served the gims that they would 
courageously and enthusiastically execute the 
orders which had been given to their commander- 
in-chief. 

The important problem Dewey was now to solve 
was the whereabouts of the Sj^anish fleet. Con- 



186 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

sul Williams had advised him that it was assem- 
bled in Manila Bay, which was defended by addi- 
tional batteries and was also mined. The obvious 
strategical course for the Spanish admiral to 
follow was either to estabhsh his squadron at 
Subig Bay, from which point he could threaten 
the communications of the American commander 
and make well-calculated dashes upon his ships 
blockading Manila, or evade him, and force his 
men-of-war to burn up their coal in fruitless pur- 
suit. Either plan would have required the con- 
centration of the invading force, and would have 
prevented the dispatch of troops for land opera- 
tions. Admiral Montojo, commander-in-chief 
of the Spanish squadron, seems to have had some 
notion regarding the advisability of establishing 
his base at Subig Bay. That arm of the sea had 
for thirteen years been subjected to exhaustive 
examination by a number of special commissions, 
and at Olongapo, situated on its eastern shore, 
the construction of a naval station had begun. 
It was hardly to be believed that this point had 
not undergone some measure of effective defense. 
Dewey had been informed that the Spanish squad- 
ron proposed to take position at Subig Bay; and, 
in fact, that had been the intention of its com- 
mander-in-chief. The latter sailed for Subig Bay 
on April 24, but on arrival found that the modern 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 187 

guns provided for its shore defense had not been 
pkiced. The Castilhx started to leak, and it be- 
came necessary to pack her shaft alley with 
cement ; the Velasco was not in condition for 
offensive work either at Snbig or Manila; and 
the Ulloa was anchored by her infirmities at 
Cavite. The council of Spanish commanders 
convened at Subig advocated return to Manila 
because the water there was shallow, and there 
was more chance of saving life there in case of 
disaster. This last conclusion shows the demor- 
alization of the Spanish force. Montojo returned 
to Manila Bay with such speed as could be made 
by the inefficient ships of his command, and upon 
arrival placed them under the guns of the land 
battery, and awaited events. 

Possessing little knowledge of the deplorable 
BL condition of the Spanish fleet, Dewey intrepidly 
^■steamed toward Luzon. The green hills of this 
^F island of Spain rose out of the water as dawn was 
^fc breaking, on April 80. There was no enemy in 
^P sight, but the in^-isible Spanish signalman at Cape 
Bolinao telegraphed that the Americans had 
come. Toward Subig Bay Dewey turned the 
prows of his squadron, and the Boston and Con- 
cord, when a short distance from their destination, 
were sent ahead to reconnoiter that arm of the 
sea. Twenty-four hours earlier and the battle 



188 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

of Manila Bay would have been in history the 
battle of Subig Bay. But no trace of the Span- 
ish ships was there found. When Dewey learned 
of the fruitlessness of his search, he stopped his 
squadron and signaled his captains to repair 
aboard the flagship. At this conference final 
plans were adopted for running past the batteries 
defending the entrance to Manila Bay and attack- 
ing the enemy if he had been guilty of the stra- 
tegical mistake of selecting that harbor as the 
battle scene. 

Crossing the China Sea little attempt was made 
to screen the movements of the squadron. For- 
cing the channel into Manila Bay, which was 
doubtless mined, and certainly defended by heavy 
guns, demanded the exercise of extraordinary 
precaution. When tropical night fell, the gleam 
of a single white light at the stern of each ship, 
by which the following vessel steered her course, 
was the only illumination allowed the squadron. 
Fortune smiled on the boldness of the assailant 
and aided his enterprise by giving him a night 
well suited to its achievement. A yomig moon 
furnished the little light needed to outline the 
Boca Grande, as the squadron, its guns loaded 
and ready for discharge, approached that channel. 
Across the face of the heavens sped black, thun- 
derous clouds; the hghtning flashmg from them 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 189 

brought into shaq^ relief the headhmds which 
nature had constructed as her defenses of the 
bay. Near the center of the wide entrance loomed 
the island of Corregidor, and within half a mile 
stood the rock El Fraile, a frowning sentinel. 

Onward Dewey's vessels steamed, spurning 
danger, and heedless of mines or guns, which 
Spanish reports asserted would be potent for 
defense. With good British charts and relying 
solely upon American seamanship to navigate the 
ships, and with the Olympia in the lead, he moved 
toward El Fraile, ignorant that a formidable bat- 
tery had been placed there. As the flagship 
turned in its direction, a Spaniard sighted the 
white light shining in her stern. Almost at the 
same instant a sheet of flame shot from the smoke- 
stack of the McCulloch. Signal lights communi- 
cating the news of the presence of the enemy 
were at once displayed at Mariveles Bay, and a 
rocket burst on the south shore near Punta Res- 
tinga. From the battery at the latter point came 
the first shot of the war in the East. El Fraile, 
too, opened fire. The Raleigh, Boston, and 
McCulloch returned the hostile greeting with 
more effect, one of their projectiles exploding 
among the gunners of the Restinga battery and 
silencing it after it had been in action only three 
minutes. There was no pause for this exchange, 



190 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

but the squadron moved on, and in half an hour 
entered Manila Bay, absolutely unharmed, and 
encouraged by the wretched gunnery of the Span- 
ish marksmen and the loss by its antagonist of a 
part of the strength upon which he had relied to 
do it injury. 

Manila lay twenty miles away, the lights illu- 
minating it casting a bright glare U23on the hori- 
zon. Desiring to attack by daylight, Commodore 
Dewey signaled that the speed should be four 
knots. When the lights twinkling this order and 
the bright replies made thereto by all the ships 
had died away, the men were permitted to lie 
down beside their guns. Few slept, for none 
knew what an hour might develop. The silvery 
sheen of dawn disclosed a fleet of merchantmen 
before the city of Manila, but they were not the 
craft that Dewey sought, and, paying little atten- 
tion to the batteries which were wildly firing in 
his direction, he headed the Olympia toward a 
line of gray objects lying in front of a group of 
white buildings comprising the naval arsenal 
of Cavite. Following the Olympia in the order 
named were the Baltimore, Kaleigh, Petrel, Con- 
cord, and Boston. Action impending, the Mc- 
Culloch and the colhers were sent to the middle 
of the bay, there to give assistance to any of the 
ships, should assistance be needed. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 191 

Thus tlie opposing squadrons came face to 
face. Montojo had been informed on April 28 
by the Spanish consul at Hongkong: "Enemy's 
squadron sailed at 2 p. m. from the Bay of Mirs, 
and according to reliable accounts they sailed 
for Subig Ba}", there to destroy our squadron, 
and will then go to Manila." He was apprised 
of Dewey's appearance off Cape Bolinao on 
April 80, and of his arrival off Subig Bay twelve 
hom'S later. He learned of the search made in 
Subig, but, desj^ite the grim persistency Avhich 
this procedure betokened, he seemed to think 
that Dewey would hesitate to force Manila Bay. 
If so, he underestimated his man and paid the 
penalty of his mistake. Officers and men of 
the Si^anish force were in Manila, some in bed, 
when the news that the American squadron was 
in the Boca Grande reached the city. They 
were hastily summoned, and for several hours 
were compelled to suffer that nervous mood 
which oppresses most men prior to battle, be- 
fore they sighted the ships destined to deal death 
and destruction among them. 

Such little preparation as could be made in the 
short time remaining before the battle Montojo 
attempted. Yet the first gun had not been fired 
when the Spaniards knew that they were beaten. 
Montojo directed that every disposition be made 



192 THE NEW AlVIERICAN NAVY 

to burn the coal and stores at Cavite Arsenal, to 
prevent them from falhng into Dewey's hands. 
He distributed his ships in a long, curved line, 
one end of which, protected by batteries and 
iron lighters loaded with sand, rested on Sangley 
Point. They were in such position that the bat- 
teries of Fort San Felipe and Cavite could fire 
over them. In the Spanish line of battle were 
the Don Antonio de Ulloa, Castilla, Reina Cris- 
tina (flagship), Don Juan de Austria, Isla de 
Cuba, Isla de Luzon, and Marques del Duero. 
Lying at the arsenal were the Velasco, Lezo, 
and Argos, and the Manila took refuge in the 
roads of Bacoor, not far distant. IS^one of these 
last-named vessels joined in the action. Admi- 
ral Montojo, in his comparison of the relative 
strength of the two squadrons, counted himself 
greatly inferior, as shown by this table, which 
he prepared. 

Tons. Horse-power. Guns. Men. 

American 21,410 49,290 163 1750 

Spanish 10,111 11,200 76 1875 

Approaching the Spanish fine, the momentous 
signal, " Prepare for general action," was flown 
from the signal-mast of the Olympia, and fol- 
lowing it the inspiring flag of om^ country was 
broken out on every ship. What a thrilling mo- 
ment ! Answering the challenge, the Spaniards 




11, ,,,.. K. ,.;. .aahl 

THE BATTLE OF MANILA 1?AY 

Tlie crew of the Reina Cristiiia escaping from the hiirniiii; ship 




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THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 193 

hoisted their red aiul yellow colors, and a deaf- 
ening roar announced that the batteries of Cavite 
and Manila were endeavoring to cripple or de- 
stroy their audacious enemy. At twenty minutes 
after five the Spanish vessels joined in the thun- 
der of battle. Save for two shells fired by the 
Concord at the Manila battery, our sqnadron 
proceeded silently, relentlessly, toward its naval 
antagonist. Fifty-six hundred yards distant, the 
commander-in-chief, without the smallest trace 
of excitement, turned to Ca^jtain Charles V. 
Gridley, commanding the Olympia, and author- 
ized him to open fire. It was the now famous 
legend : " You may fire when you 're ready, 
Gridley." Immediately one of the eight-inch 
gims of the forward turret sent its steel mes- 
senger of a nation's wrath toward the Spanish 
hue. As each vessel got within range, it, too, 
discharged all available guns. Eegardless of 
mines — tw^o of which Dewey reported as ex- 
ploding just ahead of the Oljnnpia — the flag- 
ship, followed by her supporting ships, ran par- 
allel to the Spanish vessels, smothering some 
and demoralizing all by a deadly hail of pro- 
jectiles. At the begmning of the action, a 
lead-colored launch steamed toward the flasr- 
ship. Seemingly a dangerous torpedo-boat was 
coming to perform its deadly mission. The 



194 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

secondary batteries of the Olympia and Baltimore 
quickly picked up the range, and disabled the 
launch, which turned toward the shore, where 
she was beached. Another torpedo-launch, which 
Dewey discovered, was equally unfortimate, be- 
ing sunk in the shallow water near Ca\dte. The 
Spaniards claimed that no torpedo-boats partici- 
pated in the action, and that the craft which was 
beached was really a market-boat performing its 
daily duty. These distracting incidents of the 
battle did not, however, divert the attention of 
the American gunners from the one important 
fighting ship of the Spanish force — the Reina 
Cristina. She was the target of all the marks- 
men of our squadron, and only when she was out 
of range did the Castilla and other Spanish ves- 
sels midergo a fire as miu'derous as that to which 
the flagship had been subjected. Believing that 
closer quarters might turn the tide of battle, 
Montojo, in the Reina Cristina, put out from the 
Spanish line. The maneuver promised nothing, 
but it created an opportimity to show to Spain 
and to the world how bravely a Spaniard could 
die. An exploding shell set the cruiser on fire for- 
ward, a six-inch projectile pierced her stern, and 
through the hole thus made an eight-inch shell, 
with terrible energy, forced its way. Flames burst 
from the hull; white steam mingling with the 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 195 

black smoke showed that the steam-pipes had 
been penetrated. Uncontrollable, her decks filled 
with dead and wonnded and slippery with blood, 
the Cristina retreated from the fire she had pre- 
cipitated and sought refuge at Cavite. The Isla 
de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon were signaled 
to aid the Marques del Duero and men from the 
Cavite Arsenal in rescuing such of the crew as 
were alive, and this was accomplished mider a 
fire as terrifying as that which had destroyed 
the Spanish flagship. The execution done by the 
American squadron is shown by the fact that 
when the Cristina went into action her comple- 
ment comprised 493 men. The men able to 
respond to muster at Cavite Arsenal numbered 
160, of w horn 90 were wounded. The loss of the 
vessel in killed and w^omided was thus 423 men. 
Dewey passed up and down parallel to the 
enemy's fine three times, the range decreasing 
from 5600 yards to 2600 yards as confidence grew 
in the charts and in the marks of the leadsmen, 
and as contempt developed for the Spanish gun- 
ners afloat and ashore. Spanish shell churned the 
water along the path of the squadron, passed be- 
tween the smokestacks of the ships, and, shriek- 
ing, flew high above their mastheads. Errone- 
ously informed that its 5-inch battery was short 
of ammunition, the Olympia signaled at 7.35 a.m. 



196 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

to " withdraw from action," and, when out of 
reach of Spanish range, Dewey ordered: "Let 
the people go to breakfast." Except for a httle 
coffee given on some of the ships in the early 
morning, the men had been without food for six- 
teen hours ; yet they served their guns with the 
energy, alacrity, and courage which have so often 
been the characteristics of American seamen. 

Distant from the Spanish squadron, the terri- 
ble effects of the American fire could be seen; 
the Reina Cristina lay under the north wall of 
Cavite, her bulwarks awash. The Castilla still 
floated, but she was on fire, and at ten o'clock 
her flag came down, and flames sprang from her 
hull, and, with fantastic leaps, licked her spars. 
The Don Juan de Austria, which had received 
almost the concentrated fire of the American 
squadron when the destruction of the Cristina 
was complete, was badly damaged, and the Isla 
de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon had been repeat- 
edly struck. The Spanish ships, which had has- 
tened in disorder behind Cavite Arsenal, were, 
with the exception of the Antonio de Ulloa, aban- 
doned, and their sea-valves were broken. The 
commander of the Don Antonio de Ulloa dis- 
regarded Montojo's instruction to sink his ship, 
and gallantly remained to resume battle on odds 
promising certain disaster. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 197 

"While the men were at breakfast Commodore 
Dewey consulted his captains in regard to con- 
ditions aboard their vessels and the next move 
in the programme. During the conference a 
strange vessel was sighted, and the captains 
returned to their posts prepared to do battle in 
case reinforcements for the enemy had arrived. 
The stranger was found to be a merchantman. 
After the destruction of the Spanish ships Dewey 
sent word to the governor-general of the Philip- 
pines to order the batteries defending Manila to 
cease fire instantly or he would shell the city. 
This warning was effective, and then the admiral 
returned to Cavite to complete the work of 
destruction. The Baltimore, leading the column 
in place of the Olympia, was granted permission 
to attack the enemy's earthworks. A duel be- 
tween ship and shore occurred, described as one 
of the most picturesque events of that eventful 
day. The battery at Canacao was the first to 
withdraw from the contest, its flag hauled down 
and the men flying from their defenses. Fort 
Sangley was the next to undergo the American 
fire, the entire squadron joining in the attack. 
Bursting shell silenced the gmis thrice, and 
finally a white flag succeeded the Spanish en- 
sign, showing that the enemy had surrendered. 
As the Baltimore neared Sangley Point, the Don 



198 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Antonio del Ulloa opened fire. Upon that brave 
little craft were turned the guns of the Baltimore, 
Olympia, and Raleigh. Soon her crew swarmed 
over her side and swam ashore, and she listed 
and sank. At twenty minutes after twelve the 
cheering signal flew from the signal-arm of the 
Petrel, which gallantly stood in to the Cavite 
Arsenal: "The enemy has surrendered." The 
battle was won. Dewey took station in front of 
Manila, and subsequently ordered the Baltimore 
and Raleigh to destroy the batteries on Corregi- 
dor Island. The McCulloch was sent post-haste 
to Hongkong to notify the anxious country of 
the victory, and a few days later the President 
and Navy Department were informed that the 
commander-in-chief could take Manila at any 
time, but had not sufiicient men to hold it. 

The dispatch sent by the McCulloch reached 
Washington early on the morning of May 6. It 
was in cipher, and it was not until almost nine 
o'clock that its translation was completed. A 
cheering mob of men and women crowded the 
anteroom of the Secretary's ofiice. General 
R. A. Alger, then Secretary of War, came to 
offer his congratulations. I recall saying to him, 
referring to the military operations in the Orient, 
as he was preparing to return to his depart- 
ment : — 



I 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY 199 

" The navy has completed its work, General. 
The army's has begun." 

Stnpendous were the results of this brilliant 
victory. The Philip})ine archipelago, comprising 
1700 islands and inhabited by 8,000,000 people, 
belonged by conquest to the United States, to 
hold permanently as indemnity for the war or as 
a means for exerting pressure upon Spain to sue 
for peace. Victory for American arms at the 
outset of the war produced a moral effect of in- 
calculable advantage, and demonstrated to the 
world the powerlessness of our enemy. From 
that time the Pacific coast was entirely free from 
apprehension. Commerce was free alike from 
peril of the foe and from the high rates of friendly 
insurance. How great the lesson that could be 
drawn from the battle ! Seven men slightly 
wounded, and no damage of any account to our 
vessels, made up the American casualties. Ten 
ships destroyed, three batteries silenced, and 381 
killed are the gruesome totals of Spanish de- 
feat. American valor had again won the victory. 
President McKinley at once appointed Dewey an 
acting rear-admiral, and recommended that he be 
promoted to the grade of admiral, and that the 
thanks of Congress be conferred upon him. Each 
of the captains and many of the subordinate offi- 
cers received advancement for gallantry in action. 



200 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

In this way only could substantial compensation 
be given, but it was given spontaneously, and the 
officers who received it knew that their greater 
reward would lie in the fact that they had glo- 
riously observed the traditions which have made 
the American navy historically famous/ 

1 For an account of the presentation by Act of Congress of a 
sword to Admiral Dewey, see Appendix C. 



yn 

THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA AND ITS EFFECT 

By the terms of the joint resohition voted by 
Congress on April 19, 1898, and approved by the 
President on the following day, the government 
of the United States recognized the independence 
of Cuba and pledged itself to remove Spanish 
control. Of itself, this resolution made that is- 
land the military objective of the American land 
and naval forces. All other offensive operations, 
though necessarily conducive to final victory, 
were simply incidental to its attainment. Mars 
had girded on his armor and was raising his sword 
to strike. In dispatches to the President and the 
State Department, Minister Woodford, in Madrid, 
had asserted that a public sentiment was there 
crystallizing which would sustain the Spanish 
government in its effort to preserve peace even 
though the price were the surrender of an island 
which had been an appurtenance of the Crown 
for four hundred years. So rapid was the march 
of events, however, that this sentiment failed to 
attain the strength necessary to enable Maria 



202 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Christina, the brave and anxious mother of Al- 
phonso XIII., to sever from the kingdom of her 
son the " Pearl of the Antilles." Approval by 
the President of the joint resolution of Congress 
was immediately followed by a request from the 
Spanish Minister in "Washington for his passports. 
To Minister Woodford an instruction was sent 
directing him to demand formally that the gov- 
ernment of Spain at once relinquish its authority 
and government in Cuba and withdraw its land 
and naval forces therefrom. Before the Minister 
could communicate this instruction to the Spanish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, he was notified that 
diplomatic relations had been broken off. His 
further stay in Madrid rendered useless, he with- 
drew. 

Diplomacy had failed. To the sailor and to 
the soldier the United States now intrusted the 
task of expelling Spain from Cuba. In the coun- 
cils of the l^avy Department there were some who 
asserted that this purpose could be most promptly 
and economically achieved by destruction of the 
commerce of Spain and by threatening ports of 
the Peninsula which lay upon the seashore and 
which were known to be as notoriously lacking in 
defense as were those situated near the seaboard 
of the United States. To such advice the depart- 
ment gave consideration, but it was not followed 






THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 203 

because the plan, worked out lonj^ before hos- 
tilities began, contemplated a procedure which 
would place the greater strain upon Spain and 
give the United States the further advantage of 
time in which to organize an army sufficiently 
well equipped and drilled and adequate in num- 
bers to overcome the enemy's troops in Cuba. 
History shows that Spain has been always coura- 
geous in defense. Kapoleon's Peninsular cam- 
paign placed his brother on the throne at Madrid, 
but Castilian pertinacity and Castilian patriotism 
forced its relinquishment. Mere bombardment 
of Spanish ports would have caused simply wanton 
destruction of property, and might have roused 
Continental Europe, avowedly sympathetic with 
Spain, to interfere in her behalf. Conquest of 
the Peninsula would have demanded an army 
large and highly trained, and its transportation 
a distance of more than three thousand miles — 
a dangerous maneuver, in yiew of the fact that 
Spain's available naval force in the Atlantic Ocean 
was nominally the equal in fighting strength of 
that which we had assembled in our own waters. 
Had Admiral Cervera and his officers been per- 
mitted to direct the naval operations of their 
comitry, they would have endeavored to shift the 
burden of offense to the shoulders of the United 
States. " The idea of sending the fleet to Cuba," 



204 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Admiral Cervera wrote before the war, " seems 
to have been abandoned, I beheve very wisely. 
Concerning Porto Rico I have often wondered 
whether it wonld be wise to accumulate there all 
our forces, and I do not think so. If Porto Rico 
is faithful, it will not be such an easy job for the 
Yankees; if it is not faithful, it will inevitably 
follow the same fate as Cuba, at least for us. On 
the other hand, I am very much afraid for the 
Phihppines and the Canaries, as I have said 
before; and, above all, the possibihty of a bom- 
bardment of our coast, which is not impossible, 
considering the audacity of the Yankees, and 
counting, as they do, with four or five vessels of 
higher speed than our own." These views were 
entertained also by Cervera's subordinates, as is 
shown by the following decision of the council 
of war held on board the Cristobal Colon at Cape 
Yerde Islands on April 21, before the squadron 
sailed for the Caribbean Sea : — 

Several opinions were exchanged concerning the prob- 
able consequences of our campaign in the West Indies ; tlie 
great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the 
enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty 
resources which the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico were 
able to offer for the purpose of estabhshing a base of 
operations. In consideration of this, and the grave conse- 
quences for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, 
thus leaving unobstructed the coming of the enemy agamst 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 205 

the Peninsula and adjacei.u islands, it was unanimously 
agreed to call the attention of the government, by means 
of a telegram, in which the commander-in-chief of the 
squadron, in agreement with the second in couuuand and 
the commanders of the vessels, suggested to go to the 
Canaries. 

In the light of the best thought focused upon 
the situation, the ^avy Department determined to 
concentrate our sea strength in the Atlantic upon 
Cuba particularly, and Porto Rico incidentally. 
Had we been opposed by a more powerful enemy, 
immediate capture of Porto Rico might have 
been advisable. Using it as a base, we could 
have threatened his communications and thus 
retarded, if not actually prevented, his relief of 
Cuba. Had he remained in occupation, he would 
have been in an excellent geographical position 
to defend Cuba and menace our ports. As the 
United States had no outlying colonies and no 
lines of communication to support, and our coast 
is distant only ninety miles from Havana, the 
Naval War Board rightly concluded that con- 
quest of Porto Rico promised no results com- 
mensurate with the sacrifice such action would 
entail. 

That Cuba had been selected as the first scene 
of American naval endeavor must have been 
apparent to Spain and to other naval and military 



206 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

nations, for at Key Wesi lay a fleet at least able 
to initiate action for the accomplishment of the 
object declared in the congressional resolution. 
Essential as was such mobilization, it was not 
regarded with satisfaction by the timid among 
the inhabitants of our seaboard. Apologies are 
profuse now for the fears of Spanish bombard- 
ment entertained by certain coast cities and towns, 
but in April of 1898 there was insistent demand 
for protection, and the department was compelled 
to modify the rule of concentration adopted as 
the guide of its conduct during the war. The 
double-turreted, low-freeboard monitors — four 
in number — had been constructed specially to 
supplement the shore fortifications in repelling 
attack by an enemy. It was suggested that one 
be stationed at Boston, another at New York, a 
third at the mouth of the Delaware, and a fourth 
at Hampton Roads. But clamor for protection 
arose at points for which we had no monitors. 
Besides, a single vessel of this type, not of mod- 
ern construction and armament, would be of httle 
avail in a battle with five armored cruisers, swift 
and thus able to choose the scene and position in 
conflict, and provided with an armament com- 
posed of the latest models of heavy guns. To 
reduce this superiority, it was urged that the 
monitors be mobihzed at a central point on the 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 207 

Atlantic coast. The insuperable objection to this 
plan was that the slowness of the craft would 
prevent them from reaching a distant port at- 
tacked by the enemy in time to catch him if he 
were disposed to avoid a fight. Were he willing 
to risk the chances of conflict, their unsteadiness 
as gun platforms in a seaway would increase their 
disadvantage. 

Thus, though the monitors were built espe- 
cially for coast defense, they were manifestly 
misuited for this j^urpose, and the department, 
driven to the employment of every weapon, what- 
ever its value, was compelled to order them to 
Key West for participation in offensive opera- 
tions ior which they were equally unsuited. 
This decision necessitated, however, the division 
of the battle fleet, the full strength of which 
would be needed in case Spain made the natural 
tactical move and mobilized her entire fighting 
force. Circumstances consequently forced sepa- 
ration of the real effectives of the United States 
navy — its battle-ships and armored cruisers ; 
but as far as possible the department sought to 
overcome them and to place each squadron within 
supporting distance of the other. The " Flying 
Squadron," the name of which denotes the 2^ur- 
pose of its organization, was assembled at Hamp- 
ton Roads, a thousand miles from Key West, but 



208 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

within reach of that point and of Porto Rico, and 
yet within easy striking distance of the great 
commercial center of 'New York, npon which 
particularly it was apprehended that an attack 
might be made. Organization of the [N'orthern 
Patrol Squadron, at first composed of the San 
Francisco, flagship of the commander-in-chief, 
Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, and Yosemite, reheved 
to some extent the pressure upon the 'Nayj De- 
partment to hold the Flying Squadron at Hamp- 
ton Poads, and partially allayed the unwarranted 
terror felt by the inhabitants of the coast towns. 
Instead of frittering away our naval strength 
by assignment of vessels before every port of the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts, the department, by the 
use of makeshifts, succeeded in concentrating it 
at last into two squadrons. That at Key West, 
when war began, had an armored backbone made 
up of the battle-ships Indiana and Iowa, armored 
cruiser New York, and monitors Puritan, Mian- 
tonomoh, Amphitrite, and Terror. The lighter 
framework was made up of the cruisers Cincin- 
nati, Detroit, Marblehead, and Montgomery, the 
gunboats Castine, Dolphin, Helena, Machias, 
Wilmington, Nashville, Newport, Vesuvius, 
Fern, and Mayflower, the transport steamer 
Resolute, revenue cutters McLane and Morrill, 
lighthouse tender Mangrove, tugs and converted 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 209 

yachts Accomac, Leyden, Uncas, Wompatuck, 
Eagle, Hawk, and Hornet, and torpedo-boats 
Gushing, Dupont, Ericsson, Foote, Rodgers, and 
Winslow. Other vessels were rapidly added. 
The Flying Squadron comprised the battle-ship 
Massachusetts, second-class battle-ship Texas, 
armored cruiser Brooklyn, protected cruisers Co- 
Imnbia, Mmneapohs, and !N'ew Orleans, armored 
ram Katahdin, and converted yacht Scorpion. 
Hastening with all speed around Cape Horn were 
the battle-ship Oregon and gimboat Marietta, the 
former needed to reinforce the armorclads of the 
^orth Atlantic fleet and make them imdoubtedly 
the superior of the Spanish ships beheved to be 
ready for sea. 

In the officers and men who formed the com- 
plements of the vessels which represented the 
naval arm of the United States, the country pos- 
sessed efficient and courageous servants who 
could be depended upon to do their duty and 
to do it w^ell. Commanding the division at Key 
West w^as Captain William Thomas Sampson, 
promoted upon the outbreak of war to the rank 
of acting rear-admiral and given supreme com- 
mand of the entire naval force in North Atlantic 
w^aters. Before the destruction of the Maine, 
none of the officers on the active list of the 
navy was prominently known to the country. 



210 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

though many had gained distinction in their pro- 
fession and some had displayed gallantry and 
ability dm-ing the war of the RebelUon. Sampson 
was preeminent among this niunber. His cour- 
age had been proven by performance in the Civil 
"War. An officer of the ill-fated Patapsco, sunk 
by a submarine mine at Charleston, S. C, he 
calmly stood on the roof of the turret while the 
vessel was going to the bottom, and when his 
men had safely left the ship he stepped into the 
water. He demonstrated his progressiveness by 
striving constantly to improve the service. His 
executive ability, especially in ordnance, made 
him a rare administrator, and was responsible for 
his retention on shore duty a longer period than 
usual. When I entered the Na\"y Department, 
Sampson was chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. 
He was offered a transfer to the Bm^eau of Navi- 
gation, but, beheving that he would be more use- 
ful at sea and that his health would be benefited 
by the change, he declined it and assumed com- 
mand of the battle-ship Iowa in the smnmer of 
1897. The !North Atlantic Squadron was then 
under Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, who 
had earnestly and energetically striven to make 
his command an efficient instrument of war. Ill- 
ness of this commander-in-chief caused the Sec- 
retary of the Navy, in March of 1898, to appoint 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 211 

a board of medical survey to make an examina- 
tion of his physical condition. To his own re- 
gret, no less than to that of the authorities in 
Washington, he was condemned, and the depart- 
ment was advised that his health demanded his 
detachment from the squadron. 

On the eve of war the department was con- 
fronted by the necessity of choosing a fitting 
successor to this capable and conscientious officer. 
The moment required a man of splendid judg- 
ment, quick decision, possessing intimate know- 
ledge of the characteristics of the vessels he 
would have to use and the officers and men man- 
ning them, and enjoying the esteem and confi- 
dence of his subordinates. The consensus of 
naval opinion was that Sampson had these quali- 
fications. He had graduated number one in his 
class at the JN^aval Academy, and this without 
social prestige. He had maintained this superi- 
ority throughout his naval career. He had been 
a dominant voice in important boards which had 
considered the development of the materiel and 
personnel of the I^ew Navy. He was the senior 
captain of the North Atlantic Squadron, and in 
command of it during Sicard's incapacity. He 
enjoyed the full confidence not only of the of- 
ficers and men of his own ship, but of the officers 
and men of the entire navy. 



212 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

There was no political demand for Sampson. 
He had no friends in Congress to speak for him, 
nor did he directly or indirectly indicate to the 
department that he desired to succeed Rear-Ad- 
miral Sicard. For his selection the department 
is alone responsible; and it was made advisable 
by the interests of the country, to which the eye 
of the department was single. The President 
gave his cordial approval to the choice, and 
Sampson, though there were worthy and efficient 
officers his seniors, was to give ample evidence 
that the assignment was right. 

Commodore Winfield Scott Schley was in 
Washington serving as chairman of the Light- 
house Board when the Maine was destroyed. 
He at once made application for assignment to 
sea duty, and upon the organization of the Fly- 
ing Squadron I selected him as its commander- 
in-chief. Among his naval associates Schley was 
not credited with as high a measure of profes- 
sional ability and judgment as Sampson and some 
other officers. ^N'evertheless, his career was filled 
with stirring incidents which had their scenes in 
the War of the EebelHon, in the frozen Korth, 
where he voluntarily went in search of Greely 
and his daring companions, and in other parts of 
the world where American interests demanded 
protection. He had been chief of the Bureau 




l'hot..-rapl\ In C. M. Gilbert 

keai;-ai)Mii;al .ioiix adams uowkll 

Coinuiamier of the Noitlierii I'utrol Siiiui.lr.m .iwiiiii; the war 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 213 

of Equipment, had commanded a vessel of the 
New Navy, and aj)peared to be an officer of skill, 
judgment, and resource. That there might be 
no doubt of his position at sea, I personally 
informed him that, while his command would, 
for a time at least, be independent, it was a part 
of the North Atlantic fleet, and when his squad- 
ron and that at Key West were merged he would 
be subordinate to Acting Rear-Admiral Samp- 
son. To this condition he cheerfully agreed, and 
expressed his cordial readiness for cooperation 
and ser\T[ce. 

To assure efficient operations on the part of 
the numerous vessels engaged in the blockade 
of Cuba, the department determined, a few days 
after the outbreak of war, to order two officers 
of the rank of commodore to report to Rear- 
Admiral Sampson. Commodore George C. 
Remey, who was senior to Sampson in actual 
rank, accepted orders to command the naval 
base at Key West. In a letter to Sampson in 
regard to Commodore Remey's duty, it was ex- 
plained that the latter would see that the ships 
of the squadron were coaled, provisioned, and 
supplied with ammunition speedily, and that any 
repairs on them were pressed with all the dis- 
patch possible with the facilities on board the 
ships themselves and at the station on shore. 



214 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

" One of his most important duties," to quote 
the letter, " will be to complete each vessel that 
you send him or that comes to his station as 
quickly as possible and return to you." Com- 
modore John C. Watson, the junior commodore, 
ordered to report to Sampson, was appointed for 
employment in the squadron operating on the 
coast of Cuba, or in the general neighborhood. 
The object of sending him was to provide Rear- 
Admiral Sampson with assistance in the military 
duties devolving upon him in connection with 
the squadron of operations. Commodore John 
A. Howell, the commander of the IS^orthern 
Patrol Squadron, had been brought home from 
the European Station, of which he had served as 
commander-in-chief. 

The captains of the ships would be largely the 
brains directing maneuvers in action; and upon 
their behavior and judgment would to that extent 
depend whether their commands fought well or ill. 
Anticipating war, the department had been most 
careful in its selections of commanding officers. 
Of the armorclads, all but two were commanded 
by officers assigned during my administration, 
and the exceptions were Captain Henry C. 
Taylor, commanding the battle-ship Indiana, and 
Captain Francis A. Cook, commanding the ar- 
mored cruiser Brooklyn, who had been assigned 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 215 

by my predecessor. Captain Taylor had gone to 
sea from the IS'aval War College, where at its 
head he had solved problems such as were likely 
to arise during the war. Captain Cook assumed 
command of the Brookl;yai on December 1, 1896. 
Both thoroughly understood their ships, and could 
be depended upon to handle them with skill. 
The promotion of Captain Sampson left the Iowa 
without a commander, and the vacancy was filled 
by the assignment of Captain Robley D. Evans, 
at the time serving on the Lighthouse Board. 
Captain Evans's career showed intrepidity and 
resource, and the department knew he could 
be relied on. The armored cruiser ]N'ew York 
was under Captain French E. Chad^vick. Cap- 
tain Chadwick had been chief of the Bureau of 
Equipment, which had charge of all matters con- 
nected with the equipment of ships and coaling, 
and the knowledge he possessed, especially in 
relation to such matters, made him valuable to 
the commander-in-chief, w^hose flag floated on 
the ]N'ew York. Captain John TV. Philip was the 
commander of the Texas. He was known to be 
a brave, God-fearing man. The Massachusetts 
had as her captain Francis J. Higginson, an ear- 
nest oflicer. The scout St. Paul was given to 
Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, who had commanded 
the ill-fated Maine j and Lieutenant-Commander 



216 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Richard Wainwright, executive of that sunken 
ship, was ordered to the auxihary yacht Glou- 
cester when she was commissioned. Captain 
Bowman H. McCalla was on the Marblehead. 
The department had no difficulty in obtaining 
willing hands, for most of the officers of the ser- 
vice on shore volunteered for sea duty, and those 
of sufficient rank were placed in command of 
vessels available. The following is a hst of ves- 
sels and their commanding officers that served 
during the war : — 

NORTH ATLANTIC STATION. 

Collier Abarenda, Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Buford. 
Collier Alexander, Commander W. T, Burwell, 
Revenue cutter Algonquin, Boatswain James Matthews. 
Monitor Amphitrite, Captain C. J. Barclay. 
Gunboat Annapolis, Commander J. J. Hunker. 
Tug Apache, Lieutenant G. C. Hanus. 
Lighthouse tender Armeria, Commander L. C. Logan. 
Tug Accomac, Ensign W. S. Crosley to May 6, 1898, then 

Boatswain J. W. Angus. 
Auxiliary cruiser Badger, Commander A. S. Snow. 
Gunboat Bancroft, Commander Richardson Clover. 
Armored cruiser Brooklyn, Captain F. A. Cook, 
ColUer Csesar, Lieutenant- Commander A. B. Speyers. 
Revenue cutter Calumet, First Lieutenant W. H. Gushing, 

Revenue Cutter Service. 
Collier Cassius, Commander Samuel W. Very. 
Gunboat Castine, Commander R. M. Berry. 
Supply-ship Celtic, Commander H. B. Mansfield. 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 217 

Cruiser Cincinnati, Captain C. M. Chester. 

Cruiser Columbia, Captain J. H, Sands. 

Torpedo-boat Cushing, Lieutenant Albert Cleaves. 

Cruiser Detroit, Commander J. H. Dayton. 

Auxiliary cruiser Dixie, Commander C. IL Davis. 

Gunboat Dolphin, Commander IL W. Lyon. 

Converted yacht Dorothea, Lieutenant- Commander W. J. 
Barnette. 

Torpedo-boat Dupont, Lieutenant S. S. Wood. 

Converted yacht Eagle, Lieutenant W. II. II. Souther- 
land. 

Torpedo-boat Ericsson, Lieutenant N. R. Usher. 

Gunboat Fern, Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Cowles until 
April 27, 1898, then Lieutenant- Commander Herbert 
Winslow. 

Fish Commission vessel Fish-Hawk, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander F. H. Delano. 

Ferry-boat East Boston, Passed- Assistant Engineer W. M. 
Gilman. 

Torpedo-boat Foote, Lieutenant W. L. Rodgers. 

Converted yacht Frolic, Commander E. H. Green. 

Supply-ship Glacier, Commander J. P. Merrell. 

Converted yacht Gloucester, Lieutenant - Commander 
Richard "Wainwright. 

Revenue cutter Gresham, Captain C. A. Abbey, Revenue 
Cutter Service. 

Ferry-boat Governor Russell, Lieutenant Charles H. 
Grant. 

Torpedo-boat Gwin, Lieutenant C, S. "Williams. 

Revenue cutter Hamilton, Captain W. D. Roath, Revenue 
Cutter Service. 

Collier Hannibal, Commander H. G. O. Colby. 

Converted yacht Hawk, Lieutenant J. Hood. ■"' ft 

Gunboat Helena, Commander W. T. Swinburne. 



218 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Converted yacht Hist, Lieutenant L. Young, 

Converted yacht Hornet, Lieutenant J. M. Helm. 

Revenue cutter Hudson, First Lieutenant F. H. Newcomb, 
Revenue Cutter Service. 

Battle-ship Indiana, Captain H. C. Taylor. 

Battle-ship Iowa, Captain R. D. Evans, "^o 

Steamer Iris, Lieutenant Arthur B. Connor. 

Collier Justine, Commander G. E. Ide until July 10, then 
Commander W. L. Field. 

Gunboat Lancaster, Commander Thomas Perry. 

Collier Lebanon, Lieutenant-Commander C. T. Forse. 

Collier Leonidas, Commander W. I. Moore. 

Tug Leyden, Boatswain J. W. Angus until May 6, 1898, 
then Ensign W. S. Crosley. 

Gunboat Machias, Commander J. F. Merry until June 27, 
1898, then Commander W. W. Mead. 

Revenue cutter Manning, Captain F. M. Munger, Revenue 
Cutter Service. 

Lighthouse tender Mangrove, Lieutenant - Commander 
W. H. Everett until June 7, 1898, then Lieutenant- Com- 
mander D. D. V. Stuart. 

Lighthouse tender Maple, Lieutenant-Commander W. 
Kellogg. 

Cruiser Marblehead, Commander B. H. McCalla. 

Gunboat Marietta, Commander F. M. Symonds. 

Converted yacht Mayflower, Commander R. M. S. Mac- 
kenzie. 

Battle-ship Massachusetts, Captain F. J. Higgmson. 

Torpedo-boat McKee, Lieutenant C. M. Knepper. 

Revenue cutter McLane, First Lieutenant W. E. Rey- 
nolds. 

Collier Merrimac, Commander J. M. Miller. 

Monitor Miantonomoh, Captain M. L. Johnson. 

Cruiser Minneapolis, Captain T. F. Jewell. 




KEAR-AI).M1I;AL GEOHGK (Ol.LIKIJ i;K.Mi;v 

Comiuaiulant of tl.e naval base at Key West Jiiriiur the war 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 219 

Cruiser Montgomery, Commander G. A. Converse. 
Revenue cutter JMorrill, Captain 11. D. Smith, Revenue 

Cutter Service. 
Torpedo-boat Morris, Lieutenant C. E. Fox. 
Gunboat Nashville, Commander W. Maynard. 
Collier Niagara, Commander G. A. Bicknell until May 30, 

1898, then Lieutenant-Commander E. S. Prime. 
Cruiser Newark, Captain A. S. Barker. 
Cruiser New Orleans, Captain WiUiam Folger. 
Gunboat Newport, Commander B. F. Tilley. 
Armored cruiser New York, Captain F. E. Chadwick. "^ ^ 
Tug Oneida, Lieutenant W. G. Miller. 
Battle-ship Oregon, Captain C. E. Clark until August 6, 

1898, then Captain A. S. Barker. 
Tug Osceola, Lieutenant J. L. Purcell. 
Transport Panther, Commander G. C. Reiter. 
Tug Peoria, Lieutenant T. W. Ryan. 
Tug Piscataqua, Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Niles. 
CoUier Pompey, Commander J. M. Miller. 
Torpedo-boat Porter, Lieutenant J. C. Fremont. 
Auxiliary cruiser Prairie, Commander C. J. Train. 
Gunboat Princeton, Commander C. H. West. 
Tug Potomac, Lieutenant G. P. Blow. 
Monitor Puritan, Captain P. F. Harrington until June 18, 

1898, then Captain Frederick Rodgers. 
Transport Resolute, Commander J. G. Eaton. 
Torpedo-boat Rodgers, Lieutenant J. L. Jayne. 
Cruiser San Francisco, Captain R. P. Leary. 
Collier Saturn, Commander S. W. Very until June 4, 1898, 

then Commander G. A. Bicknell. 
Collier Scindia, Commander E. W. Watson. 
Converted yacht Scorpion, Lieutenant-Commander A. 

Marix. 
Tug Sioux, Ensign W. R. Gherardi. 



220 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Tug Sirgen, Lieutenant J. M. Robinson. 

Hospital-ship Solace, Commander A. Dunlap. 

Collier Southery, Commander W. Goodwin. 

Collier Sterling, Commander R. E. Impey. 

Converted yacht Stranger, Lieutenant G. L. Dyer. 

Supply-ship Supply, Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Inger- 

soU. 
Converted yacht Suwanee, Lieutenant- Commander D. 

Delehanty. 
Converted yacht Sylvia, Lieutenant G. H. Peters. 
Tug Tecumseh, Lieutenant G. R. Evans. 
Monitor Terror, Captain Nicoll Ludlow. 
Battle-ship Texas, Captain J. W. Phihp. 
Torpedo-boat Talbot, Lieutenant W. R. Shoemaker. 
Gunboat Topeka, Commander W. S. Cowles. 
Tug Uncas, Lieutenant F. R. Brainard. 
Dynamite cruiser Vesuvius, Lieutenant- Conunander J. E. 

Pillsbury. 
Gunboat Vicksburg, Commander A. B. H. Lillie. 
Converted yacht Viking, Lieutenant- Commander J. C. 

Wilson. 
Converted yacht Vixen, Lieutenant A. Sharp, Jr. 
Repair-ship Vulcan, Lieutenant- Commander I. Harris. 
Converted yacht Wasp, Lieutenant A. Ward. 
Revenue cutter Windom, Captain S. E. Maguire, Revenue 

Cutter Service. 
Gunboat Wilmington, Commander C. C. Todd. 
Torpedo-boat Winslow, Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou. 
Tug Wompatuck, Lieutenant C. W. Jungen. 
Revenue cutter Woodbury, Captain H. B. Rogers, Revenue 

Cutter Service. 
Auxiliary cruiser Yankee, Commander W. H. Brownson. 
Converted yacht Yankton, Lieutenant-Commander J. D. 

Adams. 



I 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 221 

Auxiliary cruiser Yosemite, Commander W. H. Emory. 
Ram Katahdin, Captain G. F. F. Wilde. 
Auxiliary cruiser St. Louis, Captain C. F. Goodrich. 
Auxiliary cruiser St. Paul, Captain C. D. Sigsbee. 
Auxiliary cruiser Harvard, Captain C. S. Cotton. 
Auxiliary cruiser Yale, Captain W. C. Wise. 

ASIATIC STATION. 

Protected cruiser Olympia, Captain B. P. Lamberton. 
Protected cruiser Baltimore, Captain N. M. Dyer. 
Protected cruiser Charleston, Captain Henry Glass. 
Protected cruiser Raleigh, Captain J. B. Coghlan. 
Protected cruiser Boston, Captain Frank Wildes. 
Monitor Monterey, Commander E. H. C. Leutze. 
Monitor Monadnock, Captam W. H. Whitmg. 
Gunboat Concord, Commander Asa Walker. 
Gunboat Monocacy, Commander O. W. Farenholt. 
Gunboat Petrel, Commander E. P. Wood. 
ColUer Brutus, Lieutenant V. L. Cottman. 
Steamer Nanshan, Lieutenant B. W. Hodges. 
Steamer Nero, Commander Charles Belknap. 
Supply-ship Zafiro, Ensign H. A. Pearson. 
Revenue cutter McCulloch, Captain D. B. Hodgson, Re- 
venue Cutter Service. 

PACIFIC STATION. 

Fish Commission steamer Albatross, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Jefferson F. Moser. 

Gunboat Bennington, Commander H. E. Nichols. 

Gunboat Wheeling, Commander Uriel Sebree. 

Unprotected cruiser Mohican, Commander George M. 
Book. 

Revenue cutter Corwin, Captain W. J. Herring, Revenue 
Cutter Service. 



222 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Revenue cutter Grant, Captain J. A. Slamm, Revenue 

Cutter Service. 
Revenue cutter Perry, Captain W. J. Kilgore, Revenue 

Cutter Service. 
Revenue cutter Rush, Captain W. H. Roberts, Revenue 

Cutter Service. 

AUXILIARIES. 

Converted yachts — 

Aileen, Lieutenant Alonzo Gartley. 

Elfrida, Lieutenant (junior grade) M. A. Orlopp. 

Enquirer, Lieutenant W. H. Stayton. 

Free Lance, Lieutenant Thomas C. Zereaga. 

Huntress, Lieutenant Felton Parker. 

Inca, Lieutenant W. E. McKay, 
Monitors — 

Catskill, Lieutenant M. E. Hall. 

Jason, Lieutenant H. F. Fickbohm. 

Lehigh, Lieutenant Robert G. Peck. 

Montauk, Lieutenant L. L. Reamey, 

Nahant, Lieutenant C. S. Richman. 

Nantucket, Lieutenant C. B. T. Moore. 

Passaic, Lieutenant F. H. Sherman. 

Wyandotte, Lieutenant Thomas I. Madge. 
Tugs — 

Choctaw, Lieutenant (junior grade) W. O. Hulme. 

Potomac, Lieutenant George P. Blow. 

Powhatan, Lieutenant (junior grade) F. M. RusseU. 

Cruiser Restless, Lieutenant A. H. Day. 

Steamer Arctic, Lieutenant George C. Stout. 

SPECIAL SERVICE. 
City of Pekin, Commander W. C. Gibson. 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 223 

UNASSIGNED. 

Cruiser Buffalo, Captain J. N. Hemphill, 

Cruiser Panther, Commander George C. Reiter. 

Steamer Hector, Commander F. i\I. "Wise. 

Protected cruiser Philadelphia, Captain G. H. Wadleigh. 

TUGS AT KEY WEST, FLA. 

Samoset, Acting Boatswain Patrick Deery. 
Massasoit, Lieutenant Alfred Reynolds. 
Nezinscot, Boatswain J. J. Holden. 
Sioux, Mate Albert Benzon. 

Such were the vessels and their commanders 
assembled to execute the pledge made by the 
United States. While bending every energy and 
straining every nerve to make ready for war, the 
ISTavy Department had maintained the most care- 
ful surveillance over Spain's preparations. Like 
our own force, the section of Spain's armored 
fleet in the Atlantic Ocean was divided into two 
squadrons, one of which, homogeneous and mobile, 
was at the Cape Verde Islands, and the other, 
unready, although the work upon it was pushing 
to completion, was distributed among the ports of 
Spain. The squadron at the Cape Verde Islands 
had been assembled by the withdrawal from the 
West Indies of the armored cruisers Vizcaya and 
Almirante Oquendo, which had been sent across 
the ocean to display the flag of Spain and to show 
the United States that their government pos- 



224 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

sessed means of defense, and to inspire courage 
and faith among the loyal in the islands of Cuba 
and Porto Kico. War's approach caused the 
dispatch of the Yizcaya and Oquendo to St. 
Vincent, where they fomid the armored cruisers 
Infanta Maria Teresa and Cristobal Colon, the 
torpedo-boat destroyers Furor, Terror, and Plu- 
ton, and three torpedo-boats and two colliers. 
This first move by Spain was sagacious, and it 
was anticipated that she would follow it up by 
adding the Carlos V. and Pelayo, the former an 
armored cruiser and the latter a battle-ship, to 
the force. Such action would have required con- 
centration of all American armored ships in the 
Atlantic, for the Oregon could not have arrived at 
Key West by the time the Spanish fleet reached 
American waters, and singly each division of 
ours would have been inferior to the enemy. 

The exact strength of the Spanish fleet was to 
us unknown. It was true that the department had 
received many reports, some apparently authori- 
tative and circumstantial, indicating that the 
ships were indifferently equipped and inefficiently 
manned, and these reports were worthy of some 
credence in view of the defects supposed to exist 
in Spanish administration, and the neglect which 
the Madrid government had observed toward 
its na^^. After a visit to Cadiz in 1793, IS^el- 




AHMIKAL (KKVKIJA 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 225 

son wrote: " The Dons may know how to build 
beautiful ships, but they do not know how to 
procure men. At Cadiz they have in commis- 
sion four battle-ships of first rank, very beautiful 
ships, but miserably manned." Until the contrary 
was established, the department, however, was 
bomid to estimate the Spanish ships as highly 
trained and efficient, to credit their officers and 
men with patriotism and strategical and tactical 
ability, and to put forth every effort to bring 
about their prompt destruction. Five of the 
Spanish vessels were armored cruisers, all of 
modem construction and armament and possess- 
ing on paper swifter heels than any of om- armor- 
clads with the exception of the Brooklyn and 
Kew York; and one was a battle-ship, which, if 
properly fought, could give a good account of 
itself in a duel with the Indiana. Spain had also 
a type of vessel which we had not, and which, 
its possibilities unlaiown, was greatly feared by 
experts and laymen. I refer to torpedo-boat 
destroyers. To the department and to the world, 
Spain possessed a fleet composed of vessels of 
tactical and strategical value, and properly han- 
dled it would have a chance of obtaining control 
of the sea. We know now how misleading was 
our information. Writing in the month of April, 
shortly before the war, Cervera said : — 



226 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

My fears are realized. The conflict is coming fast upon 
us; and ttie Colon has not received her big guns; the 
Carlos V. has not been dehvered, and her 10-cm, artillery 
is not yet mounted ; the Pelayo is not ready for want of 
finishing her redoubt, and, I believe, her secondary bat- 
tery ; the Victoria has no artillery, and of the Numancia 
we had better not speak. 

In another letter he said : — 

You talk about plans, and, in spite of all my efforts to 
have some laid out, as it was wise and prudent, my 
desires have been disappointed. How can it be said that 
I have been supplied with everything I asked for ? The 
Colon has not yet her big guns, and I asked for the bad 
ones if there were no others. The 14-cm. ammunition, 
with the exception of about 300 shots, is bad. The 
defective guns of the Vizcaya and Oquendo have not 
been changed. The cartridge-cases of the Colon cannot be 
recharged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo. 
There is no plan or concert, which I so much desired and 
called for so often. The repairs of the servomotors of the 
Infanta Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya were only made 
after they had left Spain. . . . The Vizcaya can no longer 
steam, and she is only a boil in the body of the fleet. 

Spain's withdrawal of her Minister and the 
enforced dejDarture of Minister "Woodford from 
Madrid were, in themselves, defiant declinations 
to comply with the President's demands. As- 
sured of the safety of Mr. Woodford and the 
consular officers of the United States, who had 
started from Spain on April 21 for neutral terri- 
tory, the President on the followmg day issued 
this proclamation of blockade : — 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 227 

PROCLAMATION 

Blockade of Cuban ports. By the President of the 
United States, a prochimation. Whereas, by a joint reso- 
lution passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 
1898, and communicated to the government of Spain, it 
was demanded that said government at once relinquish 
its authority and government in the island of Cul)a, 
and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and 
Cuban waters, and the President of the United States 
was directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the 
actual service of the United States the mihtia of the 
several States, to such extent as might be necessary to 
carry said resolution into effect; and 

Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the 
President of the United States deems it necessary to set 
on foot and maintain a blockade of the north coast of 
Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas 
and Bahia Honda and the port of Cienfuegos on the 
south coast of Cuba aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws 
of the United States and the laws of nations applicable 
to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as to 
prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports 
aforesaid. Any neutral vessels approaching any of said 
ports or attempting to leave the same without notice or 
knowledge of the establisliment of such blockade, will be 
duly warned by the commander of the blockading forces, 
who will indorse on her register the facts and the date 
of such warning, where such indorsement was made, and 
if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter any block- 
aded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest 
convenient port for such proceedings against her and her 
cargo, as prizes, as may be deemed advisable. Keutral 



228 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

vessels lying at any of said ports at the time of estab- 
lishment of said blockade will be allowed thirty days to 
issue therefrom. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and 
caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-second 
day of April, a. d. 1898, and of the Independence of the 
United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 

[seal.] WILLIAM McKINLEY. 

By the President, 

John Sherman, Secretary of State. 

With the hmited force at Rear- Admiral Samp- 
son's disposal, a blockade of the entire island 
was impossible; furthermore, the President had 
no intention of estabhshing merely a "paper" 
blockade, with its accompanying international 
embarrassments and entanglements. "A block- 
ade to be binding and effective," to quote the in- 
struction given to Rear-Admiral Sampson, " must 
be maintained by a force sufficient to render in- 
gress to or egress from the port dangerous ; " and 
this principle of international law was observed 
strictly and legally. 

In selecting the ports to be blockaded, the 
department had considered those which, closed, 
would shut the enemy off from food supplies 
and munitions of war. Cuba imports large quan- 
tities of foodstuffs, and the insurrection com- 
pelled the Spanish troops to obtain most of the 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 229 

components of their rations from adjacent lands. 
From Havana a raili'oad stretched to the east, 
connecting the capital with Cardenas and Matan- 
zas, and to the west, where it provided commu- 
nication with Bahia Honda. A branch connected 
the capital with Cienf iieg-os, — an excellent har- 
bor, which, it was anticipated, might be the ob- 
jective of the Spanish squadron. In this section 
of the island most of the Spanish army was con- 
centrated. Here its rule was effectually main- 
tained, and here it was thought would occur 
military operations when the AVar Department 
determined the time propitious to invade the 
island. 

By the measure of blockade three important 
results were anticipated : first, exhaustion of the 
Spanish army in Cuba Avithout injury to our- 
selves ; second, destruction of Spanish commerce, 
the main artery of which connected the Penin- 
sula and its West Indian possession, and, third, 
the imposition upon Spain of the duty of sending 
rehef to her colonies, and the consequent strain 
of conducting war more than three thousand 
miles from an effective home base. " They," 
[the Americans,] wrote a Spanish captain of 
artillery who served in Cuba, " realized that, 
owing to our lack of naval power, the island of 
Cuba, separated from Spain by a long distance, 



230 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

and without direct means for supporting its army 
and people as a result of the agricultural con- 
ditions, could be easily cut off, and reduced by 
starvation, without much effort or bloodshed." 
Great as was the promise of this measure, it did 
not appeal to those who could not understand 
the department's refusal to permit an immediate 
assault upon Havana. Rear- Admiral Sampson 
himself advocated such a movement, pointing 
out that the batteries — the western batteries 
particularly — were well placed for an attack 
from the westward and close inshore, where 
they would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the 
fire of our big ships at short range, where the 
secondary batteries would have full effect. Rear- 
Admiral Sampson reported that he had discussed 
the plan with Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chad- 
wick, and that they united with him in the belief 
that the direct attack was sufficiently promising 
of the capture of the city to warrant a trial. It 
is quite possible that had Rear- Admiral Sampson 
been allowed to make the assault, the results he 
expected would have been achieved. But the 
department could not lose sight of the fact that, 
dashing though the project, it involved a grave 
element of risk for the vessels participating in it, 
and that even if Havana were captured, the 
Spanish squadron at Cape Yerde was still intact 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 231 

and capable of indicting heavy damage npon onr 
coast, especially if there were any rednction in 
the fighting strength of onr fleet. Writing to the 
admiral nnder date of April 6, the Secretary of 
the IN^avy said: — 

The department does not wish the vessels of your 
squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at 
Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified 
ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels 
should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this 
case, the department would suggest that a rigid blockade 
and employment of our torpedo-boats might accomplish 
the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy's 
vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men- 
of-war to the fire of the land batteries. 

There are two reasons for this : — 

First, there may be no United States troops to occupy 
any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and 
arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of 
October. 

Second, the lack of docking facilities makes it particu- 
larly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled be- 
fore the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable 
vessels. 

Spain wonld have welcomed an attack npon 
Havana. " It wonld likewise have been of good 
effect," observed the Spanish artilleryman I have 
already qnoted, " if we had compelled the enemy 
to engage in a battle against Havana. A victory 
there would have cost them much time and blood." 



232 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Moreover, Germany and France had made no 
secret of their wish that Spain should prove vic- 
torious, and in Germany particularly, unofficially 
it is true, there were indications among her peo- 
ple of their contempt for the American navy, 
and she could not be unconscious that she might 
develop into an important factor in determining 
how the war should end. 

Preservation of our armored ships was, there- 
fore, imperative. It would have been the height 
of recklessness to have risked the destruction of 
one or more of our few battle-ships while the 
Spanish fleet was afloat intact. Contributory to 
this decision was the unwiUingness of the de- 
partment to stray from its purpose to devote 
itself to one thing at a time. Adequate fortifica- 
tion of the Atlantic coast would release the Flying 
Squadron and enable its location at Cienfuegos 
on the south of Cuba, the one place above all 
others where it should be stationed. The block- 
ade of the north coast was strenglhened by the 
armored ships under Rear- Admiral Sampson; 
that of the south coast w^as maintained by small 
vessels, ridiculously inadequate in strength and, 
at first, in numbers, which could have been brushed 
aside without the slightest difficulty by the 
Spanish cruisers. The department was deeply 
concerned about the maintenance of the blockade 




Photi.sraph i-,.pyri,:;lit Iv^ l.v 1'. liutfkiiiist 

RiLVR-ADMlItAL JOHN CRITTENDEN WATSON 



I 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 233 

of Cienfuegos. Had it been raised, Spain would 
have gained an advantage which would have been 
hailed with satisfaction in Europe, and might 
have produced international complications. To 
reestablish it, formal proclamation and mainte- 
nance before the port of a sufficient number of 
ships to enforce it would have been necessary. 
But in the interim merchant ships flying neutral 
flags departing from or entering Cienfuegos 
could not have been seized mider the provisions 
of the original proclamation. In consequence of 
the insufficient force at the disposal of the com- 
mander-m-chief, a trade was developed by neu- 
trals with Batabano and other ports in the vicinity 
of Cienfuegos not specifically closed, and thus 
the purpose of the blockade in the early days of 
the war partially failed of effect. International 
law recognized the legality of this trade unless 
declared contraband by the United States, and 
the President and his advisers were not disposed 
to take this action, because it would have increased 
the mifriendliness of nations none too well dis- 
posed toward us. Once Cervera's fleet was safely 
locked in the harbor of Santiago, and with addi- 
tional converted war-ships available, it was pos- 
sible to prevent this trade by extension of the 
blockade on the south coast of Cuba from Cape 
Francis to Cape Cruz. After the destruction of 



234 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

Cervera's fleet, an expedition was ordered to the 
Isle of Pines to occupy it as a base for small 
vessels operating against Cienfuegos, Batabano, 
and other southern coast ports; but the peace 
protocol suspended hostilities, and the occupation 
was not effected. !N'ot so much for the purpose 
of starving out the Spanish army in Porto Rico 
as to watch the port and prevent the departure 
of the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer which had 
sought refuge there, a blockade of San Juan was 
declared. 

What was the gain of the blockade of Cuba ? 
This question may be best answered by quoting 
from an article written by Commander Jacobsen, 
commanding the foreign cruiser Geier, whose 
constant inspection of the blockade was a cause 
of some irritation to the department : — 

A walk through the streets of Havana (May 17) revealed 
the usual every-day life. Of course the traffic was not as 
great as in time of peace. . . . Beggars were lying about 
in front of the church doors and in the main streets, among 
them women with half-starved little children, but not in 
very large numbers. Many a coin was dropped into their 
outstretched hands by the passers-by ; but there was no- 
thing to indicate that the blockade had entailed serious 
results for the poorer population. . . . The general opinion 
was that there were sufficient provisions in the city to 
sustain the blockade for some length of time ; but what 
was to become of the poorer class of the population in 
that event was a problem. . . 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 235 

Since our last visit to Havana, about a month ago (June 
22), there was liardly any change noticeable in the aspect 
of the town and the conditions prevailing there. The 
harbor was empty and deserted. . . . l*rovisions were 
expensive, but the prices were held down by the govern- 
ment, so as to prevent excesses on the part of the dealers. 
The poor were being taken care of as far as possible by 
the distribution of food in free kitchens and by entertam- 
ments for their benefit. . . . The rate of sickness and 
death was said to be hardly higher than usual. . . . 

We . . . again returned to Havana on August 1. . . . 
Few changes were noticeable in the city itself. There was 
not as yet an actual famine, but the poorer classes were 
evidently much worse off than they had been on our 
former visit, for the number of beggars in the streets had 
increased. Crowds of poor people would come alongside 
the ships in boats to try to get sometliing to eat. . . . 
" If the Americans would only attack Havana," the people 
would say, " they would soon find out what the garrison 
of the capital is made of. They would get their heads 
broken quick enough. But Uncle Sam is only beating 
about the bush. He is not going to swallow the hot 
morsel and burn his tongue and stomach." No wonder 
that the Spanish troops, condemned to inactivity, poorly 
fed, cut off from the wiiole world, and without any pro- 
spect of rehef, were anxious for the end to come. . . . 

. . . But I have information from reliable sources that 
on August 12 the military administration of Havana had 
provisions on hand for three months longer, outside of 
what the blockade-runners had brought mto the country 
and what was hidden away in the houses of the city. One 
can therefore miderstand the indignation of Captain- 
General Blanco when he heard that the peace protocol 
had been signed. But of what use would have been a 



236 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

further resistance on the part of the Spanish garrison ? 
Tlie United States government only needed to make tlie 
blockade more rigid. That would necessarily have sealed 
the fate of Havana sooner or later. A fortress in the 
ocean, cut off from its mother country, can be rescued 
only with the assistance of the navy. The enemy who has 
control of the sea need only wait patiently until the ripe 
fruit drops into his lap. 

N^one regretted more than the President and 
the people of the United States the condemnation 
of the poor of Cuba to starvation, by reason of 
the blockade, equally with the Spanish army. But 
war inflicts its wounds upon all classes. How 
different became the condition in Havana when 
the peace protocol was signed! I again quote 
from Captain Jacobsen : — 

... I returned to Havana for the fourth time on Sep- 
tember 3. How different everythuig looked ! The clouds 
of smoke of the blockadmg ships were no longer seen on 
the horizon. That circle of brave vessels, greedy for prey, 
ready every moment to pounce upon anything that came 
within their reach, had vanished. . . . The harbor entrance 
was animated. In the harbor itself German, English, 
and Norwegian steamers were busily engaged in load- 
ing and unloaduig. Alongside the custom-houses there 
were a number of American and Mexican sailing-vessels 
that had brought food and wane. All the storerooms were 
filled with provisions of every kind. The city had awak- 
ened to new life, business houses were once more open, 
merchants were again at work, the streets were full of 
people. . . . 



THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA 237 

By her severance of diplomatic relations with 
the United States Spain had, by international 
nsage, precipitated a state of war ; and the United 
States gave recognition to the same condition by 
declaring a blockade of her colonies. To define 
more clearly the status of the United States, and, 
to quote President McKmley, " to the end that 
all its rights and the maintenance of all its duties 
in the conduct of public war may be assured," 
Congress declared, in accordance w^ith the recom- 
mendation of the President, that a state of war 
existed, and had existed since April 21. This 
declaration at once imposed the obligations of 
neutrality upon nations not party to the conflict. 
The Spanish squadron lay in the Portuguese 
harbor of St. Vincent, Cape Yerde Islands. It 
had been rumored that Portugal w^ould throw in 
her fortune with Spain, and this report was impor- 
tant, because the attitude of the Lisbon govern- 
ment would determine the length of time Cervera 
would remain at St. Yincent. That the king of 
Portugal had no intention of injecting himself 
into the Hispaiio-American quarrel was shown at 
5 p. M. April 28, when he signed the imperial 
proclamation of neutrality. That proclamation 
permitted the stay of beUigerent vessels in Portu- 
guese ports for a " short time " — an indefinite 
period, somewhat puzzling to the men who w^ere 



238 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

attempting to work out the grand problems of 
war. Cervera relieved our anxiety on this point, 
but gave us fresh cause for concern. On April 
29 he left the Cape Verde Islands, and for almost 
two weeks the Navy DejDartment floimdered in 
a sea of ignorance as to his whereabouts. 




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yiii 

THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET AND 
SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 

Spain's naval division, under the command of 
Admiral Cervera, arrived off the island of Mar- 
tinique on May 11, 1898. Thirty-six hours later, 
information of its appearance there reached 
Washington. Vital as was this intelHgence, there 
was natui-al irritation because of the time lost in 
its transmission, and there was some disposition 
to attribute the delay to the pro-Spanish sym- 
pathies of the inhabitants of the French island. 
If so, redress was out of the question and recrim- 
ination was useless. The department, therefore, 
centered its attention upon Cervera's fleet. If 
afloat, there was constant menace to our block- 
ade and to our coast; if destroyed or shut up in 
port, our blockade and coast were absolutely safe, 
Spain's defeat was assured, and Cuba would fall, 
like an apple, into our mailed hand. 

There was no fear that Cervera would escape 
ultimate annihilation ; rather was there an uneasy 
feeling that, in the game of strategy wliich had 



240 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

begun, he might evade us at first and thus post- 
pone the inevitable. The men who studied the 
war board at midnight of May 12-13, when news 
of Cervera's appearance reached them, were con- 
fident, however, that the dispositions arranged 
were such as to insure his apprehension within 
a reasonable time. Notification that he had been 
sighted was at once transmitted by cable and 
scout to Kear-Admiral Sampson, then retm^ning 
to Key West from his trip to San Juan.^ Commo- 
dore Schley, at Hampton Roads, was prelimi- 
narily instructed to get ready for sea, and a few 
hours later was directed to proceed to Chai'leston, 
S. C, where he would be in a better geograplii- 
cal position to remforce Sampson or to protect 
the naval base at Key "West. The news of Cer- 
vera's presence was telegraphed to Commodore 
George C. Remey, the efiicient commandant of 
the naval base at Key West, and twenty-four 
hours later he was ordered to remove all but the 
smallest blockading vessel from Cienfuegos and 
to advise the ships off the Cuban coast to be pre- 
pared in case of the appearance of the enemy. 

These orders were intended to improve the 
strategic position of the units into which our fleet 
was divided; they were certainly in the direc- 

1 See Appendix, Exhibit E, for Sampson's report of attack on 
San Juan, Porto Rico. 



Pli.>tii<;raph by HnUiiijier 

THE LATE REAR-ADMIRAL WILLLV.M THoMAS .sAMl'>()\ 

111 comiuaiia of tlie North Atlaiitii- S.|ii;nlron iliiriiijf tlie war 



THE COMING OF CERVERAS FLEET 241 

tion of concentration, which had been our policy 
from the outset of the war. AVhen Scliley was 
directed to sail for Charleston, the intention 
existed to make this merely a port of call. To 
Key West he was now ordered, and proceeded 
at 6 p. M. May 15. Sampson, in the mean time, 
had arrived off Puerto Plata, Santo Domingo, 
from which point he cabled to the department in 
regard to a press report that Cervera had returned 
to Cadiz, Spain, and to Commodore Remey, di- 
recting him to send the d^aiamite cruiser Vesu- 
vius to San Juan, provided the Spanish division 
had been sighted in Peninsular waters. Freed 
from concern in regard to Cervera, Sampson 
proposed to return and capture the capital of 
Porto Rico, the wealniess of which he had devel- 
oped by a bombardment. To him, however, as 
it had to the department, the situation changed 
when he received dispatches from Washington, 
the first of which announced the appearance of 
Cervera off Martinique, and the second his arri- 
val on May 14 at Cura9ao. The later message 
directed Sampson to hasten to Key West. 

When Cervera flashed across the horizon at 
Martinique, he added a new feature to the prob- 
lem of search which we had been attempting 
to solve. At the time he sailed from the Cape 
Yerde Islands, his objective was clouded by the 



242 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

comparatively numerous points to which he might 
proceed; his arrival off Martinique established 
that either Cuba or Porto Rico was his desti- 
nation. The coast of the United States was out 
of the question at the moment, because he had 
necessarily burned the greater part of his coal, 
and must replenish his supply before he could 
undertake any distant and offensive movement. 
It may be interpolated here, as characteristic 
of human nature, that with the appearance of 
Cervera in American waters, and with the depar- 
ture of Schley from Hampton Roads, there was 
practically immediate cessation of demands from 
our ports for protection. On the day Cervera 
lay off Martinique, Sampson bombarded San 
Juan, Porto Rico, and, wliile we did not Iniow 
it then, this fact, which Cervera learned through 
the commander of his torpedo-boat flotilla, as 
well as the information that he could not obtain 
coal at Fort de France, determined him to seek 
refuge elsewhere. Three days before Cervera's 
arrival, the department had been advised that 
colliers would probably meet him off the north 
coast of Yenezuela. "When he was reported at 
Cura9ao, therefore, it seemed likely that this 
information was correct, and in the light of it the 
department studied the possibilities of the situ- 
ation. The four ports, one of which must be 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET 243 

his ultiiiuite destination, were San Juan in I'oi-to 
Kico, and Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegow, and 
Havana in Cuba. The hiwt named seemed out 
of the question, because to enter it he would 
liave to encounter a superior force, and once in 
it he could not hope to escape the ileet which we 
were ceitam to assemble before it, and which 
would be able to operate from the base of Key 
West, only ninety miles away. Cienfuegos 
appeared the most probable in view of the 
report that he was carrying munitions essen- 
tial to the defense of Havana with which Cien- 
fuegos had railroad connection ; but it was also 
probable that he might make Santiago de Cuba, 
and, after coahng, attempt a dash into the Gulf 
of ^Mexico, — a movement which, however, Avould 
have had httle justification as there exist but two 
means of exit therefrom, each of which would 
have been promptly guarded by a squadron supe- 
rior to his own. 

This speculation indicates the way in which 
the department reasoned with respect to antici- 
pated developments. How nearly it conformed 
to the views of the Spaniards themselves may 
be seen by a quotation from a book written by 
Captain Victor M. Concas y Palau, who served 
as commander of the Infanta Maria Teresa and 
Cervera's chief of staff. "The only harbors 



244 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

/'^ which we could enter," Captam Concas wrote, 
" were : First, San Juan, which we had to discard 
altogether, because, as the United States admiral 
has said, with good reason, he could have taken 
it whenever he pleased. Second, Havana, which 
we supposed to be well guarded, and it was 
indeed, since the Americans have since said 
that it was considered highly improbable that 
we should attempt to enter Havana, and it must 
be understood that it was better guarded by 
the squadrons at a distance than those near 
by, because, in spite of the blockade, it would 
have been difficult to prevent ships, whether 
injured or not, from placing themselves mider 
the protection of the batteries of the city, while 
an encounter at a distance from Havana meant 
the total destruction of our squadron. Third, 
Cienfuegos, which we also sujDposed guarded, 
especially since, om' squadron havmg been 
sighted from the southward, it was from here 
that our passage to Havana could be most 
effectually cut off; moreover, this harbor, situ- 
ated at the head of Cazones Bay, is a verita- 
ble rat-trap, very easy to blockade, and from 
which escape is more difficult than from any 
other harbor of the island. We knew there were 
torpedoes there, but no fortifications to amomit 
to anything, and, moreover, the entrance is very 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET 245 

difficult to defend against a serious attack from 
the sea. 

"On tlie other hand, wc were twelve hiiiidrcd 
and fift}' miles distant from the latter harbor, 
while from Havana, or Dry Tortngas, and Key 
West, the enemy's base of operations, they had 
to make a run of only five hundred miles to cut 
us off. For this reason, Cienfuegos harbor was 
not seriously considered by us at that time. 
Later, when starvation stared us in the face at 
Santiago de Cuba, the former harbor was thought 
of as a possible solution, but not on the day of 
our arrival at Martinique. 

'' There remained as the only solution going 
to Santiago de Cuba, the second caj^ital of the 
island, which we had to suppose, and did sup- 
pose, well supplied with provisions and artilleiy 
in view of the favorable conditions of the harbor 
entrance. Moreover, the southern coast of the 
island offered chances of sortie on stormy da^'S 
and an open sea for operations, after we had 
refitted and made repairs. But as we also sup- 
posed that the fortifications there were not suf- 
ficient to afford us much support in the sortie, 
it was not at that time decided to go to said 
harbor in the hopes of a solution which would 
permit us to force our way into Havana harbor. 
The distance from Martinique to Santiago is 



I 



k 



246 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

about nine hundred and fifty miles, so that the 
hostile squadron, which was at San Juan, could 
easily have arrived there ahead of us. But we 
never believed that it would do so, thinking that 
Admiral Sampson — though it has since come 
to light that he did not know of our arrival — 
would do what he actually did, namely, cover 
the remotest possibility, the entrance to the only 
fortified point, Havana." 

We knew nothing, of course, of the conditions 
under which Cervera was acting; but strategical 
and geographical considerations determined our 
plan of campaign. The moment the department 
learned of the enemy's presence in the Caribbean 
Sea, it turned the eyes of the navy — its scouts — 
in that direction. The Minneapolis was directed 
to proceed at her utmost speed to Caicos Bank, 
Bahamas, and cruise between that point and 
Monte Cristi, Haiti, and keep a shari? watch for 
the Spanish division. The St. Paul was ordered 
to cruise between Morant Point, Jamaica, and the 
west coast of Haiti. By means of these two ves- 
sels, the department believed it would prevent 
the unperceived passage of Cervera around the 
eastern end of Cuba. As an indication of how 
quickly the situation changed, the St. Paul, which 
was coaling at Hampton Poads, and had not 
carried out her original orders, was, a few hours 



THE COMING OF CEIIVERAS FLEICT 247 

later, on May 14, directed to proceed to Key 
AVest, there to coal to her full caj)acity and await 
further instructions. The modilication of the 
orders to the St. Paul was the result of tlic ar- 
rival of the Spanish division at Cura^-ao. Cer- 
vera's failure to proceed directly to Cuba, which 
was his objective, could be attributed only to 
his expectation of obtainmg coal in the vicinity 
of Curasao, and this inference was supported 
by the report of the impending arrival of colliers 
in the Gulf of Venezuela. The colliers did not 
arrive, and the armored cruisers Infanta Maria 
Teresa and Yizcaya took on foiu* hmidi-ed tons 
of coal at Willemstadt. At Key West the St. 
Paul would be strategically in a central position 
— not much farther from the Windward Pas- 
sage, to which she had first been ordered, than 
the Spanish division, and only two hundred miles 
from the Yucatan Passage, which the enemy 
might use m order to enter the Gulf of Mexico 
or to reach Havana, and would be available for 
service in any direction in which developments 
in the situation might require the presence of a 
fast scout. While the St. Paul was covering the 
distance of a thousand miles between IIampk)n 
Roads and Key West in four days, the depart- 
ment decided again to modify her orders. It 
was planned to dog the movements of Cervera 



248 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

— to send three of our fast cruisers, one of 
which should be the St. Paul, the second the 
Minneapolis, and the third the Harvard, to the 
Gulf of Venezuela, there to get and keep in 
touch with him. Thus, wherever he should go, 
he would be preceded or followed by a vessel 
of superior speed, which, upon approach at a 
near-by cable station, would drop out of the race 
for a short time to communicate with the depart- 
ment or the commander-in-chief. The St. Paul 
was due at Key West, the Minneapolis was 
cruising, in accordance with the orders given, 
between Caicos Bank and Monte Cristi Island, 
and the Harvard was at St. Pierre, in which it 
at first had been believed she was blockaded 
by a Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer. It subse- 
quently developed that the enemy's vessel, the 
Terror, had been compelled to enter Fort de 
France to make repairs. The Terror later crept 
to San Juan, where she was badly injured in an 
engagement with the St. Paul. 

The plan to keep in touch with the Spanish 
squadron was not put into execution, because 
of the enemy's departure from Curasao, and 
Rear-Admiral Sampson suggested a different 
disposition of the scouts. His instructions con- 
templated that the Yale and St. Paul should 
cruise between Morant Point, Jamaica, and Mole 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET 2t0 

St. T^icholas, Haiti, and Ciil)a, aiul the Harvard 
across the Mona I^assage, wliich sejiarates Santo 
Domingo and Porto Kico, and along the north- 
ern coast of the hitter isUxnd. The department 
modified tliese orders so as to have the St. 
Panl and Yale proceed to Cape IIa}i:ien, Haiti, 
and there await further orders. The Yucatan 
Passage was patrolled by the Cincinnati and 
Vesuvius. 

The orders and movements of the scouts ha^•e 
been given in detail because of the dependence 
placed in these ships by the department. Cap- 
tain Concas has not, apparently, a high opinion 
of this class of vessels. " A question arises here, 
which has since been discussed," he says in his 
book, " but which at the time seemed very clear 
to us, namely, that it would be the telegraph 
rather than the hostile scouts that would betray 
us, and as a matter of fact that is what happened." 
But Captain Concas, when writing this passage, 
perhaps lost sight of the fact that it Avas essential 
to the United States to keep close track of Cer- 
vera's squadron wherever it should go, and that 
physical impossibilities prevented our considar or 
other agents from keeping constant touch with it. 
Had Cervera succeeded in leaving Santiago de 
Cuba before May 26, he would have been fol- 
lowed by one of five vessels, all fast and most of 



250 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

which were of greater coal endm^ance than any 
of the ships of his own command. To one of 
these scouts, indeed, is due the credit of cap- 
turmg the cargo of coal which in his possession 
would have enabled dej)arture from Santiago. 

In order to aid the reader it may be desirable 
now to state the position of the fighting ships of 
the opposing squadrons. Admiral Cervera was 
last reported as preparing to sail from Cura9ao 
at 6 p. M. of May 15. Rear-Admiral Sampson 
received this information off Cape Haytien at 
12.30 A. M. May 16. His squadron, which was 
pushing on as much as possible, was in a position 
at noon of May 17 to prevent the enemy from 
reaching Havana, via the Bahama Channel, with- 
out a conflict. Eeheving his personal presence 
more desirable at Key West, where he could get 
in communication with the department, he au- 
thorized Captain Robley D. Evans to take com- 
mand of the squadron, and himself, in the Kew 
York, proceeded with all dispatch to that naval 
base. The Flying Squadron left Charleston for 
Key West at the same hour Cervera was reported 
as having left Cura9ao, and, steaming at twelve 
knots, arrived at its destination at 12.30 A. m. 
May 18. The :N'ew York reached Key West 
at three o'clock in the afternoon of the same 
day. 




Photograph by Ges>t'.il 

KEAK-ADMIUAI. KoBLEY l)rN(;Ll>f)N EVANS 

In commanJ of the battle-sliip Iowa duriist tlie war 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET 251 

Instructions from the dc'])artnKMit and Kear- 
Admiral Sam])Son had caused ai-ran^^enicnts to be 
made at Key West for jiromptly coahng all the 
ships that might apply for fuel. Assured that 
Sampson's division was in a position to prevent 
Cervera's use of the Bahama Channel to reach 
Havana, the department determined to send the 
Flying Squadron to Cienfuegos. In selecting 
Cienfuegos as the station of this squadron, the 
department was actuated by the information that 
the Spanish vessels were carrying munitions of 
war necessary to the defense of Havana, and that 
the orders were imperative to reach either that or 
some other point in railroad commmiication with 
Havana. Cienfuegos appeared to be the only port 
fulfilling these conditions. Besides, it was neces- 
sary that the blockade there should be defended, 
and that the Yucatan Channel should be covered. 
Moreover, with Sampson before Havana and 
Schley at Cienfuegos, the armored vessels of the 
United State>- would be in a position from which 
they could strike e'ther for the defense of our o^\ai 
blockade and coast, or engage in an offensive 
movement, combined or separate, against the 
enemy's squadron, ^\e had learned from our 
consul at Curacao that the Spanish ships wei'c 
short of coal. With the meager coaling appli- 
ances at the Spanish ports not covered by our 



252 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

ships, some days would have to be occupied by 
Cervera in refiUing the bunkers of his vessels. If 
he sought refuge in San Juan, the plans adopted 
by the department would have resulted in his 
bemg i^romptly reported by a scout off that port. 
The receipt of this information would have been 
followed by instructions to Sampson and to Schley 
to proceed at full speed to Porto Rico. These 
instructions could have reached Sampson within 
six hours, and Schley within eighteen hours, the 
department having determined to hold fast cruis- 
ers at Key West for the special purpose of con- 
veying them. It was calculated that in five days 
there would be before San Juan a force of such 
strength that Cervera could not escape annihi- 
lation. But if Cervera had succeeded in obtain- 
ing coal in such time that it might have been 
thought inadvisable to order our armored shijDS 
before San Juan, then he would have been 
followed by scouts, just as it was intended that 
he should be followed by the vessels stationed 
off Santiago. With our armored divisions off 
Havana and Cienfuegos, he would not have 
dared to proceed to either of those points, and 
had he attempted a demonstration against our 
Atlantic coast, Sampson would have started in 
pursuit and Schley would have been ordered to 
Havana to maintain the blockade of that harbor. 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET 253 

Tliese movements would have restored the con- 
ditions existin<^ ])ri()r to Cervera's appearance off 
Martinique. A dash to the north by the Sj)anish 
di^■ision would have been disadvantageous in one 
sense to Sampson, Imt disadvantageous also to 
Cervera, who Avould have been compelled to act 
on exterior lines — that is, follow a curve, while 
Sampson would have steamed along a straight 
line. Deprived of the Iowa, which had joined 
Schley, the efTiciency of Samj^son's division was 
sensibly diminished, and it was not until May 28, 
when the Oregon, which had reached Key AVest, 
had coaled, that it became tactically equal to the 
task of fighting and destroying such a swift foe 
as we believed Cervera's ships to be. But be- 
tween May 19 and May 28 the only vessels mider 
Sampson's command which were capable of main- 
taining a running fight with the Spanish division 
were his flagship, the New York, and the Indiana. 
The sluggish monitors could not hope to keep 
within range of the enemy unless, as Cervera 
steamed by, they succeeded in disabhng some of 
his vessels. The plans of battle issued by Samp- 
son were calculated to keep the Spaniards Avithin 
fighting range of the monitors as long as possible. 
From what we know now of the condition of the 
hostile fleet, it is not nnhkely that the New York 
and the Indiana could, without assistance, have 



254 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

destroyed or seriously crippled the Spanish squad- 
ron; and the same result could perhaps have been 
achieved by the Oregon alone. But the estimate 
of efficiency which we placed upon the Spanish 
cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers made ques- 
tionable the abiUty of the Oregon or of the Indi- 
ana and ISTew York to annihilate them. 

Sampson placed his squadron in the Bahama 
Channel so as to intercept Cervera in case he 
eluded Schley and attempted to make Havana 
via the Windward Passage ; and he subsequently 
endeavored to obey the department's instruction 
to cover that port from the westward also, in 
order to bring the Spaniards to action should they 
pass Schley off Cienfuegos and steam through 
the Yucatan Channel. Ko one better than Samp- 
son understood the difficulties and perplexities 
of the commander of our squadron directed to 
remain off Havana. Yet he generously chose 
that station, though he had been authorized 
by the department to proceed to Cienfuegos, 
where it was believed the enemy would seek 
refuge. 

Promptness had been displayed by Rear- Ad- 
miral Schley in making the voyage to Key West, 
and there was equal promptness in the coaling of 
his vessels upon arrival — both auguries of what 
should have been his future swiftness of move- 




l'l,Mt,._'iiipli by liMchrnch ,t Hr... 

KEAK-ADMIKAL Wl.NFlKIJ* S(( > 1 T .s( IlLKV 
In coiuinaiid of the Flyiiii; S.iuaJroii ^lu^ill^f the war 



i 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET '2r,r> 

ment in onler to insure the early overtakin*^ of 
Cervera. 

Upon his arrival, Schley had been instructed, 
through the commandant of the naval base, to 
sail for Havana to support the blockade until the 
appearance of the naval force attached to Samp- 
son's command. Before this order could be 
observed, Rear-Admiral Sampson directed him 
to " proceed with dispatch (utmost) off Cienfue- 
gos." Sampson also directed him to establish, 
" with the least possible dela}'," a blockade '' as 
close as possible." The Flying Squadron sailed 
at eight o'clock on the morning of May 19, and 
arrived and established a blockade off Cienfue- 
gos at seven o'clock on the morning of May 22, 
requiring almost three da^s to cover this dis- 
tance. The Iowa and the Dupont sailed in com- 
pany from Key West at 11.20 of the morning of 
May 20, tAventy-seven hours after the dej^arture 
of the Flying Squadron, and proceeded via Ha- 
vana. The Dupont arrived at Cienfuegos early 
in the morning, and the Iowa at 1.30 p. m. of 
May 22. The battle-ship thus made the voyage 
in two hours over two days, and reached its 
destination only six and a half hours after Schley. 
This absence of dispatch on the part of Schley 
was certainly contrar}^ to his instructions, and 
might have had unfortunate results. Had Cer- 



256 THE NEW AMERICAN NA\Tr 

vera at Curasao selected Cienfiiegos as his 
destination, he could, proceeding with the same 
speed he employed to reach Santiago, have en- 
tered the former port some hours before Schley 
arrived. 

Thirty miles from Key West, the Flying 
Squadron sighted the Marblehead and Eagle, 
which formed a division under the command of 
Captam Bowman H. McCalla. Schley knew that 
McCalla had been at Cienfuegos, but did not 
attempt to commiuiicate with him, and INIcCalla, 
believing the Flying Squadron bound for the Car- 
ibbean Sea, did not, except through the Eagle, 
seek to acquaint the commodore with the situ- 
ation at the Cuban port. All this was to have 
decidedly serious consequences, which might, 
under certain circumstances, have proved disas- 
trous. That the failure to stop the Marblehead 
was not because of any desire to ]3roceed " with 
disj)atch (utmost) " is shown by the fact that 
when the commodore subsequently spoke the 
Cincinnati, he stopped his squadron, and called 
Captain Colby M. Chester, commanding the 
cruiser, on board his flagship, though the latter 
had no information of special importance to com- 
municate. 

Between thirty and forty-five miles from Cien- 
fuegos Schley reports, and he is corroborated by 



THE COMING OF CERVERA'S FLEET 257 

one of the officers of the Brooklyn, tliat he heard 
guns fired with the cadence of a sahite. As 
Cienfiiegos had been repoiled as the destination 
of the enemy's division, Schley regarded the guns 
as the welcome of Si)anish forts and ships to the 
incoming Si)anish men-of-war, and this impres- 
sion was strengthened when he subsequently 
sighted smoke in the harbor. 

At dawTi of May 19, the Spanish squadron 
entered Santiago de Cuba. " By a miracle," to 
again quote Captain Concas, " it arrived there 
intact, and there was nothing to be done but to 
suffer the consequences of its dej^arture [from 
Cape Yerde]." Through spies in Havana the 
efficient chief signal officer of the army, Briga- 
dier-General A. "\y. Greely, learned on the same 
day that the Spanish division was "probably " at 
Santiago. The Minneapolis, St. Paul, St. Louis, 
Harvard, and Yale were at once instructed by 
cable to proceed off Santiago, to watch carefully 
and to keep in commmiication with the Spanish 
division, reporting as often as possible to the 
department. These orders were received by all 
the ships except the St. Louis, Captain Goodrich 
commanding, the whereabouts of which was un- 
known, and the failure to reach her was doubly 
annoymg in view of the fact that she had only 
recently come from Santiago and Guantanamo, 



258 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

where she had done very gallant service in cut- 
ting cables, and was consequently familiar with 
conditions at both those ports. 

"While the information received in Washington 
concerning Cervera's presence in Santiago was 
not absolutely trustworthy, it was sufficiently 
reliable to justify the taking of risk, and it was 
determined to order Schley to Santiago. There 
were some disposed to criticise this decision, but 
a choice had to be made between Cienfuegos and 
Santiago, and, regrettable as would have been 
the entrance of the Spanish ships into the former 
port, it was believed that Schley would be able 
to move swiftly and engage the enemy's fleet if 
it tried to make Cienfuegos from Santiago, or to 
blockade it in the latter harbor in case of its fail- 
ure to escape from it before our ships arrived. 
Sampson was therefore informed that the re- 
port of Cervera's arrival at Santiago " might 
very well be correct," and he was strongly advised 
"to send word immediately by the Iowa to 
Schley to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba 
with his whole command, leaving one small vessel 
off Cienfuegos." Sampson received this mes- 
sage early in the morning of May 20, and at once 
prepared instructions to Schley. Sampson also 
sent by the Iowa a memorandum from Comman- 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 259 

derMcCalla, descril)ing a <2^ood landing-place for 
troops at Savanilla Point, a short distance from 
Cienfuegos. This memorandum stated that the 
Cuban insurgents had perfect knowledge of what 
was going on inside the city, and gave infonna- 
tion of the Spanish fortifications defending the 
place. 

These dispatches were delivered to Commo- 
dore Schley immediately after the arrival of the 
Iowa and Dupont. Casting, as they did, a doubt 
upon the presence of the Spanish shi23s in Cien- 
fuegos, his efforts should have been redoubled to 
settle beyond question whether the enemy were 
in that port. On May 22 he stood in toward the 
entrance of the harbor, and by means of glasses 
attempted to ascertain whether the Spanish ships 
were inside. He also sent a lookout aloft. But 
the harbor of Cienfuegos is so formed that it is 
impossible to examine it thoroughly from the sea, 
and he gained no information of value. 

Sampson received corroboration of the report 
of Cervera's presence in Santiago, and at three 
o'clock on the morning of May 21 prepared new 
instructions to Schley, which were sent by the 
Marblehead. In this communication Schley was 
informed that the Spanish squadron was probably 
at Santiago de Cuba. " If you are satisfied that 
they are not at Cienfuegos," Sampson wrote, 



260 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

"proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to 
Santiago de Cuba, and, if the enemy is there, 
blockade him in port." Concerned about the 
early delivery of the orders sent by the Marble- 
head, Sampson ordered the gunboat Hawk to 
convey a duplicate to Schley, and accompanied 
it by a memorandum which left no doubt of 
the presence of Cervera at Santiago. "It is 
thought that the inclosed instructions will reach 
you by 2 o'clock A. m. May 23," Sampson said. 
" This will enable you to leave before daylight 
(regarded very important), so that your direc- 
tion may not be noticed, and be at Santiago A. m. 
May 24." 

It is now necessary to shift the scene to Schley 
at Cienfuegos. On the night of May 22 he no- 
ticed lights on shore, arranged in line and having 
the appearance of signals. These lights appeared 
agam on the night of May 23. They were noticed 
by other officers of his command, and caused 
some speculation. ]N"othing wrs done to ascertain 
what they indicated, and no attempt was made 
to send a boat to the shore t( ^.ommunicate with 
the msurgents, who, as the M alia memorandiun 
stated, were in the vicinity Cienfuegos. In 
view of this memorandum, it *s surprismg that 
Commodore Schley, in official commmiications, 
should have stated that he " had no knowledge 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 2G1 

that there Avere any iiisiir^erits alioiit Cieiifuep^OR 
who were friendly to us until the Marblehead ar- 
rived on the 24th." Schley claims that he did not 
receive the McCalla memorandum by the Iowa 
or Dupont, though he admits it reached him at 
8.15 A.M. May 23, by the Hawk. The Hawk 
delivered her dispatches before the ^Marblehead 
arrived. Li order to save time, Sampson accom- 
panied the Hawk some eighteen miles from Key 
West, writing, as his flagship and the dispatch- 
boat sped along, the instruction urgently direct- 
ing Schley to hasten to Santiago. Imperative as 
w^as this instruction, the only thing done on May 
23 to ascertain whether the Spanish ships were 
within the harbor of Cienfuegos was to permit 
the entrance of the British steamer Adula, which 
carried authenticated papers from a United States 
consul authorizing her to receive as passengers 
any persons w^ho desired to leave Cienfuegos. 
Her commander informed Schley that he had 
passed the lights j^f seven ships, which he took 
to be Spanish, ne%- Jamaica, on May 18, and that 
a war bulletin pu> ^fehed at Kingston announced 
the arrival of Cer v^ga's fleet at Santiago on May 
19, and its depai ye from that point on the fol- 
lowing day. Frq { the refugees on board when 
the Adula should. <;ome out, Schley expected to 
get mformation as to whether or not the Span- 



262 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

ish shij)S were in the harbor, but she was not 
permitted to leave while he was in sight. 

The Marblehead, accompanied by the anxihary 
gunboats Vixen and Eagle, reached Cienfuegos 
on May 24 and delivered dispatches; and Cap- 
tain McCalla of the Marblehead told Commo- 
dore Schley that the Spanish force was reported 
at Santiago. McCalla asked Schley if he had 
seen any hghts on shore, to which Schley replied 
in the affirmative, and McCalla then stated that 
they were signals which he had arranged with 
the insurgents before his departure from Cien- 
fuegos. The mistake of Schley in failing to speak 
McCalla thirty miles from Key West, when he 
knew that that officer had been off Cienfuegos, 
must have been apparent to him then. Receiv- 
ing permission from Schley, McCalla, in the Mar- 
blehead and accompanied by the Eagle, went 
to Savanilla Point. He promptly learned from 
insiu-gents there that Cervera was not in the 
harbor of Cienfuegos, and he sent the Eagle 
post-haste to convey tliis information to the com- 
modore. 

Schley received the report of Commander 
McCalla between three and four o'clock on the 
afternoon of May 24. He immediately prepared 
dispatches, which were forwarded to the com- 
mander-in-chief and to the commandant of the 




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SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 2G3 

naval l)ase at Key AVcst. In liis mL'Ssao;(. U) tlie 
department he stated he had ascerta'nu'd from 
insurg-ents that the Spanish fleet was not in 
Cienfuegos, and added that, as it was not prac- 
ticable to coal the Texas from the collier at 
Cienfuegos on account of the swell, he would 
" proceed to-morrow^ for Santiago de Cuba." 
This delay was hardly in accord with the de- 
mands of the situation, or with the instructions 
he had received by the Hawk on the 23d and 
the Marblehead on the 24th. " Spanish squad- 
ron probaljly Santiago de Cuba," the dispatch by 
the Marblehead read. "... If you are satisfied 
that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all 
dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, 
and, if the enemy is there, blockade him in 
port." The instruction by the Hawk was ex- 
plicit, imjDcrative. Schley, however, reconsid- 
ered his determination to wait until the morrow. 
He left for Santiago about 7.45 in the evening 
of May 24. 

Such W' as the course of events at Cienfuegos. 
We know it now, when all the facts have come 
to light through the investigation made by the 
now famous Schley Court of Inquiry in 1901. 
We did not know it then. Then the delay was 
inex^^licable, and the failure to ascertain without 
loss of time whether Cervera was at Cienfuegos 



264 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

was a matter of the keenest anxiety in Wash- 
ington. Each day's information, after the first 
report that Cervera was probably at Santiago, 
increased the probabiHty of his presence there, 
and the certainty that, if not ah-eady coaled and 
ready to sail, he was straining every nerve to 
get in condition to leave his port of refuge be- 
fore we could assemble an overwhelming force 
before it. For us, in the department, it was a 
time of nervousness, but of hope allied with 
apprehension. Cervera's escape would have been 
a distinct blow to our prestige. "We would have 
overhauled hun in the end, but his first move 
would have been successful, and Em-ope would 
have hailed it as an American defeat. 

This was the feeling of the department on 
May 25, when it received a disj^atch from Schley, 
filed at the cable station at Mole St. Nicholas, 
Haiti, on the same day. This message had been 
brought by the Harvard, to which it had been 
given by the Scorpion, and had been sent by 
Schley in obedience to Sampson's instructions 
to communicate with the scouts off Santiago. 
Schley's disj^atch contained information of events 
of May 21 and 22. He was imable to state 
whether the Spanish fleet was m Cienfuegos or 
not, and he anticipated difficulty in coaling his 
ships from the collier Merrimac, laden with 4500 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 205 

tons of coal, wliich liad been sent to liiin l)y 
Sampson. Commodore Kemey at Key AVest re- 
ceived on INIay 2G and immediately tranKinitted 
to the department Schley's message of May 24, 
stating that he had learned that the Spanish 
fleet was not at Cienfnegos and that he would 
move eastward on May 25. " On account of 
want of coal," Schley added, " I cannot jjlock- 
ade." 

The department was decidedly puzzled ])y this 
second dispatch. Why had Schley not obeyed 
the instruction sent to him by Sampson under 
date of May 21 to proceed to Santiago ? AVhy, 
after having learned that the enemy was not in 
Cienfnegos, did he not move immediately upon 
Santiago instead of Avaiting until the morrow ? 
Effort was made but it was impossible to oljtain 
additional information of Schley's purpose. Be- 
sides the dispatches to the department, Schley 
had cabled to Sampson a duplicate of his mes- 
sage sent by the Harvard to the Secretary of 
the ^avy, and, on May 26, the commander-in- 
chief received from him two letters dated May 
23. In one of his letters Schley stated, '" Am 
not satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not at 
Cienfnegos. The large amount of smoke seen 
in the harbor would indicate the presence of a 
number of vessels, and under such circumstances 



266 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase 
up a probability at Santiago de Cuba reported 
via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. I shall there- 
fore remain off this port with this squadron, 
availing myself of every opportimity for coaling 
and keeping it ready for any emergency." The 
second letter from Schley closed: " I think I have 
them here almost to a certainty." Commodore 
Schley's belief was not that of his subordinates. 
Lieutenant John Hood, commanding the Hawk, 
who brought these commmiications from him, 
advised the commander-in-chief that a good 
number of officers "do not believe the Span- 
iards are there at all, although they can only 
surmise." It was at 1 p. m. of May 27 that 
Sampson, who was in St. Nicholas Channel, re- 
ceived Schley's dispatch of May 2-4 in regard to 
the establishment of the fact that the Spaniards 
were not in Cienfuegos and of his purpose to 
sail on May 25 for Santiago. 

These dispatches caused anxiety to the de- 
partment and Sampson. Immediately after the 
receipt of the message brought by the Harvard, 
the department cabled to the commanding officer 
of that vessel, under date of May 25, directing 
him to proceed at once and inform Schley and 
also the senior officer of the scouts off Santiago 
that the information at hand mdicated that the 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 207 

Spanish division was still at Santiago. Schley 
was to be informed that the department looked 
to hhn "to ascertain facts and that the enemy, if 
therein, does not leave without a decisive action." 
lie was advised that Cubans reported landing- 
places five or six miles west from the mouth of 
the harbor, at which insurgents would probably 
be found, and that from the heights sun-ounding 
the harbor every vessel in port could be seen. To 
relieve his anxiety concerning coal, he was in- 
formed that a fresh supj^ly woidd be sent to ]Mole 
St. Nicholas, and it was suggested that his squad- 
ron and the Harvard coidd coal from the collier 
Merrimac to the leeward of CajDC Cruz, in Go- 
naives Channel, or at Mole St. Nicholas. Samp- 
son, ignorant of this action of the department, 
also acted. On the morning of May 27, he sent 
the Wasp, via Cape San Antonio, to Cienf uegos, 
with instructions to inform Schley that " every 
report, and particularly daily confidential reports, 
received from Havana, up until May 25, state 
that the Spanish squadron had been at Santiago 
since May 19." The Flying Squadron was or- 
dered to proceed with all possible dispatch to 
Santiago and establish a blockade, unless upon 
arrival positive information were obtained of 
the departure of the Spanish ships, in which 
event it was to follow in pursuit. This dispatch 



268 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

by the Wasp did not reach Schley at Cienfiie- 
gos. 

Had Schley been at Cienf uegos at the time the 
"Wasp arrived, he could have reached Santiago 
before Sampson could have done so ; the latter, 
therefore, delayed his squadron in St. Nicholas 
Channel. Sampson determined personally to pro- 
ceed to Key West, coal, and, with the authority 
of the department, sail for Santiago. Before his 
arrival at the naval base he communicated to 
Captain W. M. Folger, commanding the cruiser 
Kew Orleans, an instruction to convoy the collier 
Sterhng through the Bahama Chamiel, and then, 
leaving her, to go with all dispatch to Santiago. 
" You will communicate with Commodore Schley," 
Captain Folger was instructed, " and direct him 
to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all haz- 
ards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in 
that port." It was suggested to Schley that, to 
prevent the escape of the enemy's division, the 
Sterling should be sunk across the narrowest part 
of the channel leading into the harbor. " Liform 
Commodore Schley," Sampson added, " that the 
details of this plan are left to his judgment. In 
the mean time he must exercise the utmost care 
that none of the vessels already in port are al- 
lowed to escape, and say to the commodore that 
I have the utmost confidence in his ability to carry 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 2G9 

this plan to a successful conclusion, and cai-ncstly 
wish hiin good luck." The idea of sinking a ves- 
sel across the entrance of Santiago de Culxi liad 
l)een considered by the IN'aval War Board and 
had received its approval. AVith the mouth of 
the harl)or closed, the escape of Cervera would 
have been impossible, and the capture of his 
ships could have been effected by the army, a 
division of which the War Department was at 
the time preparing to embark. 

The j^s^avy Department believed with Sampson 
that on May 24 the Flying Squadron had arrived 
off Santiago. But on May 26 we learned that 
not imtil May 24, three days after May 21, the 
date reported by Schley as that of his arrival off 
Cienfuegos, though May 22 was the date upon 
which he estabhshed a blockade, had the com- 
modore finally and definitely ascertained that the 
Spanish division was not in that port, and this 
notwithstanding the receipt of information from 
Washington and the commander-in-chief indi- 
cating it was at Santiago. And when satisfied 
Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, he cabled that he 
would sail for Santiago, not immediately, as his 
instructions required, but the next day, and that, 
on account of the short coal supply of his shijxs, 
he could not blockade Santiago ! There was no 
fast scout available, but on the chance of one 



270 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

soon touching at Mole St. IS^icholas, the depart- 
ment cabled on May 27 to that pomt for delivery 
to the next American man-of-war to arrive : — 

Proceed immediately and deliver following to Schley : 
The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know posi- 
tively whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba 
harbor, as, if so, immediate movement agamst it and 
the town will be made by the navy and division of about 
10,000 United States troops, which are ready to embark. 
You must surmount difficulty regarding coaling by your 
own ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, 
and the department relies upon you to give quickly infor- 
mation as to Cervera's presence, and to be all ready for 
concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been 
ordered to St. Nicholas Mole, and your ships might coal 
singly there, or in Gonaives Channel, or to leeward of 
Cape Cruz, Sampson will convoy the army transports, 
probably coming around by the Windward Passage. 
Yankee will join you and the Minneapohs will go north. 
Cervera must not be allowed to escape. Long. 

That the apprehension of the Kavy Depart- 
ment and the commander-in-chief regarding the 
prospective flight of the Spanish division from 
Santiago de Cuba was well founded is demon- 
strated by the official dispatches of Admiral 
Cervera, which were published after the war. 
On May 23 he was advised that twelve hostile 
ships were off Cienfuegos and that the Indiana, 
'New York, and other vessels had gone from 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 271 

Havana to the windward, k-aving only i'our gun- 
boats on the blockade of that port. Later in thi- 
same day Cervera received secret information of 
the positions of our ships. He determined to sail 
from Santiago at daybreak the following morning 
for San Juan, Porto Kico, but it was decided at 
a subsequent meeting of the commander-in-chief 
and his captains that, " owing to the location of 
the hostile forces and their number and strength, 
it is considered impossible to carry out said i)lan." 
Contributory to this decision was the fact that 
four American ships lay off the harbor, the 
strength of which Cervera did not know, but 
which we knew to be simply vulnerable scouts. 
Having defective instruments and inadequate 
resources Cervera lost heart, and on May 23 he 
cabled to Madrid that his division was blockaded. 
Yet Schley had not arrived. Cervera felt, how- 
ever, he could hope to gain little by leaving San- 
tiago. " If another opportunity presents itself," 
he wrote on May 25, " I intend to try and take 
advantage of it, but as I cannot hope with these 
scant forces to attempt any definite operations, 
it will only be a matter of changing this harbor 
for another where we would also be blockaded." 
On May 26 Cervera again convened his captains, 
and it was unanimously decided that the squad- 
ron should sail in the afternoon for San Juan. 



272 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

In the mean time three hostile ships were sighted, 
and a pilot expressed the opinion that in going 
out the Colon might sustain injm-y on accoimt of 
her draft by striking a flat rock in the channel. 
Five of Cervera's captains voted against depar- 
ture; two urged that they should immediately 
sail. Cervera ajjproved the opinion of the ma- 
jority, because he did not consider the circum- 
stances so extreme as to make it necessary to risk 
the loss of one of his ships. 

Cervera's hesitation was unknown to the de- 
jDartment and to our ofiicers. We believed him 
feverishly working to repair and coal his ships, 
as indeed he was. The coal supply of our scouts 
off Santiago was running low. If Schley arrived 
off that port and failed to stay, there was danger, 
it was believed, that the United States would be 
without a vessel in its vicinity to make report 
of Cervera's departure. Consequently we would 
be absolutely in ignorance as to the direction he 
had taken, and the problem of search would have 
to be worked out all over again. 

It is ad\dsable now to follow Schley again. 
He had been instructed by order of May 21 to 
"proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to 
Santiago de Cuba." On the same day Sampson 
had advised him to leave Cienfuegos before day- 
light May 23, so that he could arrive at Santi- 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 273 

ago on the morning of May 24. Leaving the 
gunboat Castine to maintain tlie l^iookade at 
Cienfuegos, Schley sailed from that i)oint al)out 
8 p. M. of May 24, his heavy ships in column 
of vessels, with the lighter ships on his flanks. 
Heavy rolling caused the forward compartment 
of the gmiboat Eagle to fill with water, causing 
reduction of her speed, and the weather on the 
following day, May 25, was bad. In a battle 
with the Spanish division the little Eagle would 
have been of no value, and Commodore Schley, 
in \^ew of the paramomit necessity of getting in 
contact with the Spanish fleet, should have left her 
to take care of herself and have gone on with 
his fighting ships. Instead, he reduced the speed 
of the squadron in order to permit the Eagle to 
keep up with it. On the following day, when 
the weather had moderated, and the Eagle's com- 
partments had been freed from water, he ordered 
her to Jamaica. 

The orders of Schley were to go to Santi- 
ago de Cuba. He failed to obey them promptly. 
At 5.30 p. M. of May 26 he was twenty-two 
miles to the southward of the port named in his 
instructions. The distance Sampson expected 
Schley to cover wnthin thirty hours actually 
occupied more than forty-five hours, and even 
then the Flying Squadron was not at Santiago. 



274 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

The scouts Minneapolis, Yale, and St. Paul 
joined Schley at this time, and a few minutes 
later the commodore was informed that an acci- 
dent had occurred to a part of the engine of the 
collier Merrimac. Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, 
who commanded the St. Paul, informed Schley 
that the scouts knew nothing positively or abso- 
lutely about the movements of the Spanish fleet, 
and says he recited certain events to show 
there was a probabiUty that Cervera was in San- 
tiago at the time. But, whether mmecessarily 
uneasy about the coal supply of his vessels, or 
because of the accident sustained by the Merri- 
mac which increased the difficulty of coaling 
though the conditions of wind, sea, and weather 
were sufficiently favorable for that operation, or 
for what inexphcable reason, — inexplicable to 
his own officers at the time as well as to every- 
body else since, — Schley, at 7.45 p. m. May 26, 
signaled to his squadron: "Destination, Key 
West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Chan- 
nel, as soon as collier is ready; speed nine 
knots." The Yale took the Merrimac in tow, 
and the squadron actually turned back from its 
almost reached goal and proceeded westward 
mitil 11.15 p. M., when, the tow-lines having 
parted, it stopped and drifted until 3.40 p. m. of 
May 27. While the squadi-on was lying at the 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 275 

drift of wind and current, the Harvard aiiivcd 
at 0.30 A. M. of May 27, and dclivcivd tliu de- 
partment's disi)atcli above quoted, stating- tliat 
all indications pointed to the presence of the 
Spanish ships in Santiago do Cuba, wliicli he 
was directed to confirm if true. Schley answered 
this message three hours later by a cablegi-am 
which caused consternation when it reached the 
department on May 28. This message may be 
classed as one of the most infelicitous in history, 
and it is worth quoting : — 

Merriraac's engine is tlisabled, and she is helpless ; am 
obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been abso- 
lutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, and 
Brooklyn from collier, 0"\^^ng to very rough seas and 
boisterous weather since leaving Key "West. Brooklyn is 
only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to 
reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in 
present state of coal account of the squadron. Not pos- 
sible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer owing to 
southwest winds. Harvard just reports to me she has 
only coal enough to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed 
to Port Royal. Also reports only small vessels could coal 
at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti. ^Minneapolis has only coal 
enough to reach Key West, and same of Yale, which will 
tow Merrimac. It is to be regretted that the department's 
orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven 
to that end. I am forced to return to Key West, via 
Yucatan Passage, for coal. Can ascertain nothing certain 
concerning enemy. Was obhged to send Eagle to Port An- 
tonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only t^s•enty-seven 



276 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

tons of coal on board. Will leave St. Paul here. Will re- 
quire 9500 tons of coal at Key West. 

I remember well the receipt of this dispatch. 
I was with President McKinley at the army re- 
view at Camp Alger. His face fell when I showed 
it to him. It was incomprehensible — the first 
flinching of the campaign. Tt was the darkest 
day of the war. It was the lack, not of personal 
courage, but of that unswerving steadiness of 
pilrpose and nerve which is the essence of su- 
preme command, and of which Farragut is an 
example. Undoubtedly it is a fair criticism on 
the department that Schley was not reheved at 
once and an inquiry ordered. But it was not 
then known what his situation was, or that the 
situation had not been as stated in his excusatory 
telegram, and it was taken for granted that the 
commander-in-chief, Sampson, who was near 
at hand, would take proper action, which, had he 
been senior in service, he would probably have 
done, and not doing which he too failed to do 
his duty. 

The situation of his command appeared at the 
Schley Court of Inquiry in 1901 not to have been 
as Schley reported it. At noon on May 27 his 
vessels had coal enough to have remained on 
blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba — the Brook- 
lyn for twenty-six days, the Iowa for sixteen 



* 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 277 

days, the Massachusetts for twenty days, the 
Texas for ten days, the ^farljleliead for five days, 
and tlie Yixen for twenty-three days, and then 
they would have had siifiicient fuel to reach 
Gonaives or Cape Cruz, where they could have 
refilled their biuikers from the Merrimac which 
contained 4350 tons of coal. The amount of coal 
required to completely supply these ships was 
2750 tons. Schley must have knoAMi when he 
sent his dispatch that the Iowa, Castine, and 
Dupont had coaled at Cienfuegos on ^lay 23, 
and the Massachusetts and Castine on May 24. 
Permission had been asked by the Texas on May 
23 to coal, but she was refused, and ordered to 
coal on the following day. This order was sub- 
sequently revoked. Indeed, the Texas and Mar- 
blehead did actually coal from the Merrimac at 
sea off Santiago on the evening of May 27 and 
the morning of May 28; and the Massachusetts 
and Vixen on May 29, the Brooklyn and Iowa 
on May 30, and the Brooklyn, Texas, and Mar- 
blehead on May 31. Thus there were but two 
days — the 25th and the 26th — when no coal was 
transferred from the collier to the men-of-war, 
and the failure to take fuel on these days was not 
due wholly to rough seas and boisterous weather 
or to the helplessness of the Merrimac, but to the 
fact that the squadron was imder way. Captain 



278 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

McCalla, when at Cienfuegos, had informed 
Commodore Schley that coahng operations could 
be conducted in the vicinity of Cape Cruz, and 
that no difficulty would be experienced in coaling 
on the south side of the northern promontory of 
Haiti. Yet, in spite of the fact that there was 
ample coal in the bunkers of his fighting ships, 
that attached to his command was a collier carry- 
ing an abundant supply of fuel, that the weather 
was not too rough for coaling his vessels, and, 
finally, that near by there were points sheltered 
from the wind at which coaling could be con- 
ducted with safety, Schley cabled the depart- 
ment : — 

It is to be regretted that the department's orders can- 
not be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that 
end. 

Another phase of Schley's action which seri- 
ously concerned the department was his state- 
ment that the Harvard would jjroceed to Port 
Royal, the Minneapolis to Key West, and that 
the Yale would accompany him, leaving only the 
St. Paul, with a depleted coal supply, off Santi- 
ago. "We did not know until later that for 
nearly twenty-four hours — that is, from 6 p. m. 
May 26 to 5 p. m. May 27 — not a scout was off 
the harbor of Santiago. But we did know that 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 279 

the St. Paul, if the Spanish lleet attemjjted to 
escape, could not keep touch with it or make 
frequent repoi-ts to the department, and our plan 
of constantly following Cervera was in danger of 
being frustrated by the orders of the commander 
of the Flying Squadron. 

Schley had been instructed that the department 
was looking to him to ascertain whether the 
Spanish division was at Santiago. He excuses 
his action in deliberately turning his ships away 
from that port and starting back for Key West 
on the ground that Captain Sigsbee told him he 
had not seen the enemy, and that a pilot, whom 
Captain Sigsbee and Schley himself did not at 
first fully trust, expressed the opinion that the 
Spanish ships could not enter the harbor because 
of their length. Captain Sigsbee told Schley 
that he had captured a collier bound for Santiago 
with coal for Cervera, and this certamly indicated 
that, if the Spanish division were not at Santiago 
that port was its destination. Whatever the 
opinions expressed by the commander of the 
scout and by the pilot, however, they were based 
upon negative information, and Schley's first 
duty was to establish beyond the shadow of a 
doubt whether Cervera was in the harbor. 

The squadron, again, strange to say, resumed 
its retrograde westward course at 3.40 p. m. of 



280 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

May 27, and steamed thirty-three miles, stopping 
once more at 7.15 p.m., when the Texas went 
alongside of the Merrimac and coaled. The 
squadron again drifted mitil 1 p. m. of May 28, 
when Schley signaled to the fleet to turn again 
and proceed to Santiago. He arrived at a point 
seven miles south of the harbor at 6 p. m. May 
28, and established a blockade. Had he obeyed 
the orders of Sampson, he would have reached 
that point on the morning of May 24. The re- 
sult of his vacillation and lack of push was that 
Cervera had had several days in which to coal 
and make repairs to the engines of his ships. 
In the early morning of May 29, the day following 
Schley's arrival, he discovered the Colon and 
Teresa and two torpedo-boat destroyers moored 
inside of the Moro. 

Schley's arrival at Santiago and his discovery 
of the Spanish vessels were not known in Wash- 
ington until late in the evening of May 29. The 
receipt of his dispatch announcmg his purpose 
to go to Key West, imposed upon the department 
the necessity of taking action which would repair 
the grievous, and it might be the disastrous, mis- 
take he had made. Following the receipt of his 
message, the department cabled to the Harvard 
for dehvery to Schley, " as soon as possible : ut- 
most m^gency," an instruction to remain off San- 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 281 

tiago unless it were unsafe to do so or unless the 
Spanish division were not there. To Kear-Admi- 
ral Sampson a dispatch was sent giving the 
contents of Schley's cable, and asking him liow 
soon after arrival of Schley at Key West could 
he reach Santiago with the Xew York and Oi-e- 
gon, Indiana, and some lighter vessels, and how 
long could he blockade that port. Sampson 
promptly replied : — 

Answering the first question, three days. I can block- 
ade indefinitely. Think that I can occupy Guantanamo. 
Would like to start at once with New York and Oregon. 
Do not quite understand as to the necessity of awaiting 
arrival of Schley, but I would propose meeting and turn- 
ing back the principal part of the force under his com- 
mand. 

Before the New York and Oregon could leave 
Key West, another dispatch came from Schley 
saying that he would hold on. But though he 
also reported that he had sighted only four of 
the Spanish ships, it was believed that the naval 
base at Key West could be safely left unde- 
fended, and that the battleship Indiana and the 
monitor could prevent the remaining Spanish 
ships, if they were not at Santiago, from entering 
Havana. Schley was advised that Sampson was 
coming, and he was urged to locate the missing 
armored cruisers. Though the Colon and other 



282 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

vessels of the Spanish squadron were discovered 
lying in the entrance of the harbor on the morn- 
ing of May 29, it was not nntil 1.30 p. m. of May 
31 that an attempt was made to capture or de- 
stroy them. The department's orders to the com- 
mander-in-chief, a copy of which had been fur- 
nished to Schley, but which he denies having 
received, authorized him to expose his ships to 
the heaviest gmis of land batteries if there were 
Spanish vessels of sufficient mihtary importance 
protected by these guns to make an attack advis- 
able. Instead of approaching within effective 
range of the enemy, Schley signaled that the 
Massachusetts, Iowa, and T^ew Orleans should 
open fire at a range of 7000 yards, and this range 
increased until it was 11,000 yards. At this 
great distance, our fire, as well as the return fire 
of the Spanish vessels and batteries, was ineffect- 
ive. The chance of hitting the enemy was still 
further diminished by the speed — ten knots — of 
the American men-of-war and the brief time — 
four minutes — each had to sight and fire its 
gims at the targets, partially protected by the 
bold headlands of the harbor. 

Sampson arrived off Santiago at 6 A. m. on the 
morning of June 1. " The importance of abso- 
lutely preventing departure of Spanish squadron 
of paramount importance," he telegraphed to the 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 283 

department from Key West on May 28, '' and 
demands tlie prompt and eflieient use of every 
means." Tlie disaster wliich Cervera had j)re- 
dicted as far back as 1807 was loomin<^ porten- 
tously upon the Spanish horizon. Upon arrival 
at Santiago, Sampson estal)lishcd a Jjlockade so 
strict that the Spanish sentinels could hear the 
cries of the watch on the American ships. Cer- 
vera declared that, with the harbor entrance 
blockaded as it was during that fateful month of 
Jmie, it was disaster to leave. " It was abso- 
lutely impossible to go out at night," he wrote 
after the war, " because in this narrow channel, 
illmninated by a dazzling light, we could not 
have followed the channel and would have lost 
the ships, some by running aground, others by 
colliding with their own companions. But, even 
supposing that we had succeeded in going out, 
before the first ship was outside we should have 
been seen and covered from the very first with 
the concentrated fire of the whole squadron." 

It is easy, in the light of the foregoing facts, 
to see the propriety of the opinion of the Schley 
Court of Inquiry, which upon the points testified 
to was unanimous, except as not very materially 
modified in one or two minor details by Admiral 
Dewey in the memorandum which he submitted 
with that opinion. Tliis modification, as will be 



284 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

seen, relates to the degree of dispatch with which 
the passage from Key West to a point twenty- 
two miles south of Santiago was made, to the 
steamer Adula, and to the blockades of Cien- 
fuegos and Santiago. Li all other respects the 
opinion of the court stands on the record as 
unanimous. 

The opinion of the court is as follows : — 

Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squad- 
ron, should have proceeded with the utmost dispatch off 
Cienfuegos, and should have maintained a close blockade 
of that port. 

He should have endeavored on May 23, at Cienfuegos, 
to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by 
communicating with the insurgents at the place desig- 
nated in the memorandum deUvered to him at 8.15 a. m. 
of that date. 

He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago 
de Cuba with all dispatch, and should have disposed his 
vessels with a view of interceptmg the enemy in any at- 
tempt to pass the Flying Squadron. 

He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle. 

He should not have made the retrograde turn west- 
ward with his squadron. 

He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Depart- 
ment's order of May 25. 

He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the 
Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago 
Harbor on May 29 and 30. 

He did not do his utmost with the force under his com- 
mand to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels 
of the enemy which he attacked on May 31. 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 285 

By commencing the en^^asement on July 3 with the 
port battery, and turning the Brooklyn around with port 
helm. Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and 
position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the Viz- 
caj^a and Colon. 

The turn of the Brooklyn to starboard was made to 
avoid getting her hito dangerous proximity to the Spanish 
vessels. The turn was made toward the Texas, and 
caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid 
possible collision. 

Admiral Scliley did injustice to Lieutenant-Commander 
A. C. Hodgson in pubUshing only a portion of the corre- 
spondence which passed between them. 

Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the 
events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, 
was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of 
enterprise. 

His official reports regarding the coal supply and the 
coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate 
and misleadmg. 

His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-pos- 
sessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subor- 
dinate officers and men to fight courageously. 

GEORGE DEWEY, 

Admu-al U. S. N,, President, 
SAM. C. LEMLY, 

Judge- Advocate-General, U. S. N,, Judge- Advocate. 

The memorandiun of Admiral Dewey is as 
follows : — 

In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from 
Key "West to Cienfuegos w^as made by the Hjnng Squad- 
ron with all possible dispatch, Commodore Schley having 



286 THE NEW AMERICAN NAVY 

in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as 
much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers. 

The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective. 

Commodore Schley in permittiag the steamer Adula to 
enter the port of Cienfuegos expected to obtain informa- 
tion concerning the Spanish squadi"on from her when she 
came out. 

The passage from Cienfuegos to a poiat about twenty- 
two miles south of Santiago was made with as much dis- 
patch as was possible while keeping the squadron a unit. 

The blockade of Santiago was effective. 

Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squad- 
ron off Santiago when the Spanish Squadron attempted 
to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. He was ui ab- 
solute command, and is entitled to the credit due to such 
commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted 

in the total destruction of the Spanish ships. 

GEORGE DEWEY, 

Admiral, U. S. N., President. 

With regard to the final paragraph in the 
above memorandum of Admiral Dewey as to the 
question of command m the later battle of San- 
tiago, July 3, 1898, on which it will be noted 
that the full court in its opinion expressed no 
view, and reference to which more properly be- 
longs to a later chapter, this question not only 
had not been before the court, but the court, 
through Admiral Dewey himself as its spokes- 
man, had emphatically refused to consider it or 
hear evidence with regard to it. That, in face 
of this fact, he should, unHke his associates, pass 



SCHLEY'S MOVEMENT TO SANTIAGO 287 

judgment Tii)on it, has ])ccn a subject of sui-priHc 
and criticism, as it left him in the position of 
agreeing with his associates on all the more im- 
portant matters which were considered by him 
and them, and of then expressing an opinion, 
while his associates jDroperly expressed none, on 
a matter vital to a brother officer on which the 
full court had refused to hear any evidence on 
either side. 

There have been few more notable trials than 
that before this Court of Inquiry. It was com- 
posed of three distinguished naval officers, Ad- 
miral Dewey and Rear- Admirals Benham and 
Ramsay. It lasted from September 12 to the 
middle of December, 1901. Judge- Advocate 
General Lemly, assisted by the solicitor of his 
office, Mr. E. P. Hanna, both of whom made able 
arguments, put in with great care and fairness 
the e\ddence of the witnesses summoned by them, 
while Admiral Schley was represented with dis- 
tinguished animation and force by Hon. Isidor 
Raynor, a leading member of the Baltimore 
bar. The attendance was large and the puljlic 
interest great. An appeal was taken to the 
President, but without changing the result, and 
the finding and opinion of the court thei-efore 
stand as the historical record. 



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